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Thi icial District Court - Canyon County 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-1985-0006810-C Current Judge: Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
User: RANDALL 
Debra A Peterson vs. Myron G Peterson 






















New Case Filed 
For Information Prior To This Date See Case File. 
Old Manual Docket # D 6810 
Reopened Due To Modification 
Motion To Modify - Jack Swafford, Def Atty 
Special Motions, Motionlreopen Divorce No Prior Appearance 
Notice Of Hearing On Def Motion To Modify 
Hearing Scheduled - Motion - Modify (11/13/1997) Bradly S. Ford 
Pitts Response To Def Motion To Modify 
Continued - Motion - Modify 
Hearing Scheduled - Motion-1/2 Day (12/08/1997) Bradly S. Ford 
Order Setting Case (12-8-97) 
Disposition With Hearing - Motion-1/2 Day 
Child Support Worksheet 
PI Response To Def Motion To Modify 
File And Order To Judge Ford 
Order On Defendants Motn To Modify Jdmt 
Case Status Closed But Pending 
Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment 
Affidavit in Support of Motion for Renewed Child Support Judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Further Proceeding 10/27/2011 09:00 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 10/27/2011 
Judge 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
. Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Bradly S. Ford 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Stipulation to Continue Motion for Renewed Child Support Judgment and Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Allow Parties to Brief the Issue 
Hearing result for Further Proceeding scheduled on 10/27/2011 09:00 AM: Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Hearing Held 
Order Contiuing Motion for Renewed Child Support Judgment and Allow Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Parties to Brief the Issue 
Memorandum in support of Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support 
Judgment (fax 
Motion to Dismiss and in the Alternative for Summary Judgment 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
ContinuedlMotion hearing 
Notice Of Hearing 1-3-12 (fax 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 01/03/2012 09:00 AM) 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 01/03/2012 09:00 AM: 
Continued 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 02/17/201202:00 PM) ORAL 
argument only 
Notice Of Hearing 
000001 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Date: 6/17/2013 
Time: 04:29 PM 
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Case: CV-1985-0006810-C Current Judge: Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
User: RANDALL 
Debra A Peterson vs. Myron G Peterson 




















Reply Brief in support of Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Judgment (fax 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 02/17/2012 02:00 PM: Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Hearing Held ORAL argument only 
Hearing resultfor Motion Hearing scheduled on 02/17/201202:00 PM: Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Motion Held ORAL argument only (Mr Keim to Prepare and submit Order) 
Motion to Reconsider (fax Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Notice Of Hearing 4-12-12 (fax Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 04/12/201209:00 AM) Pit Mo to 
reconsider 
Brief in Oppositon to Motion to Reconsider (fax 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 04/12/2012 09:00 AM: 
Continued Pit Mo to reconsider 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 05/10/201209:00 AM) Pit Mo to 
reconsider 
Supplemental Argument (Pltf) 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 05/10/201209:00 AM: 
Continued Pit Mo to reconsider 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 05/24/201209:00 AM) Pit Mo to 
reconsider 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2012 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held Pit Mo to reconsider 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2012 09:00 AM: 
Motion Denied Pit Mo to reconsider/Mr. Keim to prepare the order 
Filing: L2 - Appeal, Magistrate Division to District Court Paid by: Harris, 
Richard L (attorney for Peterson, Debra A) Receipt number: 0041058 
Dated: 6/29/2012 Amount: $53.00 (Check) For: Peterson, Debra A 
(plaintiff) 
Appeal Filed In District Court 
Notice of Appeal 
Order of Assignment - Judge Huskey 
Change Assigned Judge 
Final Order on Motion for Renewed Judgment 
Civil Disposition entered for: Peterson, Myron G, Defendant; Peterson, 
Debra A, Plaintiff. Filing date: 7/10/2012 
Case Status Changed: Reopened 
Appellate Order and Briefing Schedule 
Estimated Cost of Transcript for Appeal 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 56770 Dated 9/18/2012 for 162.50) 
Lodged Transcripts (2-17-12 & 5-24-12 Hearings) 
Notice of Clerk's Lodged Transcript for Appeal 
000002 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Molly J Huskey 
Dayo OOnanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Molly J Huskey 
Molly J Huskey 
Molly J Huskey 
Molly J Huskey 
Molly J Huskey 
Molly J Huskey 
Molly J Huskey 
Date: 6/17/2013 
Time: 04:29 PM 
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Debra A Peterson vs. Myron G Peterson 
User: RANDALL 















Bond Converted (Transaction number 3549 dated 10/26/2012 amount 
110.50) 
Transcript Bond Exonerated (Amount 52.00) 
Transcript Filed (2-17-12 & 5-24-12 Hearings) 
Notice of Clerk's Filed Trancript for Appeal 
Appellant's Brief on Appeal from Magistrate's Court 
Motion for Extension of Time to File Respondent's Brief (fax) 
Order Granting Extension of time 
Respondents Brief 
Appellant's Reply Brief on Appeal for from Magistrate's Court 
Judge 
Molly J Huskey 
Molly J Huskey 
Molly J Huskey 
Molly J Huskey 
Molly J Huskey 
Molly J Huskey 
Molly J Huskey 
Molly J Huskey 
Molly J Huskey 
Order on Motion to File the Renewed Judgment and Order to Remand-Mag Molly J Huskey 
Decision Reversed 
Remanded 
Change Assigned Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 05/16/2013 10:00 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 5-16-13 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid 
by: Idaho State Dept of Health & Welfare (other party) Receipt number: 
0030999 Dated: 5/16/2013 Amount: $.00 (Cash) For: Idaho State Dept of 
Health & Welfare (other party) 
Molly J Huskey 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Notice of Appeal Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 05/16/2013 10:00 AM: Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Hearing Held - proceedings stayed pending appeal to SC - Dep. AG to 
prepare Order 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Notice of Cross-Appeal (Plaintiff Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
by: Harris, Richard L (attorney for Peterson, Debra A) Receipt number: 
0033243 Dated: 5/28/2013 Amount: $109.00 (Check) For: Peterson, 
Debra A (plaintiff) 
000003 
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6 iI II ' " 






FILED C6'''L I 
~A,M. ___ J).M. 
JlH! i~ 41985 
II 
II IN 'n-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUPICIAL DISTRICT 


























Case No. D- G~ID 
COM P L A I N T 
*********-Is* 
Ii :i COMES NOW The abo~e named plaintiff and for her cause of 
22 
H 









That plaintiff is now, and for more than six weeks prior to 
,I 
fi the commencement of this action has been, a bOna fide resident of 
!1 . 
; ~ 




D£ME;iV!$JI .~. P~~.!;>'I':r:~ 
AT7'a~~~y~_,~! L:.~W 
f1!. c;l. :qQJ~k~~'1 
1'1" -w~_".~· _-~ft,~ 





. :,. ?'. ,: .. " 
v' 'rl 
II 
Ill' , '. I ~, . "I . , .. ; .j . , ,t;, " ,~ II 
';~:r .~ T~~ t.p,l ain tl':r:; £ and. ? ef entia:;:!:" w,e.i:e. '.:n;~~t;jred,'~:~:":;i:;~gan ~. ut~ll' on 










Tbat'plai~tiff and defendant have been living separate and 
sinc(3 Pnor a1:)out the 20th day oi.June, 1985. 
IV at 
SliThat twqchilc1ren were born the issue of this marriage, said 
1 : ~ .' 
1Q II chilCl.l;:"pitl}:)$in9: Ian James Peterson, born  , and Erik 
111 BrYc~Pete:pso.n, born . 'rhat the plaintiff and 
18 1ldefend~nt ,~hould be awarded the joint legal cus~ody of said child~ 
~$ . I ren:W~thtp.e actual p!,lYsical custody awarded to the plain tiff sub-
I ' " 
jeqtto, th.e rights of reasonaple visitation in the defendant. 14 
v 15/ 
I! " 
r! ''!'patQ.8£endant' is an able bodied person who is capable of 
Ii p"pv*<iFn~ for the s~ppon. and maintenance of the parties' minor 




Ii ' " ' .1, ~POl;:"~ o:r:; the minor children, thl;:"ou~h the Clerk of the District 





!\ Court I t,t'.e sum of $175.00 per month per child commencing the first Ii ',-
!I~ay 6frthe first month immediately following the date the Decree 
I.i 
tl of Diyorce is granted herein and payable e,ach and every month 
Ii ' .. 
!i the~,~~fter On Qr before the first day of ('!ach month until ,each 
Ii ' " ' 





































·.:t 1ji~.uran7 •. !,<;\li"y in an amount an~ type equtvalent to the policy 
:~Jo~xren.t)"y ,i,n~ffuc~. uPRP t;h~ )ninior:ch~).dfen. sac1d)atty sh.all 
;S11·paY9n~"i1alt .ai.any medic a1 , dental ; optical, or orthQ.don ti c e x-
i ~ ~~Ds~~nptGPva~ed by s~id insuranc~~ 
.!I .5. .' V:rI 
e ThatF~aintiff should be. entitled to claim Erik Bryce Peter-
. 7 .j.scmas.3. dep¢nqgnt for the purpos~s. of filing her Fede:t:"al and 
I a 'IS:tClt~ J.:"\'lcQme Tax returns . 
.. ~j" VIII 
:ur \. Thq.tdefendant should be entitled to claim Ian James Peter""' 
ll;!t Sort as a dePenqent for the purposes of filing his Federal and 
1.~11 S1:qt13 Inc()meTa,x returns. 
1.1 
.l~ .jl IX 
!VltH· . That plaintiff should be awarded the following items of coro-'i . ....... . 
15 .!rml.lni ty prOJ?erty as her sole and separate property: 
\
1 . 
I . . 
~. I . Sewing machine 
I . Stove'· 
11 '1' . MicroW.;ive 
. Smail television 
l~ .1' Dining rOom table 
U. 1981 Mazqa RX 7 1. U Waterbed n . . 
····20 Freezer 
:ji\.· Pres ser 'i 
I Washer & dryer 
St .~ One~half (1/2) of other items of furnishings, linens, 
ij utensils and appli.;inces not specifically awarded lj ", 
~? i,I".. to plaintiff or defendant 
II PersonCl.l effects of plaintiff and the parties I minor 









~h.;it defendant should be award~d the following items of bom-
,p • 































. " . 
p~"'.~t'(J:1'! .' .~(Ji='t'.'l"ffl'i 
/-~,,!n.~;t!~Y~.' ,It:~ .. ~~,~_ 
~.,I'l; !JC/,XU7 














l,~rgr tei'evis.ion . 





Cha,,in . ,<:'.3.W 
~etirement account. if any 
0p~:half (1/2~ 6f other items of 
. . utensils .Cl.nd app'liances not 
to plaintiff oide£endant 





'I'h~t defendantpe ord,ered to pay. all of ,the indebtedness of II . 
II the p~rties incurred prior. to June 20, BaS, including the indebt-
liedneSS~Wing to United States National Bank, Nyssa, OregOn, and 
'
Itha£ each party be oFdere~ to pay and ~6ld the other free from 
'I . 
Ii q.ny deb'ts they have persqnally incurred since JUl!e 20, 1985. 
II . XII 
I, 
II 
I, 'J?h,at. def,,,"ndant be ordered to reimburse the plaintiff $180.00 
II . 
Ilfar h~r ~osts and attorney fees if this matter is uncontested and 
~; ", 
l!such.Pbher reasonp,b12 sums as the Court may allow if this matter 
il . 
:1 is cont~pted. 
jj . 
! ~ 
II XI. II I! 
11 
U ·'rIta'\: irrecon<;::ilabledifferences have arisen between the par-
H 'I :jtii:!sl1erein making .it· imppssihle for them to continue to live to-
ll"' -,', if . . 
i,geth.er as husband and wife. 
r 1 ... ". ~:.' . -... . "' 
!~ WtIEF,EFORE, P+aintiff p:rays as follows: !i . 
d 
IlL. for an a~s91ute divorce from the defendant on the grounds 
:fj 
ijo£ irreconcilable differcinces~ 
'lJ n 









1,11 and plaintiff and de;Eer\d~nt sqould be awarded the jOint legal cus-
jI. .... ....:. \., '... '. ',~ ;;.'.' ,: '; .. ". . 
s 
2 lj t.(ldy,:P.:t!;;~fftid children, 'wi tl-l .',the a~'b::ial :'Phy~~pa;i~;:~u:S:t:6!Oly 'awarded to 
























O~MJ:Vt:,R &. O"'1~Y!t~ 
... ;,...rCJ/(N,~Y~ ~.,,! L~,W 
~. O. ~Q},C ~~7 .. 
1.7 W~~Y MAl':" 
I) t 
the defendant c:'lS set o.ut. in Paragraph IV herein. 
That defenognt peQrdE)redto pay for the $upport and 
rmaiJlt~nance oftj':le parties' nilnO+ children,the sum of $175.00 per; 
! month :pe+ child as setout in pal:'agral?h V herein. 
j That, defenqant shal,l. roairitain and keep in force a medical· 
lin~~rance pol~cy. upon the parties' minor children as set out in 
r 
J Pal:'agraph VI herein. 
II 5, That: plaintiff should be entitled to claim Erik Bryce 
II ,Peters.on as a dependent for the purposes of filing her Federal and 
I·, I 
IIstat:¢ Income'i'ax returns. 
[I 6. 1'hat defendant should be entitled to claim Ian James 
I, 
,ii PeteJ7s.on as a dependent ;for tl:1e purpOses of ;Eiling his Federq.l and; 
II State .Income Tax returns. 
if" 
I! That the community property listed in Paragraph IX here-\l. ' 
$ in he a0arded to the plaintiff as her sole and separate property. 
rl' 
a 8. Tha.t the corrununity property listed in Paragraph X herein 
" 'Ii 
'IbR awaroed to the defepdant as his sale and,. separ<:'tteproPerty. iI -
.:r 




1! the parties incurred prior to June 20, 1985, including the indebt,..! 
!l i 
ji. ' 
!I ~dness owing to United States National Bank, Nyssa, Oregon, and 
]' , 
:! tl that each p~u;t:;t be ordered to pay and hold the other free from 
j,l. 
If any dqbts th~y have personaLly incurr~d s.ince June 20, 1985 • 
, :.1· 
11 





~. ~. ~:p~ ~j? 






;l 1/ '$18P~OO for hE~r CO$ts 9-nd attol':n~y.fe'es if ~his I!1?ttt;!r isunqon-
, Jt> l't(:!st:~q::~~'~d sUr,;h otPt:::< Fe'a$qnal;ll~ S~llt)s' a~, :~i~~ ,Cour:t' rryay':a'lLpw if" 
,~I{:his·rti9. tter is cont~!3 ted. 
'III 4r For suCh,other and f4~ther iel~ef ftS the Courtma¥ deem 
, , ' 
'jus.t:;.gnCl eql,!itahle~ 
DJ!l.TED 'rhis2L day of June, 1985,_' 
:1 
ir 
:0 '; . 
,/(/t5% ~~~' ,"', J7~, -' _/Zv ! ~ary , D. "~Meyer ! 
Attar? y for Plaintiff 
L 
l:JffpO~~1'qtJ~ '.-~~t-~1t~ ~3~'~'H : j 
" 
" .,. I' 
:! COM]?LAIl'}'f-l? 6 
, ,,': , 
~ 




,; At t"Qpn~¥$ 'cft J,8 W 
?'O~" Box 307 ," ' 
P?ly~.t~~;+daho, 8)661 
q.'elepDone:( 208)642-4458 
~ " .>,;~ :". - '.' - - '", , 
THE DISTRICT CO OFT Of' THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TfH 














Case No. 0-6810 
ANSWER 
CQMES NOW the. Defendant and in response to Plainti if' ~ 
~cti9n, admtts, denies and alleges as f0~')WS: 
I. 
Tl:'jat Defendant denies e<l.ch and every alleqation, unles! 
allegations at.e specifically admitted here in. 
II. 
'l:'hat Defendant admits paragraphs I, II, III and the first 
of paragr9ph IV 0, Defendant fur ther admi ts paragraphs VI 1 
VII, VI:rI ,IX f X and XIII. 
IIr. 
Be_ponding to pa~agraph IV, Defendant alleqes that 
.pe:t;endant ~:hOllld be given legal custodialvisltation every other 
weekend,. every other major holiday and eight weeks in the summer. 




" I. , I 
Day, 
," - -:': • -': " >' '. '- - ~. ';-: • -', - - • 
Fat:l)~r:,I,s Day, Pourth of JlJly, r,abor J:)ay, 
and,t:h~ ,chi.l,dren's birthdays. Said h91 iday I 
v:i.s{t~1:,.i()n §hd,tlld be from 8:00 the last dqy of ~Ch001 until 
the ":tqst day immed ic;:\te:LY pr lor to school reconvening. 
Chris,t;ffi?$ V'goat:ion shall be defined as 8: 00 p.m. the day immediately 
prio{,tg ,~th~ holiQ~Y until the midpoint in the chilCl's ",inter-, " ' " ! 
Christmas va,ea,ti.on~ Ne\:l Yeay;p shall be defined as 5: 00 p.m. at the I 
rniclpo}11f 'o'fth'eChr istmas...,New vacation until 5: 00 p.m~ the 
daYirrqnediatel,y.preced lng the ch lId's re turn to school. 
IV. 
Respondir)gto paragraph V I Defendant aLLeges that Plaintiff 
an able""Qodi~Ci pe,rson who is ,capable of providing for the support 
~nd maintepance of the parties' minor children and Defendant 1 s 
cQntl,-,ibutiOl'lJ 9houldbe $125.QO per month per child. Our ing the 
':per iod in which Defendant has e~tended v isi tat ion r thechilq support 
~bligatiDn £hou~~¢ease. 
v" 
Besppnding to parag~aph VIII, Defendant admits paragraph 
a,net ~J:f;i,rmatively alleges that plaintiff should be ,r~quired to 
,~*eC\.ltf!the n~c~ssary IRS Form 8332 to insure that the Oefendant is 
ent:itledt.o c1Cl,im' Ian James P~terson as a tax dependent in the 
" VI. 
Besp.onding to paragf'aphXI, Defendant agrees to be 
repporH3ible"f9r all of the indel:,)t~dness of ,the parties of which he 
ha$kn.9w~~dge pr ior to June 20, 1985, excepting the obligation 



























",~ it', , 
" -. 
the Sni-tee Stat€:s N;1tlortal Benk which is attri,butable to th~. 
Z1?,laint if f' S ai.1tp-mobile, to~w:.i. t: one 1981 Mazda RX,.,.7 ,which Plain tif f 
:} should receive and Plaintiff should pay for. 
4. VII. 
S ReS~qnding to paragraph X~I, Defendant affirmatively 
6a+leges that (:.oth parties areworklng and th?t Plai.ntiff can be 
.7 responsible for her own attorney's fees. 
8 VIII. 
'rha.t tne Defendant inc;orporates paragraphs I, II, III, 
" . 
and KIII ofPlaintif£'s Comp1.int and affirmatively alleges that he 
II isel1titled to a divotc.e ontpe grounds of irl:'econcilableqifferences. 
\D 
~ .12 WHEREFO~E, Defendant p~ays Judgment as follows: 
Q) 
o J3 1. 'rhgt Plaint·iff's Complaint be dismissed and that she 
q; 
o z -: rp14 take nothing there\lnder. 
a::: WIO 
'0' ~ ~ ~ 
Ql ~ ~~l 15 2. That the Defendant be grantE;!d a decree of divorce on 
IJ) :;;.c'l 
901f ~ the gJ::gunds of irreconcilable differences. 
~wr-z . :r: z W 0 
u·~ ~.'~ ! 3. That the Defendant be awarded custodial visitation 
.,..J '.r-r- W 
W-<.Ul...:J 
~ ~::: 18 every other weekend, every qther lTlajor holiday and eight weeks in 
01 
i!: 19 .the·summer. Hal idavs should ;include New Years, President's DaY;r 
::J 
£ 20 E",ster, Spr lng vacat.i.on I M~mor ia1 Day, Father's Day, Fourth of 
\D 
N 
21 July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving, Christmas and the childr~n's birth~ 
Zidays. Said hQlioay visitation should be froT!1 8:00 p.m. the last 
23 'Qgy (;If schOOl" until 8:00 p.m. the last (lay immediately prior to 
:k4 school reconvening. Chr ist:l1las vacation shall be defined as 8: 00 
;l5p.m. the day imm~aiately, prior tothehoJ,inay until the midpoint in 
Z<S the child's winter-Chr.i.s,t:Jl1as vacation. NQw Years shall be defined 
l 
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~, " ' 
. ~ .. ~-: .. 
as 5: 00 p.m. at-the midpoint of the Chr istma$-New Years vacation 
2unti15;OO p.m.tl1e day immediately preceding the child's return to 
~ 'school. 'Thatdll!: l.ng thepedod i.n wh:L¢h Defendant has extended 
4 ~isj~?tion, the qhild support obligation shoul~ Cease. 
'5 4,.' That the Plaintiff be r.equired to e~ec,ute the necessary 
6 IRS,forIn83 3 ~ to insilre that Defendant isenti tIed to claim Ian 
7 J~mes Petersop as a dependent. 
8 5. ~hatthe Plaintiff receive the 1981 Mazda RX-7 





















theUn.i ted States National Bank debt at Nyssa, Oregon, and holding 
th,e'Defendant harmless therefrom. 
6. That each party pay their own attorney's fees. 
1. For all such other and further relief, both in equity 
and at law, ,as to this Court seems just and reasonable under the 
c ir:cLimstance$. 
DATED This 28th day of June, 1985. 
WELCH & OSBORN 
BERT L. OSBORN" , 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true, eomplete and ~orreGt copy of 
the foregoing ~nswer was pn the 28th day of June. 1985, mailed ~o 
CaryD. -Der1e~ier, Attorney at'taw, P.O. BO~',367, Middleton, Idaho 
83644, by f ii::~t class mail, wi th pos~e prepa~dJ thereon. 
/~({{!c:::.--
eert t. (:)8 d£i1' , 
, 
. , .•• .j . , '. " 
000013 . f. 










~. "' ·Gary D. DeMeyer '. ,~, t:' De,.~YER (. DeI-rEYER 
: 2 .' . Attorneys at Law , I P ~ O. Box 3 67 
S ltlidClleton r ID 83644 
" 585-3341 ". 
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IN 'rHE DISTRICT COURT OF Th"E'l'HIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COur~TY OF CANYON 
MAGIST&~TE'DIVISION 















Case No. 0-6810 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
THIS CAUSE Having come on regularly to be heard on the 
day of -----------------, 1985, before the Court without a jury, 
plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney, Gary D. DeMeye , 
and the defendant not appearing in person or by counsel,' .and it 
appearing ~lat the defendant has been personally served with 
Summons and Complaint and the defendant having withdrawn all plea 
ings, the default of said defendant having been entered herein 






























DeMtYER & O'M£YE~ 
1i 
1 
1,1 until 5:00 p.m. the day immediately preceding the child's return 
to school. 
3. That defendant is an able hodied person who is capable 
, of providing for the support and maint~nance of the parties I 
minor children and is ordered to pay to plaintiff, for the' suppor 
of the minor childre'n, through the Cierk of the District Court, 
the sum of $150.00 J.>er month per chiid commenc1ng October 1; 
and payable each and every month thereafter on or before the 
day of each month until each child reaches majority or is other-
wis~ emancipated. 
4. That defendant shall maintain and keep in force a medica I 
insurance policy in an amount and type equivalent to the policy 
I in effect upon the minor children at the date of plaintiff filing 
~ 
I 
her comp15int herein. Each party shall pay one-half of any medi-




5. That plaintiff shall be entitled to claim Erick Bryce 
Peterson as a dependent for the purposes of filing her Federal 
and State Income Tax returns. 
6. That defendant shall be entitled to claim Ian James 
I Peterson as a dependent for the purposes of filing his Federal 
I and State Income Tax returns and the plaintiff shall execute 
t IRS Form 8332 to enable the defendant to claim said dependent. 
A.TTQ1iitNs:i'S AT LA.W i 
1'. C. .. ex 3&7 I 
1"'1 wCST MoottH f 








iF.m. the day immediately prior to the Holiday until midpoint in > -
lithe child' s winter-Christmas vacation. New Years shall be defined 
::ae 5 :00 p.m. at midpoint of the Christmas-New Years vacation 
.: 




3. That. the Defeni:lant is an able bodied person ""ho is 
l ~ 
; ~ 
l~apable of providing for the 8upportmaintenance of the parties' 
;1 
" 
l~inor children anCi is ordered to paY to Plaintiff,. for the support 
}i 
ihf t'he minor cnildren. ., ,. 
fL 
through Ule .Cler'k 0{~tbeDistr16t Court, 
W~ft./7 
month per child commencing.OetoBer 1, 19A5 \fthe sum of $150.00 per 
" '. 
I~nd payahle each and every month thereafter on or . before the' 
" " 
;:first day of each month until each child reaches majority or is 
" 
i' :'otherwise emancipated. 
;; 
'" 
i: 4. That if neither party can provide a medical insurance 
;pOlicy in an limount and type equi velant to the policy in effect 
upon the minor children at the date of tne filing of Pla.i.ntiff's : 
, 
complaint, t'hen the costs of such meiUcal insurance policy will i 
b~ p~id one-naIf by eacn part~r.(tfG-l p;f/lr-yro l'.#Iy,,*~.),;;.A.,,:.~.s:~y ! 
: ,.".,.11, (.;fJ. 1 IJ",#rAL.I "I'r~ ~~ /l.lf7Jt "JI/-.-T'C. ..r T.",~I$~$ ... ~ t:~V~~',,(9y S'''~',,;' IN.r4'A'~;C'('r 
, ' , .. I 
S. That Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim Erick: Bryce ' 
;Peterson as a dependent for the purposes of filing her Pedera 1 
,eState Income Tax returns. 
6. That Defendant shall be entitled to claim Ian James 
Peterson as a dependent for the purposes of filing his Federal 
and State Income Tax returns and the Plaintiff shall execute IRS 
,form 8332 to enable the Defendant to claim said dependent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE - 3 
Approved by~' ~~~t::;!.'l.C:J.:ZL:i:" 
WEL'r{ & OS • 
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A'TTCItNCY'S AT LAW 
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7. That plaintiff is awarded the following items of com-










Washer &> dryer 
One-half of other it~mscif furnishings, linens, 
utensils and appliances ,n~tspecifical1y 
awarded to plainciifor defendant 
Personal effects of plaintiff and ,the parties' 
minor children " ' , , 
S. That defendant is awarded'the following items of com-
muni ty property as his sole and separate property: . 
Dishwasher 
Large ,television 






Retirement account, if any 
One-half of o~~er items of furnishings, linens, 
utensils and appliances not:specifica:lly 
awarded to plaintiff or defendant . 
Personal effects of defendant 
9. That defendant is ordered to pay all of·the indebtedness 
of the ?arties, of which he had knowledge, incurred prior to 
June 20, 1985, provided, however the defendant is ordered to pay 
$2,500.00 to United States National Bank on or before October l, 
1985, upon the account secured by the 1981 ~1azda RX-7 and 1975 
Ford 4-i...rheel drive and the plaintiff is ordered to pay the balanc 
of said account when due and prior to delinquency and hold the 









II z h .. 
I' 
!I 




r 6 ,I 
't 
7 
II 8 r 
9 I' 
10 II .! 
11 I: 
:1 





·1 I' .\ 
lS Ii 
17 II il 
18 Ii 
" II 
19 i' fi 
H 
It 







23 d Ii 
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ATTa~Nt:.Ya ~T LA.... II1I 
P. u~ BOX 367 
deh~ndant free from li3bility thereon and the 1975 Ford .:i-wheel 
drille s,hall hI;"" released as securit.}' for saici loan. That each 
party is ordered to pay and hold the other free from any debts 
they l1ave personally' incu::::-re<:1 si:!ce ·Ju!"le 20. 1985. 
to. Tbat 
attorney fees. 
DATED 'l'hi s 
each party is ordereci to pay their ovm costs and 
'/ I hJ-.L/ 
dc{ay of 4:7g~~~--~ I 1935. 
B---~------, 
Honorable A. Marvin Cherin 
Ha<;istratc Judge 
A!'PRC:VED AS '1'0 FOru,l A~-iD CONTE.NT: 
17 "OfT ...... ," 'II 
MIODLETON.. IOAHO 8:U .... 4 ,I 
I DECREE OF DIVonCE7P. 5 
II 
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.. ~ 
"'~ .' , W THE DlSTllh",Ql.JR1 OF THE THIRD JUD!CIAl ,CT OF THE 
STAlE Of IDAHO, IN ANI) FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
$UPPLEHErtTAL ORDER 
The prOV1510l1S re1ilting to. ctlstody, support. visitation and conduct of the par'ties 
are subject to the fol1~~ing terffiS and conditions. 
A. CAHE AN!} SUPERVISION - The party who has custody of the childrell. hereinafter re-
ferredta as the Custoaiar.. win jJfovro2 the condren with regular and nutl'1tious food, 
clean and appropriate clothing. sanitary and reasonably private living and sleeping 
quarters, appropriate !/'.edical examinations and treatment. and guidance and counsel in 
wordly'and spiritual matters. The custodian wi11: train the chi1dren to obey and respect 
their teac~rs and the la~. reqt.!irethe children to attend an regular sessions of 
scnool until graduation unless excused for medical !'easons or by the school> or by the 
Court; personally supel-vise and control and conduct and activities of the children ex-
cept when they are at school or in known and usual recreational activities or in the 
~~?~ate ~are of another.competent person: The ~us~odia~ will not engage in no:, ~ermit 
In ~tle pC7 €senCe oT the Chi idrei1 any EXCt!551;;e dr1r;kiii9. ';~;Qral ccncuct,,,, cbscerr~ t1.es, 
violence or disrespect for law and order. The custodian will .advise persons entitled to 
visitation of the current residence address and phone numberof the child~n. all school 
or police disciplinary contacts, all l"4edical contactsclnd repor.ts~ and all other im-
portant developments ;n the lives. and activities i)f the children.· . 
B. CONTROL OF VISITATION - The persons haviogvisitat1on rights may take the 
children to such reas(lI'Jable places-for such reasonable activities as such person may 
determine; the custodian 'Ii111 hav!:! the children. ready and available promptly for all 
vi sits. if advised at least 3 day in advance. the custodianwi11 provide~the chi 1 dren 
witn such specldl and additiona1 c10thing as. may 00 appropriate for the planned activi-
ties; in the event a child is invited or desires to participate in other activities 
which may inV~rfere with a visit, the custodian w111 not encourage, pennft nor consent 
so such activities without previous approval of the person whose visitation will be in-
terfered \'1ith. and win not criticize the denial of such approval; the person entitled to 
visitation may correspond with the children and custodian shall not censor such COITes-
pondence. The custodian must not reduce nor deny visitation for failure of support. 
C. METHOD OF PAYMENT O~ CHILD SUPPORT - Child suppnrt shall be made payable to the 
Clerk of the District Court Clerk, and delivered to Room 203. Canyon County Court Building 
or mailed to Oistr'ict Cou,t Clerk. Child Support Division. Canyon County Court Building, 
Caldwel1. Idaho, 83605; all p~yr.lents shan be made in cash or by.certified check or by 
money order. and shall be identlfiedby the number of this case or the names of the plain-
tiff and defendant in this case. Both the Plaintiff and Defendant shall promptly notify 
the Clerk cf th; s Court in wdt i00 of any change of address. 
D. INTERFERENCE - Neithel' parent wll1 intrude upon the p}~ivacy of the other, nor 
vil ify the other to the children; nor prevent or restrict nor in any way interfere with 
the othel" s ri ghts granted by thi s or tiny other Court Order. 
E. INJUNCTION - The Plaintiff and Defendant and their agents are enjoined and re-
strained from dOing or attempting to do, 01" threater.ing to do, any act injuring, mal-
treating. vi1if.ving or molesting the advet"se party, or any of the children, or any 
person 0\' pep'sons lawfully er:iployed by either' ;Jarent to care for the children. 
F. CONTENPT - Violation of any of the ol'ders or directives set forth ;above will be 
cons i dered Contempt of Court. Puni sna;ent fOI- Contempt of Court may b.e bi fine,6r,,.by im-
prisonment 'in the County jail or both. ' . ' ", . 
ATT~CHED TO AND/lADE A PpRT O~ THE FOREGOING, ~E # Pft;8'/OrjY ORDER"OF THE~~O~.BT 
THI:'l_3_DA. OF_a_~ ___ H _____ ' l~J ____ . ~. ,; 
SUPPlEME~TAL ORDER 
" . . 
~ ~ ~ 
... ""\ ,-$-. 
BILL A. STAKER. •. 
00001.9 
~~a~~0~~ ~!~ 0??!CE 
JACKD. SWAFFORD 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
TP: (208) 455-1044 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JtJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 

















Case No. CV85-068l0 C 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO MODIFY JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the court, on the 8th dav of 
December, 1997! upon Defendant's motion to Modify Judomemt. 
Both parties appeared personally and the defendant having appeared 
through counsel of record, JackiD. Swafford; arid the Court having 
taken evidence and duly deliberating, hereby orders as follows: 
1. (Joint Legal Custody Physical Custody to Defendant 
- Visitation to Plaintiff) That the leqal and physical custody 
of the minor child shall be awarded as follows: 




awarded to the plaintiff and to the defendant; 
(b) that physical custody of such minor child shall be 
awarded to the defendant; and 
(c) that visitation with such minor child shall be aw~rded 
to the plaintiff at reasonable times and places. 
2. (Child Support) That the defendant shall pay for the support 
of such minor child the sum of $150.00 for the month of July, 
August and September of 1997 . That the plaintiff shall pay for the 
support of such minor child in the sum of $134.00 per month 
commencing October 1, 1997.and the sum of $134.00 per month every 
month thereafter until the !!Iinor child reaches the age of nineteen, 
finishes high school or is emancipated, whichever comes first. 
A. (Income Withholding, Etc.) This support order is 
enforceable by automatic and immediate income withholding as of the 
effective date of this order under Chapter 12, Title 32, Idaho 
Code. This automatic and immediate income withholding order shall 
be issued by the department of health and welfare or other obligee 
to your employer or other person who pays your income, without 
additional notice to you. 
B. (Child support paid to the clerk of the court) That each 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
MODIFY JUDGMENT - PAGE 2 
00002:1 
· ; ~: 
('-
\ 
!'~.~!!!'.ent of child sUDport shall be paid to the Canyon County Court 
Clerk, in the form of cash or money order or certified check or 
cashier's check made payable to the order of such clerk who shall 
remit the same to the party entitled thereto and each party shall 
keep such clerk advised of the correct address of such party. 
3. (Medical Insurance for Minor Child Provided by 
Defendant, Etc.) The defendant should carry a medical insurance 
policy covering such minor child"and all medical expenses 
incurred for the care of such minor child (meaning all expenses 
incurred for doctors, hospitals, drugs, dentists, orthodontists and 
optometrists and including all devices, tests and examinations 
prescribed and recommended in connection therewith) which are not 
covered by such policy plus all deductible and co-insurance amounts 
which are excluded from coverage by 'such policy should be paid 
thirty-six (36) percent by the plaintiff and sixty-four (64) 
percent by the defendant. 
4. (Income Tax Exemption for Minor Child Assigned to 
Defendant) The defendant should be granted the sole right to 
claim the exemptions for dependency allowed for such minor child 
under applicable federal and state income tax laws and regulations. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 




The plaintiff should, within ten (10) days after written notice is 
given by defendant to the plaintiff so requesting, sign and deliver 
to the defendant all instruments necessary to permit the dependency 
exeriIpticns to be timely claimed by the defendant including but not 
limited to I.R.S. form 8332~ 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 





STATE OF IDAHO 
S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB NO. 3101 
CHIEF, CONTRACTS & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION 
M. SCOTT KEIM, ISB NO. 5879 
Deputy Attorney General 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
450 W State Street, lOth Floor 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 334-5537 
Facsimile: (208) 334-5548 
Attorneys for State of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
Child Support Services 
F I A.k~M. 
AUG 1 0 2011 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 






) Case No.: CV85-06810 C 
) 
) 
) MOTION FOR ENTRY OF RENEWED 
) CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT 
) 
) Fee Category: K.6. 
) Filing Fee: Exempt 
) 
COMES NOW, Deputy Attorney General, M. SCOTT KEIM, attorney for the State of 
Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, Bureau of Child Support and moves this Court to 
enter a renewed judgment for child support against Debra Peterson in the amount of Seven 
Thousand One Hundred Twenty Five Dollars and One cents 01/100 ($7125.01), which 
represents the unpaid balance remaining in the above-captioned matter. 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF RENEWED CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT - 1 
000024 
It 
This motion is brought pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1111 as amended and modified 
by 2011 Idaho Session Laws §§ 104 and 331, which specifically allow for the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare, Bureau of Child Support to renew any Idaho child support 
judgment currently being enforced by the Department, which otherwise could be deemed to 
have expired since July 1, 1995. This motion is further supported by the AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF RENEWED CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT 
submitted contemporaneously herewith. 
The Department does not intend to request oral argument or submit written briefing on 
this matter, absent the filing of an objection to this motion within fourteen (14) days. 
DATED this t1 day of August 2011. 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
d1 JJcA#-~~ 
M. SCOTTiiM ~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF RENEWED CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT - 2 
000025 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ___ day of August 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MOTION FOR ENTRY OF RENEWED CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT 
was served upon: 
Debra Peterson 
1629 Yale Ave 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Myron G Peterson 
33747 Apple Valley Rd 
Parma, ID 83660 
~ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: 
D Statehouse Mail 
~ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: 
D Statehouse Mail 
STEPHANIE WEST 
SELF RELIANCE SPECIALIST 




STATE OF IDAHO 
S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB NO. 3101 
___ \_-A.k~.M. 
AUG 1 0 2011 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY 
CHIEF, CONTRACTS & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION 
M. SCOTT KEIM, ISB NO. 5879 
Deputy Attorney General 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
450 W State Street, 10th Floor 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 334-6577 
Facsimile: (208) 334-5548 
Attorneys for State of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
Child Support Services 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 







) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 




STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of ADA ) 
STEPHANIE WEST, being first du1y sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That I am employed by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Bureau 
of Child Support, have reviewed the Department's file with regard to the 
AFFIDA VIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF RENEWED CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT - 1 
000027 
foregoing case, and the following IS based upon my personal knowledge 
gained from that review. 
2. A child support obligation was initially established against Debra Peterson for 
the support of Erik B Peterson dob , on January 09, 1998 in an 
order issued in Canyon county case number CV85-06810 C. 
3. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Bureau of Child Support first 
began attempts to enforce the support obligation referenced above on January 
26, 1998. 
4. The youngest child for whom support was owed as set forth above 
emancipated on or after July 1, 1995 which is within the specific retroactive 
timeframe set forth in Section 5 of 2011 Idaho Session Laws § 104 as amended 
by 2011 Idaho Session Laws § 331. 
5. A judgment has arisen from the support installments which became due under 
the case CV85-0681 0 C for support outlined above. 
6. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Bureau of Child Support has 
maintained documentation of all accruals, payments, and credits relating to the 
support obligation identified above since enforcement attempts first began in 
this matter. 
7. As of August 1, 2011 there remains (Seven Thousand One Hundred Twenty 
Five Dollars and One cents 011100 ($7125.01), in unpaid support due under the 
CV85-06810 C referenced above. 
8. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Bureau of Child Support has 
continuously attempted to enforce the support obligation referenced above. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF RENEWED CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT - 2 
000028 
j 1--»1 
SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _, __ day of August 2011. 
Residing in _-L..L-:"=:'~..L..-::r;.....t.~-f.-I-=-",", 
My Commission Expires:_-4~=I-f.~~ 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF RENEWED CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT - 3 
000029 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certifY that on this ~ day of August 2011, a tme and correct copy of 
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RENEWED CHILD 
SUPPORT JUDGMENT was served upon: 
Debra Peterson 
1629 Yale Ave 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Myron G Peterson 
33747 Apple Valley Rd 
Parma, ID 83660 
[gJ U.S. Mail o Hand Delivery 
o Overnight Mail o Facsimile: o Statehouse Mail 
[gJ U.S. Mail o Hand Delivery o Overnight Mail 
o Facsimile: o Statehouse Mail 
STEPHiNIE WEST 
SELF RELIANCE SPECIALIST 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF RENEWED CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT - 4 
000030 
LA "VRENeE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENER.4..L 
STATE OF IDAHO 
S. KAY CHRISTENSEN; ISB NO. 3101 
H I I Uf".I'Ie.. 1 Qe..I'IC.rzHL 
CHIEF, CONTRACTS & ADMINISTRATIVE LA W DIVISION 
M. SCOTT KEIM, ISB NO. 5879 
Deputy Attorney General 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
450 W State Street, 10tn Floor 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720~0036 
Telephone: (208) 334-5537 
Facsimile: (208) 334-5548 
Attorneys for State of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
Child Support Services 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DEBRt\ A. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MYRON G. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
) Case No.: CV-I985-0006810-C 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR ENTRY OF RENEWED 






t-'Allt. U:.U Ub 
The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, Bureau of Child Support, 
(hereinafter "the State") by and through its attorney of record, Deputy Attorney General, IvL 
SCOTT KEIM, to foJIo'\!ving memorandum in support of the State's request for entry of a 
renewed judgment for child support against DEBRA A. PETERSON in the amount of Seven 
Thousand One Hundred Twenty-Five doIlars and One 1/100's ($7,125.01). This memorandum 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR eNTRY OF RENEWED CHiLD SUPPORT JUDGMENT" 




......... ___ .. _. ___ ...... "_''-' 1'-' 
is further submitted in accordance with the specific time frame ordered in the Court's Order 
Continuing f..,{otion for Renewed Child Support Judgment and Allow Parties to Brief the !s.~ue 
filed on October 27,2011. 
Entry of the requested Renewed Child Support Judgment 'is appropriate as it is 
specifically allowed by the express retroactivity provisions of 201 I Idaho Session Laws §§104 
and 331. Those two Session Laws amended Idaho Code §§ 5·245, 10-1110 & 10-1111 to 
effectively extend the period of time in whicb unpaid child support obligations could be 
collected. Moreover, the amendments in question were passed with a specific retroactivity 
provision \vhkh stated in pertinent part, 
[T]his act shall be in full force and effect on and after its passage and approval, and 
retroactively to July 1, ) 995, and shall apply to all orders currently being enforced by 
the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Child Support Program such that any 
Idaho judgment for child support that would othenvise have expired since July I, 
1995, rnay be renewed on or before December 30. 2011 
2011 Idaho Session Laws §104 as amended by 2011 Idaho Session Laws § 331 (em.phasis 
added). The Affidavit in Support of Motion for Renewed Child Support Judgment filed in this 
matter sets forth a statement of facts meeting all of the retroactivity criteria set forth above. 
As an initial matter Idaho Code § 73-101 does generally indicate that, "No part of these 
compiled laws is retroactive," however that section goes on to state, "unless expressly so 
declared" Idaho Code § 73·101 (emphasis added). As a result the legislature has expressed a 
preference for only prospectively applied statutory enactments while still allowing itself the 
authority to expressly provide for retroactive application when it deems appropriate. As the 
Session Laws which implemented these amendments to Idaho Code §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 
contain an express statement that the amendments are to be applied retroactively under a limited 
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set of circumstances, the requirements of Idaho Code § 73-101 have been met 
Additionally, this Court should be cognizant of the fact retroactive application of these 
amendments does not trigger the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation. The 
Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto legislation is limited to criminal statutes and 
would not be applicable to this matter. Over 200 years ago, Justice Samuel Chase stated, 
The prohibition, in the letter, is not to pass any law cQnccming~ 
and after the fact; but the plain and obviou.s meaning and intention 
of the prohibition is tIns; that the Legislatures of the several states, 
shall not pass Ia'vvs, after a fact done by a subject, or citizen, which 
shall have relation to such fact, and shaII punish him for having 
done it. The prohibition considered in this lig11t, is an additional 
bulwark in favour of the personal security of the subject, to protect 
his person from punishment by legislative acts, having a 
retrospective operation. I do not think it was inserted to secure the 
citizelt in his private rights, of either property, or contracts. 
Calder v. Bull~ 3 U.S. 386,390, 1 L. Ed. 648 (U.S. 1798). See also, Collins v. Youngblood,497 
U.S, 37, lIDS, Ct. 2715, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30 (U.S. 1990). Furthennore, this view was recently 
acknowledged and followed by the Idaho Supreme Court which stated. 
The ex post facto clauses prevent the enactment of "any statute 
which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was 
innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the 
punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives 
one charged with crime of any defense available according to law 
at the time \.vhen the act was committed .... 1t Collins v, Youngblood, 
497 U.S. 37, 42, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 27l6-17 111 L.Ed.2d 30, 39 
(1990) (quoting Beazell v, Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 
68, 70 L.Ed. 216, 217 (1925)). Thus, the ex post/acto prohibition 
only applies to penal and criminal actions, not to cjvil actions. See 
16B lunJur.2d Constitutional Law § 646 (1998). 
Volheeler v .. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257) 207 PJd 988, 262, 993 (Idaho 
2009). 
Additionally, the concept of revival or revivification of a lapsed or dormant judgment is 
not without precedent. BLACK~S LAW DICTIONARY defines revival as~ "[t]he process of renewing 
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the operative force of ajudgl1lent which has remained donnant or unexecuted for so long a time 
that execution cannot be issued upon it without new process to reanimate iU' Generally, statutes 
governing revival of judgments contain specific time limitations from the original entry of the 
judgment in which it can be revived, our legislature actually took a more conservative approach 
and allowed a single window in which a certain class of judgments could be revived as a, 
remedial measure. Once that window expires future judgments will need to be renewed prior to 
their expiration date. 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that its motion be granted and 
an appropriate Renewed Child Support Judgment be issued. Furthennore, as counsel for Ms. 
Peterson has not previously identified the nature of the objection he wishes to raise on her behalf, 
the State specifically requests the opportunity to me a reply brief in accordance with the 
provisions ofIdaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(b)(3). 
DATED this 7 day of December, 2011. 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Deputy Attorney General 
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Myron G. Peterson 
33747 Apple Valley Rd. 
Parma, ID 83660 
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Richard L. Harris 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 1438 
1023 Arthur 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
Phone: (208) 459-1588 
Fax: (208) 459-1300 
ISB No. 1387 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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QANYON COUNiY QblHiK 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DEBRA A. PETERSON, ) 




) MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN THE 




COMES NOW Plaintiff and moves the Court to dismiss that certain MOTION 
FOR ENTRY OF RENEWED CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT dated August 8, 2011 (the 
"Motion") as follows: (1) pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and (2) in the alternative for summary judgment as 
contemplated by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). This motion is based in the first instance 
upon the express and unambiguous language of Idaho Code § 1 0-1111, which allows the renewal 
of a judgment for child support, if at all, only if accomplished before the expiration of the lien 
created by Idaho Code § 1 0-11 10, which lien expired on April 20, 2007 at the latest. Additionally, 
Plaintiff's right to assert the statute of limitations created by Idaho Code § I 0-111 0 is a vested 
right which cannot be taken from her by retroactive or retrospective legislation, which would be a 
violation of Plaintiff's rights to Due Process of Law recognized and protected by the Constitution 
000036 
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of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Idaho 
These Issues are discussed III greater detail III Plaintif:f s 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed concurrently herewith. 
DATED: this (i--day of December, 2011. 
Richard L. Harris, Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
instrument was faxed to the following this IVday of December, 2011: 
M. SCOTT KEIM 
Deputy Attorney General 
450 W State Street, lOth Floor 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Facsimile: (208) 334-5548 
United States Mail 
Courthouse Basket 
Richard L. Harris, Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Richard L. Harris 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 1438 
1023 Arthur 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
Phone: (208) 459-1588 
Fax: (208) 459-l300 
ISB No. 1387 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
~kffio '?PM / - ./ 
DEC' Z 201' 
CANYON COUNTY CLaRK 
.. K CANO, Oe:~UTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF CANYON 
DEBRA A. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MYRON G. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV-1985-0006810-C 
) 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN THE 




COMES NOW Plaintiff and submits the following memorandum in support of her 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed 
concurrently herewith: 
PERTINENT UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. The parties to this action are the parents of Erik B. Peterson, born  
 ("Erik"), who is presently twenty-seven (27) years of age. 
2. Plaintiff was ordered to pay child support to Defendant on behalf of Erik 
pursuant to an order entered on January 9, 1998 by the Third District Court of Canyon County, 
Idaho in this proceeding CV -85-0681O-C (the "Child Support Order.") (Affidavit of Stephanie 
West In Support of Motion for Renewed Child Support Judgment dated August 4,2011 (the 
000038 
"Affidavit"), ~ 2) 
3. Erik is the "last child for whom support is owed under the judgment" as 
contemplated by § 10-1110, Idaho Code. 
4. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Bureau of Child Support 
(the "DHW") began attempts to enforce the Child Support Order on January 26, 1998. Affidavit, 
~ 3. 
5. DHW asserts that a judgment has arisen from the support installments 
which became due in this matter in the amount of$7,125.01 as of August 1,2011. 1 
6. Erik became emancipated2 not later than April 20, 2002 when he reached 
the age of 18 years. Accordingly, any amounts of child support alleged owed by Plaintiff accrued 
between January 9, 1998 and April 20, 2002. 
7. The applicable Statute of Limitations in effect prior to the amendments 
passed by the 2011 Idaho Legislature disallowed the commencement of"[a]n action or 
proceeding to collect child support arrearages,,3 after April 20, 2007, which is five (5) years after 
Erik reached his majority. 
8. The instant Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment dated 
lPlaintiff contests the amount allegedly owed. 
2The triggering event for the end of the statute of limitations on the lien arising from § 1 O-
1110, Idaho Code, is based upon the child's "emancipation," which could conceivably occur prior 
to the child's 18th birthday. See definition of "emancipation" in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 
(Rev. 1968) For purposes ofthe pending motion, however, Plaintiff does not contend that Erik 
was emancipated prior to his 18th birthday, which in Idaho marks the end of Plaintiff's support 
obligations. See, for example, Noble v. Fisher, Idaho, 894 P.2d 118, 123 (1995) [citing] Walborn 
v. Walborn, 120 Idaho 494, 499-500, 817 P.2d 160, 165-66 (1991) 
3Section 5-245, Idaho Code. 
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August 4, 2011 (the "Motion") was filed on or about August 8, 2011, which is more than four (4) 
years after the expiration of the statute oflimitations in effect on April 20, 2007 and thereafter. 
9. The Motion in pertinent part "is brought pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1111 
as amended and modified by 2011 Idaho Session Laws §§ 104 and 331, which specifically allows 
for the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Bureau of Child Support to renew any Idaho 
child support judgment cunently being enforced by the Department, which otherwise could be 
deemed to have expired since July 1, 1995." 
ARGUMENT 
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN §10-1111, IDAHO CODE, 
MANDATES DISMISSAL OF THE INSTANT ACTION 
TO RENEW THE UNDERLYING JUDGMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT: 
The applicable statute oflimitations governing the renewal of judgments is that 
found in § 1 0-1111, Idaho Code, as amended by the 2011 Legislature. However, § 1 0-1111 must 
be read and construed with reference to 10-1110, because the renewal of a judgment for child 
support under 10-1111 must be accomplished "prior to the expiration of the lien created in section 
10-1110 ... or any renewal thereof" Under the 2011 amendments, the lien created by § 1 0-111 0 
"arising from the delinquency of a payment due under a judgment for support of a child issued by 
an Idaho court continues until five (5) years after the death or emancipation of the last child for 
whom support is owed under the judgment unless the underlying jUdgment is renewed, .... " This 
language clearly and unequivocally states that the lien created by § 1 0-111 0 only lasts until 5 years 
after the emancipation of the child in question [April 20, 2007 at the latest]. Because a judgment 
under 10-1111 must be renewed, if at all, prior to the expiration of the lien created by 10-1110, 
3 
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and the lien under 10-1110 expired on or before April 20, 2007, the present motion to renew the 
judgment is beyond the statute oflimitations and must therefore fail. 
Legislative intent in Idaho is determined fIrst from the literal meaning ofthe 
language ofthe statute in question. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is 
the duty of the Court to forego the application of any rules of statutory construction and enforce 
the statute according to its terms. Indeed, unless the result is "palpably absurd" this Court must 
assume that the Legislature meant what it said and enforce it as written. Only if the statute is 
ambiguous, i. e., if reasonable minds may differ or be uncertain about its meaning, can the Court 
engage any rules of statutory construction. Plaintiff believes that the applicable statutory 
language is clear and unambiguous and does not allow the renewal ofthe judgment against her 
sought by the DHW. 
Although Plaintiff believes that this case can be decided by this Court as outlined 
above on the clear language ofthe statute, there are also Constitutional issues at play that this 
Court should consider. Plaintiff believes and asserts that her defense of an expired statute of 
limitations is a vested right which cannot be taken from her by retroactive or retrospective4 
legislation, which would be a violation of her rights to Due Process of Law protected by the 
Constitutions of the United States and ofthe State ofIdaho. 
II. APPLICABLE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) requires that certain defenses to a claim be 
made by motion, including Rule 12(b)(6): failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted, which is the case here. Additionally, the Rule allows the Court a certain flexibility as 




If, on a motion asserting the defense number (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material mater 
pertinent to such a motion by rule 56. 
Rule 56( c), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, states in pertinent part as follows: 
... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, deposition, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter oflaw. 
Case law is well settled in Idaho and elsewhere that motions based upon Rule 
12(b)(6) require the trial court to draw all inferences from the record in favor ofthe non-moving 
party. As the Court stated in Young v. City of Ketchum, Idaho, 1157, 1159 (2002) [citing] 
Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 961, 895 P.2d 561, 562 (1995) [citing in turn] 
Miles v.Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 P.2d 757,759 (1989), 
After drawing all inferences in the non-moving party's favor, we then ask whether 
a claim for reliefhas been stated. [citation omitted] "the issue is not whether the 
plaintiffwill ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to 
support the claims." [citation omitted] 
Case law is likewise clear that if the Court in the process of its analysis pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)( 6) considers matters outside the pleadings, then the Court must consider the Rule 
12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment governed by Rule 56. See, for example, 
Hellickson v. Jenkins, Idaho Ct. App., 796 P.2d 150, 153 (1990). In the Hellickson case, the 
Court 0 f Appeals concluded, among other things, that the magistrate's judic ial notice of probate 
files constituted a consideration of matters outside the pleadings, and the fact the magistrate had 
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not treated the matter as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 was a key element in its 
reversal of the decision before it. 
In this case Plaintiff characterizes her motion to dismiss initially as a motion based 
upon Rule 12(b)(6) on the premise that the law (i.e., §§10-1110 and 10-1111) clearly do not 
authorize the actions taken by the State ofIdaho. However, Plaintiff also realizes that to grant 
Plaintiff the relief she seeks, this Court at a minimum must interpret both § § 10-1110 and 11-1111 
and perhaps consider other matters outside the pleadings, including but not necessarily limited to 
issues related to legislative intent in the event the Court disagrees that the statutory language is 
clear and unambiguous. Therefore, out of an abundance of caution Plaintiff has pled the motion 
in the alternative to give the Court the greatest possible leeway in its determination of the matters 
pending before it. 
III. THE PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF §§ 10-1110 AND 10-1111(2) 
AS AMENDED BY THE 2011 LEGISLATURE DOES NOT ALLOW THE RENEWAL 
OF THE EXPIRED JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE 
Section 10-1111 (2)5 is restated in its entirety as follows, with the provision directly 
governing this matter emphasized by underlining: 
Unless the judgment has been satisfied, and prior to the expiration of the lien 
created in section 10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof, a court that has 
entered a judgment for child support may, upon motion, renew such judgment. 
The renewed judgment may be enforced in the same manner as the original 
judgment, and the lien established thereby shall continue for ten (10) years from 
the date of the renewed judgment. 
"The lien" referred to in § 10-1111 is found in the following language from § 1 0-
5 As amended by the 2011 Legislature. 
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11106, emphasized by underlining 
A transcript or abstract of any judgment or decree of any court ofthis state ... 
may be recorded with the recorder of any county of this state, who shall 
immediately record and docket the same as by law provided, and from the time of 
such recording, and not before, the judgment so recorded becomes a lien upon all 
real property of the judgment debtor in the county, not exempt from execution, 
owned by him at the time or acquired afterwards at any time prior to the expiration 
of the lien; provided that where a transcript or abstract is recorded of any 
judgment or decree of divorce or separate maintenance making provision for 
installment or periodic payment of sums for maintenance of children ... , such 
judgment or decree shall be a lien only in an amount for payments so provided, 
delinquent or not made when due .... A lien arising from the delinquency of a 
payment due under a judgment for support of a child issued by an Idaho court 
continues until five (5) years after the death or emancipation of the last child for 
whom support is owed under the judgment unless the underlying judgment is 
renewed, .... [emphasis added] 
It is the intent of the Legislature that is paramount,1 and where the statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, as Plaintiff asserts this language is, ''this Court must give effect 
to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction." State v. Rhode, Idaho, 988 
P.2d 685, 688 (1999) [citing] State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578,581 (1995). 
"Unless the result is palpably absurd," this Court must assume that the Legislature said what it 
meant and meant what it said. Rhode at 688 [citing] Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 299, 715 P.2d 
968,969 (1986). If the pertinent statutory language is clear and unambiguous, this Court is not 
allowed to engage in statutory construction. See Thomas v. Worthington, 132 Idaho 825, 979 
P.2d 1183, 1187 (1999), wherein the Court stated as follows: 
Statutory interpretation begins with an examination ofthe literal words of the 
6As amended by the 2011 Legislature. 
7See Ada County Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, 123 Idaho 425, 428,849 
P.2d 98, 101 (1993) 
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statute. [citing] State ex reI. Lisby v. Lisby, 126 Idaho, 776, 779, 890 P.2d 727, 730 
(1995). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious and rational 
meaning.ld. In attempting to discern and implement the intent of the legislature, 
the Court may seek edification from the statute's legislative history and 
contemporaneous context at enaction. [citing] Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. 
Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 416,849 P.2d 83, 89 (1993). However, if statutory 
language is clear and unambiguous, the Court need merely apply the statute without 
engaging in any statutory construction. [citing] State v. Hagerman Water Right 
Owners, Inc., l30 Idaho 727, 732, 947 P.2d 400,404 (1997). 
The statutory language of § 10-1111 (2) clearly and plainly states that a judgment for 
child support can only be renewed, if at all, prior to the expiration ofthe lien created in section 10-
lllQ. The statutory language of § 10-1110, in turn, clearly and plainly states that the lien it 
creates is valid only for five (5) years after Erik's emancipation, which at the latest was April 20, 
2007. Therefore, the clear and plain language of these statutes as amended in 2011 allows a 
renewal of the judgment against Plaintiff only ifit occurred prior to April 20, 2007 at the latest. 
Otherwise the renewal is time-barred. 
In anticipation that the DHW will take a differing view ofthe statutory language, 
and offer a differing interpretation of the language of §§ 10-1110 and 1111 to the Court, it is 
important to note that differing interpretations ofthe statutory language do not establish 
ambiguity. See, for example, Payette River Property Owners Ass 'n v. Board, 132 Idaho 551, 976 
P.2d 477, 483 (1999). Ambiguity is established, if at all, where "reasonable minds might differ or 
be uncertain as to its meaning." Payette River at 483 [citing] Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 
854,856,891 P.2d 801, 801 (Ct.App.l995) Plaintiff believes that the operative statutory language 
quoted above is so clear and unambiguous that reasonable minds cannot differ or be uncertain 
about its meaning. 
IV. THE RETROACTIVITY PROVISIONS OF §1O-1111 DO NOT CREATE AN 
8 
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AMBIGUITY IN THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND CAN BE HARMONIZED 
WITH THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDrv1ENT WITHOUT "P ALP ABLE 
ABSURDITY" 
In anticipation that the DHW may argue that § 1 0-1111 (5) creates an ambiguity 
justifYing the application of rules of statutory construction, Plaintiff elects to treat that provision 
separately from the provisions discussed above. Section 5 of § 1 0-1111 states in pertinent part as 
follows: 
... this act shall be in full force and effect on and after its passage and approval, 
and retroactively to July 1, 1995, and shall apply to all orders currently being 
enforced by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Child Support Program 
such that any Idaho judgment for child support that would otherwise have expired 
since July 1, 1995, may be renewed on or before December 30,2011. 
It is clear from the above language that "this act," whatever that act is, "shall apply 
to all orders currently being enforced [by DHW]." "This act" obviously refers to the 2011 
amendments discussed above, and included in and integral to those amendments is the provision in 
§ 10-1111 (2) that forbids the renewal of a judgment for child support unless the order renewing the 
iudgment occurs "prior to the expiration of the lien created in section 10-1110, Idaho code, or anv 
renewal thereo f .... " [§ 10-1111 (2)] In other words, the retroactive language of the amendments 
makes "the act" applicable to "any" judgment for child support "that would otherwise have expired 
since July 1, 1995" as long as the lien created by § 1 0-111 0 and applied by § 1 0-1111 has not yet 
expired. 
It is certainly not "palpably absurd" as discussed in the Rhode case above to 
conclude that the 2011 Legislature intended to limit the retroactive application of the Amendment 
to circumstances where the lien created by § 1 0-111 0 and applied by § 1 0-1111 has not yet expired. 
Indeed, part ofthe Amendment itselfin § 10-1111 (2) was to include the "prior to the expiration of 
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the lien created in section lO-IllO" language. 
Furthermore, the act itself (Section 5) states it is applicable to "any" judgment for 
child support - not "all" judgments for child support. Ifthe Legislature had intended to make the 
Amendment applicable to "all" judgments for child support without exception, it could easily have 
so stated, but did not. Reading the provisions of §10-1111(2) and (5) together and harmonizing 
them with each other it seems clear that Section 5 makes the Amendment applicable only to Idaho 
child support judgments where the lien created by § 1 0-1110 is still in effect. 8 
In fact, such a limitation makes a great deal of sense, because it avoids to a great 
extent, if not entirely, the issue of "vested rights," i.e., the argument that once a statute of 
limitation has barred a claim, a vested right to assert the bar as a defense arises, and the claim 
cannot thereafter be resurrected and pursued against the person in whom the right is vested. 
Plaintiffbelieves that the running of the statute oflimitations on or before April 20, 2007 created in 
her the vested right to assert the bar as a defense, and that the 20 II Legislature recognized such 
vested right in its statutory scheme. However, even if the Court disagrees that the 2011 
Legislature intended to recognize her vested rights, Plaintiff believes and asserts that the 
Amendment cannot take away those rights as a matter oflaw, as discussed in the following section 
ofPlaintitrs argument. 
V. NOTWITHSTANDING THE 2011 AMENDMENTS TO §§10-1110 AND 10-1111 
[AND 5-245 FOR THAT MATTER9], PLAINTIFF HAD A VESTED RIGHT IN THE 
8The statute must be construed as a whole. Leliefeldv. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 
III (1983), appeal after remand, III Idaho 897, 728 P.2d 1306 (1986); 
9 Although §5-245 was also amended by the 2011 Legislature and also relates to the 
collection of child support arrearages, the present Motion is limited to the renewal ofthe 
underlying child support judgment, which the undersigned determined was not pertinent to §5-
10 
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE EXISTING PRIOR TO THE 2011 
AMENDMENTS WHICH CANNOT BE TAKEN A WAY BY SUBSEQUENT 
LEGISLATION 
The theory espoused by DHW is that the amendments to §§1O-111O and 10-1111 
authorize DHW to "renew any Idaho child support judgment currently being enforced by the 
Department, which otherwise could be deemed to have expired since July 1, 1995." [DHW 
Motion, p. 2J Plaintiff does not believe that was the intent of the 2011 Legislature. As the 
discussion in Section IV above shows, the clear and unambiguous language of § § 1 0-111 0 and 10-
1111 reflects otherwise. However, in the event the Court disagrees with Plaintiff's position, 
Plaintiff asserts that the applicable statute of limitations barred actions both to renew the original 
judgment and all actions to enforce the same on April 20, 2007 at the latest, and any attempt by the 
Legislature to resurrect the judgment must fail as a violation of Plaintiff's rights to Due Process of 
Law under the Constitutions ofthe United States and the State ofIdaho. 
Thus, the issue before this Court is therefore whether a child support order which 
had previously expired pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations in effect at the time of its 
expiration may be resurrected by an amendment, applied after the fact of expiration, purporting to 
extend that statute of limitations. As is discussed in more detail in the following arguments, once a 
child support order has expired under the then-applicable statute oflimitations, a vested right to 
assert the bar of the statute of limitations arises, and any subsequent attempt to revive or resurrect 
it must fail as a matter oflaw. 
Roarkv. Crabtree, Utah, 893 P. 2d 1058 (1995), although not an Idaho case, is a 
245. However, in the event the Court determines otherwise, Plaintiff reserves all rights she may 
have to contest §5-245 and its application to her circumstances. 
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case on point and offers a thoughtful discussion of the pertinent issues which Plaintiff hopes this 
Court will fmd persuasive. Furthermore, the Roark opinion espouses the majority rule, 10 which 
Plaintiff hopes this Court will follow. 
In Roark a female plaintiff filed a civil action for damages against a man arising out 
of alleged sexual assaults against her while she was a teenager and under the age of 18. Under 
Utah law, all claims arising from such abuse were tolled until she was 18 years old. Thereafter, 
tort claims for assault and battery had to be brought within one (1) year and claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress within four (4) years, i.e., December 1, 1980, or be time-barred by 
the applicable statute oflimitations. No lawsuit was filed prior to December 1, 1980. 
Some twelve (12) years later, in 1992, the Utah Legislature passed §78-12-25.1, 
Utah Code, a statute entitled "Civil Actions for Sexual Abuse of a Child" (the "Amendment"). 
Pursuant to that Amendment, a person was allowed to file a civil action "for intentional or 
negligent sexual abuse suffered as a child within four years after discovery of the sexual abuse." 
[emphasis added] Roark at 1060. Roark in 1993 filed her civil action on the basis ofthe 
Amendment and the allegation that she only recently discovered the connection between the sexual 
abuse suffered as a child and her current (i.e., 1993) extreme mental and emotional distress. 
The trial court dismissed Roark's complaint on Crabtree's motion to dismiss on the 
basis that "Roark's claims were time barred under the pre-1992 statutes of limitations and that 
section 78-12-25.1 could not be applied retroactively to revive those claims." Roark at 1060. 
Plaintiff recognizes that in the Roark case the Utah Legislature had not opted for 
retroactive application of the Amendment, whereas in the case before this Court the Idaho 
I°Roark at 1063. 
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legislature has specifically manifested its intention that §§ 11-111 0, 11-1111 and 5-254 be applied 
retroactively. However, that fact is oflittle, if any, consequence to this case. The rule of decision 
in Roark is based entirely upon whether the defense of statute of limitations is a vested right and 
not upon legislative intent. Indeed, the only reason legislative intent was even discussed in Roark 
in the first place was because it was raised by Roark as a reason to apply the Amendment 
retroactively, even though not mandated by the Utah legislature. 
The Roark Court specifically defmed the issue it was deciding as: 
whether the defense of statute oflimitations is a vested right. Phrased differently, 
can a claim which was barred under the then-applicable statute oflimitations be 
revived by a subsequent extension ofthe limitation period?" Roark at 1062. 
The Roark Court answered the question in the negative, following the majority rule 
and citing a number of authorities therefor: Davis & McMillan v. Industrial Accident Comm 'n, 
198 Cal. 631, 246 P.l046, 1048 (1926); Corbett v. General Eng'g & Mach. Co., 160 Fla. 879, 37 
So.2d 161, 162 (1948); Spitcaufsky v. Hatten, 365 Mo. 94, 182 S.W.2d 86, 104 (1944), overruled 
on other grounds, Director of Dept' of Revenue v. Parcels of Land Encumbered with Delinquent 
Tax Liens, 555 S.W.2d 293,297 (Mo.1977); Waldrop v. Hodges, 230 N.C. 370, 53 S.E.2d 263, 
265 (1949); Dunham v. Davis, 229 S.c. 29, 91 S.E.2d 716, 718-19 (1956); and the following 
citation from 51 AmJur.2d limitation of actions §44 (1970): 
"[T]he great preponderance of authority favors the view that one who has become 
released from a demand by the operation of the statute oflimitations is protected 
against its revival by a change in the limitation law." Accordingly, "after a cause of 
action has become barred by the statute oflimitations the defendant has a vested 
right to rely on that statute as a defense . .. which cannot be taken away by 
legislation ... or by affirmative act, such as lengthening ofthe limitation period." 
[emphasis maintained in citation] 
Although the undersigned has yet to find an Idaho case directly on point, there 
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are a number ofIdaho cases which recognize the existence and sacrosanct nature of vested rights 
and strongly suggest the same result as the Roark case cited above. For example, in the case of In 
the matter of Hidden Springs Trout Ranch, Inc. v. Allred, 102 Idaho 623, 636 P.2d 745 (1981) an 
applicant for a water appropriation permit claimed he was negatively affected by an amendment to 
the Idaho Code while his application was pending. Hidden Springs, pp. 745-746. Although the 
Hidden Springs court ultimately determined that the applicant in that case had no vested right that 
was affected by the subsequent legislation, it is its discussion ofvested rights themselves which is 
critical for purposes of this case. First, the Hidden Springs court recognized the importance of 
"vested rights," meaning "already existing rights." Hidden Springs at 746. Secondly, it held at 
747 that because the applicant's right was not such a right, it was "not therefore a right rising to 
any vested level which would preclude application ofthe amended [statute]." [emphasis by 
underlining added] Needless to say, if the right in question in the Hidden Springs case had been 
vested, the amended statute would not and could not have been applied to negate it. 
In Engen v. James, 92 Idaho 690, 448 P.2d 977 (1969), the Idaho Supreme Court, 
in construing whether a retired policman's vested pension rights could be negatively affected by an 
act passed by the Legislature after his retirement, observed at 980 that "ifrespondent [the retired 
policemen] had acquired pension rights under [the statute in place at his retirement], those existing 
rights could not be taken from him by a later act of the legislature." [emphasis by underlining 
added] 
In Olsen v. J. A. Freeman Co., Idaho, 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990) the 
Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the trial court's sumrnarydecision that Olsen's cause of action was 
barred by Idaho's products liability statute of repose. Olsen at 1287. In concluding that the 
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statute of repose was a legitimate exercise ofthe Legislature's authority, the Olsen Court cited 
with approval the case of Rosenberg v. Town of Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972) 
for the proposition that the Legislature has the power ''to abolish rights that have not yet vested," 
[emphasis added] as reflected in the Rosenberg Court's ruling [293 A.2d at 667] that "[t]he 
Legislature is entirely at liberty to create new rights or abolish old ones as long as no vested right 
is disturbed. Olsen at 1298. [emphasis added]. 
In Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 448 P.2d 209, Idaho, (1986) the Court 
at 214-215 recognized that "prevailing zoning ordinances" gave the applicant of a building or use 
permit a vested right at the time offiling for the permit, and the city's belated attempt to change 
the applicable zoning ordinance was ineffectual. [citing] State ex reI. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 
Wash.2d 294, 275 P.2d 899 (1954) 
In City of Garden City v. City of Boise, Idaho, 660 P.2d 1355 (1983) the Court 
discussed the retroactive application ofI.C. §67-6526 "eliminating recourse to district court as a 
means of settling overlapping impact area disputes" and held at 1358 as follows: 
Generally a statute will not be applied retroactively in the absence of clear 
legislative intent to that effect. 1. C. § 73-1 ° 1. [citing] Johnson v. Stoddard, 96 
Idaho 230,526 P.2d 835 (1974). However, it also is the rule in Idaho that 
retroactive legislation is only that which affects vested or already existing rights. 
[citing] Hidden Springs Trout Ranch, Inc., v. Allred, 102 Idaho 623, 624, 636 P.2d 
745, 746 (1981); Buckalew v. City of Grangeville, 100 Idaho 460,600 P.2d 136 
(1979) [emphasis by underlining added] 
The common thread among the cases cited above is the recognition of the validity 
and importance of vested rights and the fact that once possessed, such rights cannot be taken away 
by subsequent legislation. In this case Plaintiff had the "vested or already existing right" to assert 
the statute of limitations defense to an action by Defendant to renew the child support judgment 
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against her. That right accrued not later than April 20, 2007. At the same moment, any right to 
renew the judgment on the part of Defendant or the State ofIdaho on his behalf died and remained 
dead until 2011, when the State attempted to renew the judgment, alleging that the 2011 Idaho 
Legislature had decreed that the right of renewal had been resurrected. Plaintiff respectfully 
disagrees and urges the Court to adopt the rulings discussed above. 
v. CONCLUSION 
An integral part ofthe statutory scheme promulgated by the 2011 Idaho legislature 
is the provision in § 1 0-1111 that in order for the statute to apply retroactively, it must be renewed 
"prior to the expiration of the lien created in section 10-1110 .... " Since the lien created in § 10-
1110 expired, at the latest, on April 20, 2007, it is now impossible to renew the judgment and, of 
course, impossible to apply the amendments retroactively. 
Regardless of the 2011 amendments, the pending Motion must fail because it is 
legally impossible for the Legislature to retroactively abolish a vested right. Plaintiff's right to 
assert the statute of limitations defense is such a right, and the Motion must therefore fail on that 
basis alone. 
DATED this {'Z-- day of December, 2011. 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF CANYON 
DEBRA A. PETERSON, 
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v. 
MYRON G. PETERSON; 
Defendant. 
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REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF RENEWED 
CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT 
The State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the "Department"), 
through its attorney, M. SCOTT KEIM, Deputy Attorney General, submlts the following reply 
brief in support of its "Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment." 
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ARGUM.ENT 
Idaho Code sections 10-1110 and 10-1111 express a clear and constitutional intent to 
retroactively allow the renewal of previously expired c,hild support judgments. Thus, the Court 
should renew the child support order and resulting judgment aga.inst Plaintiff should be granted, 
A - The :Qlain meaning of Idaho Code sections 10-1110, 10-1111 \ and the relevant session law 
expressly Qrovide for the renewal of the otherwise expired child support judgment. 
In her response to the Department's motion, Plaintiff Debra Peterson (hereinafter "Ms. 
Peterson") claims that the language of Idaho Code sections 10·1110 and I O~11 J t does not allow 
the renewal of the expired judgment. The Department believes this is a misreading of the clear 
and unambiguous intent of the legislation in question. 
Ms. Peterson correctly articulates the manner in which sec60ns 10-1110 and 10-1111 (1)-
(2) interact to bar the renewal of certain judgment liens. Section 10-1111 (2) provides for a 
judgment to be renewed if it has not previously been satisfied or "prior to the expiration of the 
lien created in section 10-1110." Section I 0-1110 provides that such a lien "continues until five 
(5) years after the death or emancipation of the .. , child ... unless the judgment is renewed," 
The department agrees with Ms, Peterson that this language operates to bar the renewal of a lien 
unless the underlying judgment has been renewed during the telTIl of the original lien. Any 
judgment not so renewed, i.e. not renewed within 5 years of the emancipation or death of the 
relevant child, in this case April 20, 2007, may be said to be expired. When read in isolation, the 
Department agrees with Ms. Peterson's interpretation of this language. However, the language of 
these provisions in isolation is insufficient to determine this case. A comprehensive 
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interpretation of the 2011 legislation that amended these sections reveals the legislature's clear 
expressed intent to provide for exactly the nature of renewed judgment requested here. 
~'ls. Peterson's interpretation of the effect of chapter 104 section 5 of the 2011 Session 
Laws is mistaken. As amended, section 5 of the session law reads in relevant part: 
"this act shall be jn full force and effect ... retroactively to July 1,1995, and shall apply 
to all orders currently being enforced by the ... Department . . . such that any Idaho 
judgment for child support that would otherwise have expired since July 1, 1995, may be 
rene\ved on or before December 30, 2011." 
Act of March 22,2011, eh. 104,2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 267-69 (as amended by Act of April 14, 
2011, eh. 331, 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 968). This retroactive language clearly evinces an intent to 
'revive' eertain expired judgments and to allow their renewal. Its application is expressly limited 
to a specific set of judg.ments "that would otherwise have expired" under the relevant law. It is 
well settled that "in detennining the ordinary meaning of a statute effect must be given to all the 
words ... , so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 
109, 138 P,3d 308, 309 (2006); Norton v. Dept. of Emp 't, 94 Idaho 924, 928, 500 P.2d 825, 829 
(I 972). If the renewal language of section 5 is to avoid superfluity, it must apply to at least some 
judgments "othervvise exp.ired" under statute. The mechanism for such expiration is provided by 
sections 10-1110 and 1 0-1111. 
Ms. Peterson asks the Court to read section 5 so as to "[make] 'the act' applicable to 
'any' judgment for child support ... as long as the lien created by § 10-1110 and applied by § 
10-1111 has not yet expired." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 9, Peterson v. 
expil:ation of the lien" any judgment may be renewed upon motion, If section 5 applies only to 
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judgments that could already be renewed utlder statute, it would have no effect whatsoever. This 
result is impermissible under Ida11Q la,v as articulated in A1ercer and Norton. Instead, it is 
perfectly reasonable to conclude that the legislature, reeo gnizing that sections 1 O~ 111 0 and 10-
11 JIhad the effect of preventing the renewal of certain child support and judgment liens, clearly 
and expressly acted retroactively to create a temporary period during which certain otherwise 
expired judgments could be renewed. 
B. - The legislature's expressed intent to apply the terms of section 5 is presUITl,Rtivc1y 
constitutional and should be applied. 
Ms. Peterson further attempts to defend her position by arguing that the statute 
impermissibly disturbs what she calls a "vested right" to avoid her obligation to pay accrued 
child support. She defines her vested right in this case as the right to avoid reinstatement of any 
child support obligation that has expired. 
From the outset it should be noted that if section 5 is to have any meaning at all, it must 
permit the reinstatement of at least some child support judgments '''that would otherwise have 
expired." That is to say that the only permissible interpretation of the provision under Mercer 
and Norton requires a disruption of at least some "vested rights" as defined by Ms. Peterson. 
Since the statute's unambiguous language requires disruption of these so-called "vested rights/' 
Ms- Peterson's argument, in order to succeed, must amount to a facial attack on the 
constitutionality of the provision. "It is generally presumed that legislative acts are constitutional, 
that the state legislature has acted within its constitutional powers, and any doubt concerning 
interpretation of a statute is to be resolved in favor of that which will render the statute 
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constitution.aL" A1eisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 258~ 260, 954 P.2d 676, 678 (1998) (citing 
Olsen v. lA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706~ 709, 791 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990». Thus, the burden 
of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality Iles with the party c.hallenging the statute, in 
this case Ms. Peterson. It! Ms. Peterson has failed to carry her burden. 
As the Department articulated in its "Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment", both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Idaho Supreme Court have 
found that retroactive legislation in the context of civil statutes is pennissible. Ms. Peterson 
raises no challenge to this general presumption. 
Instead, she cites Utah case law for the proposition. that "vested rights," once settled, may 
not be altered by subsequent changes to statutes of limitations. While it is not clear that the 
present case involves a statute of limitations as such, it is not necessary to reach this question. 
Ms. Peterson misunderstands her 0'\-'111 case law. In Roark, the Utah Supreme Court took great 
palns to "note that [the statute in question] contains no express declaration of retroactivity ... 
[and] that the legislature did not intend the section to app1y retroactively." Roark v. Crabtree, 
893 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1995). The court then engages in analysis of whether the statute 
might apply retroactively, despite the lack of express legislative intent to do so, because the 
statute was "procedural in nature." Id It is only in this context that the court examines whether 
or not a "vested Tighe' was created. ld. Thus, Roark, and the so-called "majority rule" cases only 
stand for the proposition that "time barred claims [may not be revived] through retroactive 
application of extended statutes of limitations" where those statutes are not expressly made 
retroactive by the legislature.ld (emphasis added). . . 
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The Idaho case law that Ms. Peterson cites is inapplicable for the same reason: each case 
cited deals with the construction of a statute not expressly made retroactive to avoid retroactive 
application. In this case, the Idaho legislature made its express intent for retroactive application 
abundantly clear. Not only does section 5 include the phrase} "this act shall be in full force and 
effect ... retroactively," but the legislature subsequently and specifically amended section 5 to 
take effect "retroactively to July 1,1995." 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 267-69; 2011 Idaho Sess. 
Laws 968 (emphasis added). Illustrating her confusion over the issue, Ms. Peterson cites in her 
ovm brief City o/Garden City v. City o/Boise for the proposition that "it is ... the rule in Idaho 
that retroactive 1 egislation is only that which affects vested or already existing rights." 1 04 Idaho 
512,515,660 P.2d 1355, 1358 (1983). 
In other words, legislation that is not retroactive will not be interpreted to aftect "vested 
fIghts." The cases c.ited by Ms. Peterson thoroughly examine the principle underlying this rule. 
The legislature understood this rule when constructing its amendments to Idaho Code sections 
10-1 .1 10 and 1 0-1111. For that reason,' the legislature made its intent to apply section 5 
retroactively express and clear in the language it used. Ms. Peterson, who carries the burden of 
. demonstrating that the expressed intent of the legislature falls outside its constitutional authority, 
has provided no argwnent that this retroactive application is constitutiona.lly impermissible. As a 
result, the statute should be applied and the judgment against Ms. Peterson renewed. 
CONCLUSION 
Idaho Code sections 10-1110 and 10-1111 contain a dear and express provision 
providing a temporary period for child support jud~-nents otherwise expired to be renewed. 
Although statutes affecting so-called "vested rights" must be made expressly retroactive, the 
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legislature has done so here. Absent any showing the legislature's action was outside its 
"constitutional bounds, the statutes should be applied to permit renewal of the child support 
judgment against Ms. Peterson. The proposed Rene\ved Child Support Judgment should be 
executed and Ms. Peterson's Motion to Dismiss should be denied. 
DATED This _..:..!_S __ day of February, 2012. 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
M. SCOTT KElM 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CASE NO. CV -1985-681 O-C 
Plaintiff, MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
vs. 
MYRON G. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff by and through Counsel and moves this 
Court to reconsider entry of Renewed Child Support Judgrnent in the above matter and 
make the following alterations and amendments to the said Decree as herein set forth: 
1. This motion is based upon the provision:) of Rule 1 1 (a)(2)(B) or alternatively 
Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment; or altematively Rule 60 relief from 
the judgment or order. 
2. It is not contested that I.e. 10:1110 and I.e. 10-1111(2) together interact to 
bar the renewal of certain judgment liens. I.e. 10-1111(2) provides that a 
judgment may be renewed if it has not been previously satisfied or "prior to 
the lien created in section 10-1110." Section 1 0: 111 0 provides that such a lien 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDER:\ TION - Page 1 
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I 
continues until five (5:j years after the death or emancipation of the . --
chUd ... unless the judgmLt is renewed. It is clear i.n this record that the child 
support judl'ment in thj~ case was not renewed before the five year statute of 
I 
.limitations expired. I 
I 
The State however, argued that the retroactivity clause lmmps the other 
language providing for +ar. That language is as follows: 
"This act shall be in fulr force and effect. .. retroactive to July 1, 1995, and 
shaH. apply to all orders!currently being enforced by the ... Department ... 
such that any Idaho jud,gment for chil.d support that would otherwise have 
expired since July I, 1995, may be renewed on or before December 30, 2011." 




1 I. . I 4. The State argued t 1at ~he emphasIzed language of the retroacilve cause 
6. 
demonstrates an intentiln of the legislature to extend the time to renew a 
i 
I 
judgment even though t1e tIve year bar had expired to renew the judgment so 
long as the child su*port order is "culTently being enforced by the 
Department ~l I 
The record of this proCe~ding, however, is void of any evidence that the child 
I 
support order in this caJe is "cun-cntly being enforced" either in Idaho or in . .. I 
Utah where the Plajntiff~esides. 
i 
I 
No child support has bern collected in Idaho from April of 2007, which was 
I 
five years after the date; of emancipation of the child, up to the date of the 
I 
filing of the motion to ~ismiss this action, or for that matter in the State of 
i 
Utah where the Plai.ntiffhas resided during that period oftime. 
I 
Neither can the State suJport it's claim that the child support order in this case 
I 
is "currently being enf0rd" from the date of emancipation of the chi Id up to 
iV[OTION FOR RECONSIDERA .. TIbN - Page 2 
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April of 2007 by the collection of any child support or by any action in court 
to enforce the child support order. Certainly; the State has produced no 
evidence of such attempts either before the five year bar to renew a judgment 
or since. 
8. Once the five year limitation to renew a judgment lien ran without being 
renewed, the retroactivity clause has no appl.ication and there is a 
constitutional problem with such enforcement inasmuch as Plaintiff has been 
denied due process based upon a vested right she has by virtue of the five year 
bar to enforce ajudgmcnt under Idaho Jmv. 
For the reasons herein cited, Plaintiff requests tIle Court reconsider Plaintiff's Motion 
to Dismiss, and grant such motion. 
~ 
Dated this _-.:/ __ day of~~, 2012. 
Richard 1. Harris 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The nndersigned does hereby certify that a true and correct copy oftb.e foregoing 
document was served on "('vI, Scott Keim, Oftice of the Attorney General, by facsimile on 
thetnd day of March 2012 to (208) 334·5548. 
iLOlli-t;/ 
Richard L. Harris 
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APR 04 2012 
C,A.mON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, COlJNTY OF CANYON 
DEBRA A. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MYRON G. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO.: CV-1985-0006810-C 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER 
TIle State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the "Department"), 
through its attorney, M. SCOTT KEIM, Deputy Attorney General, submits the following reply 
briefin opposition to Plaintiffs "Motion to Reconsider.;; 
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ARGUMENT 
A. Continuous enforcement of the child support order is an uncontested matter of the factual 
record in this casco 
On her motion for reconsideration, Ms. Peterson claims that the child support order 
against her expired because it was not continually enforced. She has not previously introduced 
any evidence to support this claim ai'ld does not now offer any new evidence that might 
appropriately be considered on reconsideration. Furthermore, having failed to support her claim 
by affidavit or other evidence, Ms. Peterson is barred by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3) 
from serving any such affidavit now, less than 14 days prior to the date set for hearing of her 
motion to reconsider. 
ft. The Department filed Stephanie West's "Affidavit in Support of Mation for Renewed 
Child Support Judgment" with this Court on August 10,20 II. In that affidavit, Ms. West 
specifically affirmed that "The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Bureau of Child 
Support has continuously attempted to enforce the support obligation." She further affirmed that 
the Bureau "first began attempts to enforce the support obligation. - . on January 26, 1998," and 
that the Bureau has "maintained documentation of all accruals, payments, and credits relating to 
the support obligation ... since enforcement attempts began." (emphasis added) Had Ms. 
Peterson challenged Ms. West's claim of continuous enforcement with any evidence, or in fact at 
all, prior to her counsels baJd assertions at oral argument and through this motion to reconsider, 
the Department would have been more than capable of responding to her claims appropriate1y. 
However, the issue of continuous enforcement was uncontroverted in the factual record and 
necessarily decided by thjs Court in its ruling renewing the child support order. Ms. Peterson 
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carllot novi challenge the factual record she accepted by silence throughout the long course of 
this litigation. 
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In her motion, Ms. Peterson continues to claim that her successful avoidance of her 
payment obligations since August of2007 somehow discharges her ongoing obligation. Apart 
from the apparent absurdity ofthis result, this argument represents a resurrection of Ms. 
Peterson's argument, rejected by this Court through its ruling, that the Department cannot show 
continuous enforcement of the child support order if it cannot demonstrate renewal of the support 
order under Idaho Code sections 1 O~ 111 0 and 10-I 111 prior to five years after the last date of 
emancipation. As was discussed in detail both in the briefs and at oral argument before the Court, 
this interpretation of the law is impermissible as it would render the retroactivity clause of 
chapter 104, section 5 of the 2011 Session Laws completely meaningless. Department's "Reply 
Briefln Support of Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment" at 3. The Court has 
already decided the issue and Ms. Peterson's motion for reconsideration presents no new 
argument or factual basis to merit its reconsideration. 
B. - Ms. Peterson's claim of a "constitutiona1 problem" with reinstatement of the child support 
order has no merit, and in anv event has been previously rejected by this Court. 
Ms. Peterson also claims there is a constitutional problem with reinstating the child 
support order after the five year bar to enforce a judgment has passed. First, this argument was 
extensively briefed and argued before this Court in its consideration of the Motion for Entry of 
Renewed Child Support Judgment and must necessarily have been decided in the court's ruling 
so renewing the nlljng. See Department's "Reply Brief" at 4-6. In her arguments, Ms. Peterson 
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cited a list of cases holding that statutes not expressly made retroactive should not be applied 
retroactively against those whose rights had otherwise become "vested", In this instance, the 
session laws expressly included the phrase "shall be retroactive" and the necessity of retroactive 
application was obvious. Departmenf s "Reply Brief' at 6. The Department's brief closed by 
stating that "Ms. Peterson, who cfulies the burden of demonstrating that the expressed intent of 
thelegislMure falls outside its constitutional authority, has provided no argument that this 
retroactive: application IS constitutionally impennissible." Id. Ms. Peterson not only failed to do 
s() in her briefs or at oral argument, but fails to do so now. Even if she could present such an 
argument, its is not appropriate at this stage as she had every opportunity to do so previously and 
the Court necessarily considered the issue in ordering renewal of the support order against her. 
At this point she has waived any arguments other than those previously rejected by the court or 
summarily alluded to in her motion to reconsider. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Peterson asks the court to reconsider on the basis of her bald assertion that the child 
support order against her was not continuously enforced and the claim that its renewal violates 
some unspecified constitutional protection. She does so despite an uncontroverted factual record 
showing the Department's continuous enforcement of her case and this Court's prevIou.s 
rejection of her constitutional claims. She presents no new evidence and advances no new 
argument in support of her contentions. On the basis of the uncontroverted factual record, the 
legal arguments on record~ and the CQurt's previous ruling, the Department respectfully reql.Tests 
that Ms. Peterson's motion to reconsider be denied. 
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DATED this 4: day of April, 2012. 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
t1.d#-~ M. CO. I 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certiry that on this t;- day of April, 2012, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIE.F IN OPPOSITION OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER was served upon: 
Richard Harris 
Attorney at Law 
P.O Box 1328 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
D u.s. Mail o Hand Delivery o Overnight Mail 
lZl Facsimile: o Statehouse Mail 
M.SCOT 1M 
Deputy Attorney General 
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RICHARD L. HARRIS 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1328 
Caldwell, Id. 83606-1438 
Telephone (208) 459-1588 
Facsimile (208) 459-1300 
ISB # 1387 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
L E If 
~'--_...,..r\.rv1. P.M. 
MAY .. 3 2012 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
K CANO, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DEBRA A. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











CASE NO. CV-1985-6810-C 
SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff by and through Counsel And submits 
the following Supplemental Argument in support of its motion to reconsider: 
1. Orders currently being enforced. 
The governments argument as to the retroactive application of the child support statute is 
based upon that provision of the statute which states: 
"This act shall be in full force and effect...retroactive to July 1, 1995, and shall 
apply to all orders currently being enforced by the ... Department ... such that any 
Idaho judgment for child support that would have expired since July 1, 1995, may 
be renewed on or before December 30,2011." 
The real issue in this matter is not whether there has been a continuous and/or 
current enforcement of the order but rather that the stature of limitations applicable to the 
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facts here has run. The child in question turned 18 in 2002. The judgment, if any, if not 
renewed expired in 2007. The Judgment was not renewed. A statute of limitations runs 
at a certain date an hour. It runs by its terms whether there is activity going on or not. 
The terms applicable here depends on whether the judgment has been renewed regardless 
of whether there is activity (attempts to enforce the order). Once the time limit is up 
according to the terms of the statute, there is a complete bar to further attempts to enforce 
the order or not. And that is what occurred here. The statute of limitations ran without a 
renewal of the judgment which became a complete bar as to enforcement of the order. 
That bar occurred in 2007. The bar was a valuable right which became vested in the 
Plaintiff. An Amendment to the law in 2011 cannot change the effect of that bar which 
occurred in 2007. The 2011 law cannot resurrect a vested right. The statute of 
limitations either ran vesting Plaintiff with that right or it did not run. The insertion of 
language of "currently being enforced" cannot be used by the government to resurrect a 
right, something that was long since extinguished by the operation of the statute of 
limitations. 
2. Retroactive application the "current enforcement clause" deprives 
Plaintiff of due process of law because of the vested right inherent in the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
As stated above the five year statute of limitations in this case expired in 2007 
because the order or judgment for child support was not renewed. The application of the 
statute of limitations became a vested in favor of the Plaintiff and acted as a bar to future 
enforcement of that order. To make the 2011 amendments retroactive is to deny Plaintiff 
of a right which she obtained by virtue of the statute of limitations and to the extent that 
right is taken away from here amounts to a denial of due process of law. See City of 
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Garden City v. City of Boise, 660 P.2d 1355 (1983) and Ben Lomand, Inc. v. City of 
Idaho Fails, 448 P.2d 209 (1980). 
Respectfully submitted this "!> day of May, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing document was served on M. 
Scott Keirn by facsimile (208) 334-5548 on the i day fMay, 2012. 
Richard L. Harris 
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RICHARD 1. HARRIS 
Attorney at Law 
'P.O. Box 1328 
Caldwell,Id. 83606-1438 
Telephone (208) 459-1588 
Facsimile (208) 459-1300 
ISB # 1387 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CANYON COUNTY CL.ERK 
K CANNON. DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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CASE NO. CV-1985-681O-C 
Plaintiff, NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. 
MYRON G. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
TO: MYRON G. PETERSON 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & WELFARE 
M. SCOTT KEIM, Attorney for the Dept. of Health & Welfare 
CLERK OF THE DCISTRICT COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Plaintiff! Appellant, Debra A. Peterson does hereby appeal to the District 
Court from the Order of the Magistrate denying Plaintiff! Appellants Motion 
To Dismiss and in the Alternative For Summary Judgment and Motion for 
Reconsideration entered on or about May 24, 2012, and from that Order 
granting Respondents Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment. 
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2. That Plaintiff/Appellant has the right to appeal to the District Court from the 
orders and judgments described in Paragraph 1 and are appealable orders 
pursuant to Rule II(a)(1). 
3. A preliminary statement of issues on appeal which Plaintiff/Appellant intends 
to assert on appeal as set forth hereafter; provided, however, does not prohibit 
Appellant from raising or asserting other issues. Those issues are as follows: 
a. Does the plain and unambiguous language of I.C. 10-1110 and 10-
1111(2) as amended by the 2011 legislature permit and allow 
retroactive renewal of an expired judgment in this case. 
b. Does the effect of an expired judgment in this case act as a bar to 
collection efforts when the judgment lien created by I.C. 10-1110 has 
expired by a failure to renew the judgment. 
c. Did Appellant have a vested right in the statute of limitations defense 
existing prior to the 2011 amendments which cannot be taken away by 
subsequent legislation? 
4. There is not an Order sealing any part of the record in this action. 
5. Appellant requests a transcript be made of the proceedings before the Court 
which occurred on February 17,2012 and May 24, 2012. 
6. Appellant requests that all pleadings, briefs and Orders be included as part of 
the Clerk's Record in this matter. 
7. A copy of this Notice has been served on the transcript department, Canyon 
County Clerk's Office for the preparation of the mentioned transcript. Fess 
will be made upon notification of the estimated costs thereof. 
8. That service of this Notice has been made required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 and to the Office of the Attorney General. 
Dated this /~ day of June, 2012. 
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Richard L. Harris 
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&ctlEA.k. E [) P.M. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
JUt. 1 0 2012 
CANYON COUNTY CL.IIitK 
K CANNON, OEI'UTV 
S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101 
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION 
M. SCOTT KEIM, ISB NO. 5879 
Deputy Attorney General 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
450 W. State Street, 10th Floor 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 334-5537 
Facsimile: (208) 334-5548 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF CANYON 
DEBRA A. PETERSON, CASE NO.: CV-1985-0006810-C 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FINAL ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
RENEWED JUDGMENT 
MYRON G. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
This matter came before this Court for hearing on a series of motions filed by the 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Health and Welfare, Child Support Services, being 
represented by its counsel of record Deputy Attorney General MICHAEL SCOTT KEIM; as 
well as Plaintiff DEBRA A. PETERSON being represented by her counsel of record Richard 
L. Harris; with the Honorable Judge Dayo Onanubosi presiding. Defendant Myron G. Peterson 
declined to appear. 
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The Court initially heard and considered the evidence and arguments presented by the 
parties in open court on February 17, 2012, whereupon the Court issued its decision in open 
court to DENY Plaintiff DEBRA A. PETERSON's Motion to Dismiss and in the Alternative 
for Summary Judgment and to GRANT the STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Health and 
Welfare, Child Support Services' Motionfor Renewed Child Support Judgment. 
Thereafter, on March 1, 2012 Plaintiff DEBRA A. PETERSON filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration, seeking to have this Court reevaluate the law and arguments relating to the 
issuance of a Renewed Child Support Judgment against Ms. Peterson. This matter was once 
again argued and presented to the Court on Plaintiffs Motionfor Reconsideration on May 24, 
2012 and the Court then once again made its findings and rulings on the record to DENY 
Plaintiffs Motionfor Reconsideration. 
Following issuance of its final ruling on May 24,2012 the Court requested counsel for 
the STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Health and Welfare, Child Support Services prepare an 
order memorializing the Court's Decisions. 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING, SUBJCT TO THE FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS PLACED ON THE RECORD AND ANNOUNCED IN OPEN COURT ON 
FEBRUARY 17, 2012 AND MAY 24, 2012 AND GOOD CAUSE APPEARING 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1) The STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Health and Welfare, Child Support 
Services' Motion for Renewed Child Support Judgment, is hereby GRANTED 
and Judgment should issue against Plaintiff DEBRA A. PETERSON in the 
amount of seven thousand one hundred twenty-five dollars and one cent 
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i 
($7,125.01) for past due child support in accordance with Idaho Code 10-1111 
as amended; 
2) Plaintiff DEBRA A. PETERSON's J\1otion to Dismiss and in the Alternative for 
Summary Judgment is DENIED; 
3) Plaintiff DEBRA A. PETERSON's Motion/or Reconsideration is DENIED. 
DATED This CyJh..day of __ <C'"_~.J--Y---+ ____ ' 2012. 
\ 
BLE DA YO O. ONANUBOSI 
Magistrate Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I am the duly elected and qualified Clerk of the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, and that on this __ 
day of JUL 1 0 2012 ,2012, I sent a copy of the foregoing FINAL ORDER ON 
MOTION FOR RENEWED JUDGMENT to the following individual(s) via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid: 
RICHARD 1. HARRIS 
Attorney at Law 
P.O Box 1328 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
M. Scott Keirn 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
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Richard L. Harris 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 1438 
1023 Arthm 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
Phone: (208) 459-1588 
Fax: (208) 459-1300 
ISB No. 1387 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
i L ~vIr,n 
____ A.M.~M. 
DEC 1 a 2012 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
K CANNON, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DEBRA A. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MYRON G. PETERSON, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 





) APPELLANT'S BRlEF ON APPEAL 
) FROM MAGISTRATE'S COURT 
) 
-----------------------------) 
Appeal from that certain FINAL ORDER ON MOTION FOR RENEWED JUDGMENT 
DATED July 9,2012 and entered on July 10, 2010 (the "Final Order") in the Magistrate's Court 
of the Third Judicial District of the State ofIdaho for Canyon County, the Honorable Magistrate 
Judge Dayo O. Onanubosi presiding. A copy of the Final Order is attached as Addendum "A." 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case is domestic in nature, and originated in the context of a divorce between the two 
named parties. This appeal arises from the attempts by the Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare, Bureau of Child Support ("DHW") to collect unpaid child support on behalf of 
Defendant-Respondent ii-om Plaintiff-Appellant which Plaintiff-Appellant contends are barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations. 
B. Course of Pro ceedings. 
On January 9, 1998 the District Court ordered Plaintiff-Appellant to pay child support (the 
"Child Support Order") for the parties' child Erik B. Peterson ("Erik"), whose date of birth is 
. Erik became emancipated on April 20, 2002 when he became 18 years of age; 
therefore, any child support allegedly owed by Plaintiff-Appellant had to have accmed between 
January 9, 1998, the date of the Child Support Order, and , Erik's 18th birthday. 
DHW alleges that, as of August 1,2011, the amount owed is $7,125.01, which Plaintif-Appellant 
disputes. 
The applicable statute of limitations relating to the collection of child support arrearages 
existing prior to amendments passed in 2011 was §5-245, Idaho Code, which provided in 
pertinent part that 
[a]n action of proceeding to collect child support arrearages must be commenced 
within five (5) years after the child reaches the age of majority ... 
In 2011 the Legislature passed Idaho Session Laws Chapter 104, which altered the 
existing child support collection scheme by amending §5-245, § 10-1110, and § 10-1111 (hereafter 
5 
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collectively referred to as the "Amendments"), and purpOlied to allow for retroactive application 
of the Amendments in certain instances. 
For example, the 2011 amendment of §5-245 provides in pertinent part that 
[a]n action or proceeding to collect child support arrearages, arising under an 
Idaho child support order, can be commenced at any time prior to the expiration of 
the resulting judgment or any renewal thereof. ... 
The amendment to § 1 0-111 0, among other things, allows for the creation of a lien against 
real property which arises ii-om child support arrearages but imposes a five (5) year limitation of 
the lien measured fi'om the death or emancipation of the child "unless the underlying judgment is 
renewed .... " The amendment to § 10-1111, among other things, purports to authorize DHW to 
renew "any Idaho child support judgment currently being enforced by [DHW] , which otherwise 
could be deemed to have expired since July 1, 1995." 
Based on the Amendments, DHW filed its Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support 
Judgment (the "Motion to Renew Judgment") on or about August 8, 2011, which is more than 
four (4) years after the expiration of the statute of limitations bar in §5-245 prior to the 
Amendments. 
In response, Debra filed her Motion to Dismiss and in the Alternative for Summary 
Judgment (the "Motion to Dismiss") on or about December 8, 2011, wherein she argued, inter 
alia, that (1) even under the language of the Amendments DHW is not entitled to resurrect the 
barred Child Support Order and (2) Plaintiff's right to assert the defense of statute of limitations is 
a vested right which cannot be taken from her by retroactive or retrospective legislation. 
The Magistrate Judge heard the Motion to Renew Judgment and the Motion to Dismiss on 
February 17, 2012, at which time the Court verbally denied the Motion to Dismiss. On or about 
6 
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March 1, 2012 Debra filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court heard and denied 011 
May 24,2012. As a result of the hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Magistrate 
Judge signed and entered its Final Order on Motion for Renewed Judgment (the "Final Order") on 
July 10, 2012. 
The instant appeal is from the Final Order 
C. Concise Statement of Facts. 
1. The parties to this action are the parents of Erik B. Peterson, born  
 ("Erik"), who is presently twenty-eight (28) years of age. 
2. Plaintiff was ordered to pay child support to Defendant on behalf of Erik 
pursuant to an order entered on January 9, 1998 by the Third District Court of Canyon County, 
Idaho in this proceeding CV-85-06810-C (the "Child Support Order.") (Affidavit of Stephanie 
West In Support of Motion for Renewed Child Support Judgment dated August 4,2011 (the 
"Affidavit"), ~ 2) 
3. Erik is the "last child for whom support is owed under the judgment" as 
contemplated by § 10-1110, Idaho Code, as amended. 
4. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Bureau of Child Support 
("DHW") purportedly began attempts to enforce the Child Support Order on January 26, 1998. 
Affidavit, ~ 3. 
5. DHW asserts that a judgment has arisen from the support instalhnents 
which became due in this matter in the amount of$7,125.01 as of August 1, 2011. 1 
1 Plaint iff contests the amount allegedly owed. 
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6. Erik became emancipated2 not later than April 20, 2002 when he reached 
the age of 18 years. Accordingly, any amounts of child support alleged owed by Plaintiff accmed 
between January 9, 1998 and Apri120, 2002. 
7. The applicable Statute of Limitations in effect prior to the amendments 
passed by the 2011 Idaho Legislature disallowed the commencement of"[a]n action or 
proceeding to collect child support arrearages,,3 after April 20, 2007, which is five (5) years after 
Erik reached his majority. 
8. The instant Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment dated 
August 4,2011 (the "Motion") was filed on or about August 8, 2011, which is more than four (4) 
years after the expiration of the statute of limitations in effect on April 20, 2007 and thereafter. 
9. The Motion in pertinent part "is brought pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1111 
as amended and modified by 2011 Idaho Session Laws §§ 104 and 331, which specifically allows 
for the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Bureau of Child Support to renew any Idaho 
child support judgment currently being enforced by the Department, which otherwise could be 
deemed to have expired since July 1, 1995." 
2The triggering event for the end of the statute of limitations on the lien arising fi'om § 10-
1110, Idaho Code, is based upon the child's "emancipation," which could conceivably occur prior 
to the child's 18th birthday. See definition of "emancipation" in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 
(Rev. 1968) For purposes of the pending motion, however, Plaintiff does not contend that Erik 
was emancipated prior to his 18th birthday, which in Idaho marks the end of Plaintiff's support 
obligations. See, for example, Noble v. Fisher, Idaho, 894 P.2d 118, 123 (1995) [citing] Walborn 
v. Walborn, 120 Idaho 494, 499-500,817 P.2d 160, 165-66 (1991) 
3Section 5-245, Idaho Code. 
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IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the plain and unambiguous language of §§10-1110 and 10-1111(2) as 
amended in 2011 precludes the renewal of a child support judgment against 
Plaintiff-Appellant because such judgment had expired subsequent to the 
expiration of the lien created by § 10-1110, and whether it was error for the 
Magistrate Judge to rule and construe the statutOlY language otherwise. 
B. Whether § 10-1111(5) of the Amendments creates an ambiguity within the 
Amendments which allowed the Magistrate Judge to engage in statutory 
construction of the Amendments to conclude that the renewal of a child support 
judgment against Plaintiff-Appellant was authorized by the Amendments. 
C. Whether Plaintiff-Appellant had a vested right in the statute of limitations defense 
to DHW's actions which cannot be taken away by subsequent legislation. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE APPLICABLE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN §10-1111, IDAHO CODE, MANDATES 
DISMISSAL OF THE STATE'S ACTION TO RENEW THE UNDERLYING 
JUDGMENT 
1. The Controlling Statutory Language is Clear and Unambiguous that No 
Judgment for Child Support Can be Renewed Unless the Motion 
Contemplated by § 10-1111 Is Filed Before the Expiration of the Lien 
Created by § 10-111 0, Which Was Not Done in This Case 
Legislative intent in Idaho is determined first from the actual language of the statute in 
question. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the Court to 
forego the application of any rules of statutory construction and enforce the statute according to 
its terms. Indeed, unless the result is "palpably absurd" this Court must assume that the 
9 
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Legislature meant what it said and enforce it as written. Only if the statute is ambiguous, i. e., if 
reasonable minds may differ or be uncertain about its meaning, can the Court engage any rules of 
statutory construction. Plaintiff believes that the applicable statutory language is clear and 
unambiguous and does not allow the renewal of the judgment against her sought by the DHW. 
Amended Section 10-1111 (2)4 is restated in its entirety as follows, with the provision 
directly relating to this matter emphasized by underlining: 
Unless the judgment has been satisfied, and prior to the expiration of the lien 
created in section 10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof, a court that has 
entered a judgment for child support may, upon motion, renew such judgment. 
The renewed Judgment may be enforced in the same manner as the original 
judgment, and the lien established thereby shall continue for ten (10) years from 
the date of the renewed judgment. 
"The lien" referred to in § 1 0-1111 is found in the following language from § 10-111 os, the 
parts directly relating to this matter again emphasized by underlining 
A transcript or abstract of any judgment or decree of any court of this state ... 
may be recorded with the recorder of any county of this state, who shall 
immediately record and docket the same as by law provided, and from the time of 
such recording, and not before, the judgment so recorded becomes a lien upon all 
real property of the judgment debtor in the county, not exempt from execution, 
owned by him at the time or acquired afterwards at any time prior to the expiration 
of the lien; provided that where a transcript or abstract is recorded of any 
judgment or decree of divorce or separate maintenance making provision for 
installment or periodic payment of sums for maintenance of children ... , such 
judgment or decree shall be a lien only in an amount for payments so provided, 
delinquent or not made when due .... A lien arising from the delinquency of a 
payment due under a judgment for support of a child issued by an Idaho court 
continues until five (5) years after the death or emancipation of the last child for 
whom support is owed under the judgment unless the underlying judgment is 
renewed, .... [emphasis added] 
4As amended by the 2011 Legislature. 
5 As amended by the 2011 Legislature. 
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It is the intent of the Legislature that is paramount,6 and where the statutory language is 
plain and unambiguous, as Plaintiff asserts this language is, "this Court must give effect to the 
statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction." State v. Rhode, Idaho, 988 P.2d 
685,688 (1999) [citing] State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365,913 P.2d 578,581 (1995). "Unless 
the result is palpably absurd," this Court must assume that the Legislature said what it meant and 
meant what it said. Rhode at 688 [citing] Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 299, 715 P.2d 968,969 
(1986). If the pertinent statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the Court is not allowed to 
engage in statutory construction. See Thomas v. Worthington, 132 Idaho 825, 979 P.2d 1183, 
1187 (1999), wherein the Court stated as follows: 
Statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the literal words of the 
statute. [citing] State ex reI. Lisby v. Lisby, 126 Idaho, 776, 779, 890 P.2d 727, 730 
(1995). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious and rational 
meaning. Id In attempting to discern and implement the intent of the legislature, 
the Court may seek edification from the statute's legislative histOlY and 
contemporaneous context at enaction. [citing] Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. 
Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 416,849 P.2d 83,89 (1993). However, ifstatutory 
language is clear and unambiguous, the Court need merely apply the statute without 
engaging in any statutory construction. [citing] State v. Hagerman Water Right 
Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 732,947 P.2d 400,404 (1997). 
The statutory language of § 1 0-1111 (2) clearly and plainly states that a judgment for child 
support can only be renewed, if at all, prior to the expiration of the lien created in section 10-1110. 
The statutory language of § 1 0-111 0, in turn, clearly and plainly states that the lien it creates is 
valid only for five (5) years after Erik's emancipation, which at the latest was April 20, 2007. 
Therefore, the clear and plain language of these statutes as amended in 2011 allows a renewal of 
6See Ada County Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, 123 Idaho 425, 428, 849 
P.2d 98, 101 (1993) 
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the judgment against Plaintiff only if it occurred prior to April 20, 2007 at the latest. 
Because DHW's Motion was filed more than four (4) after the expiration of the lien, the renewal is 
time-barred and it was reversible error for the Magistrate Judge to rule otherwise.7 
2. The Retroactivity Provisions of § 10-1111 Do Not Create An Ambiguity In the 
Statutory Language and Can Be Harmonized With the Other Provisions of the 
Amendment Without ''Palpable Absurdity" 
DHW argued below that the following language of Idaho Session Laws, 2011, Chapter 104 
(5), pp. 268-269 evidences the Legislature's intent to override and ignore the clear and 
unambiguous statutory language quoted above in an attempt to make all judgments subject to 
renewal, regardless of whether they are barred by the 5-year rule of the lien created by § 10-1111 
and recognized by § 10-1110 or not: 
... this act shall be in full force and effect ... retroactively to July 1, 1995, and 
shall apply to all orders currently being enforced by the ... Department ... such 
that any Idaho judgment for child support that would otherwise have expired since 
July 1, 1995, may be renewed on or before December 30, 2011. 8 
Debra believes DHW's position makes no sense, because it requires the conclusion that the 
amendments in § 10-1110 and § 1 0-1111, which carve out exceptions for child support judgments 
ah'eady expired, are meaningless. It is clear from the above language that "this act," [whatever that 
act is], "shall apply to all orders currently being enforced [by DHW]." "This act" obviously refers 
7Also pertinent to this issue is the Legislature's 2011 amendment to §5-245, Idaho Code, 
which provides in pertinent part that [aJn action or proceeding to collect child support arrearages, 
arising under an Idaho child support order, can be commenced at any time prior to the expiration 
of the resulting judgment or any renewal thereof. .. , [emphasis added], demonstrating that 
regardless of all other factors, the Legislature recognized that some judgments for arrearages in 
child support payments were unenforceable, regardless of the 2011 amendments. 
8DHW Reply Briefin Support of Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment 
dated February 15, 2012, p. 3. 
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to the 2011 amendments discussed above, and included in and integral to those amendments is the 
provision in § 10-1111 (2) that forbids the renewal of a judgment for child support unless the order 
renewing the judgment occurs "prior to the expiration of the lien created in section 10-1110, Idaho 
code, or any renewal thereof .... " [§ 10-1111 (2) ] In other words, the retroactive language of the 
amendments makes "the act" applicable to "any" judgment for child support "that would otherwise 
have expired since July 1, 1995" [as long as the lien created by § 10-1110 and applied bv § 1 0-1111 
has not vet expiredl. 
Furthennore, Section 5 of the Session Laws states that the amendments are applicable to 
"any" judgment for child support - not "all" judgments for child support. If the Legislature had 
intended to make the Amendment applicable to "all" judgments for child support without 
exception, it could easily have so stated, but did not. Reading the provisions of §5-245, § 10-1110, 
§ 10-1111 (2), and Section (5) of the Session Laws to gether and hannonizing them with each other 
makes it clear that Section 5 makes the Amendments applicable only to Idaho child support 
judgments where the lien created by § 10-1110 is still in effect, and not otherwise.9 
It is certainly not "palpably absurd" as discussed in the Rhode case above to conclude that 
the 2011 Legislature intended to limit the retroactive application of the Amendment to 
circumstances where the lien created by §10-1110 and applied by §10-1111 has not yet expired. 
Indeed, part of the Amendment itself in § 10-1111 (2) was to include the "prior to the expiration of 
the lien created in section 10-1110" language. Therefore, at most there is a difference in how 
DHW and Debra interpret the statutory language of the Amendments, and it is important to note 
9The statute must be construed as a whole. Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 
III (1983), appeal after remand, III Idaho 897, 728P.2d 1306 (1986); 
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that mere differing interpretations of the statutory language do not establish ambiguity. See, for 
example, Payette River Property Owners Ass'n v. Board, 132 Idaho 551,976 P.2d 477, 483 
(1999). Ambiguity is established, if at all, where "reasonable minds rnight differ or be uncertain 
as to its meaning." Payette River at 483 [citing] Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 856, 891 
P.2d 801, 801 (Ct.App.1995). The operative statutory language of the Amendments quoted above 
is so clear and unambiguous that reasonable minds cannot differ or be uncertain about its meaning. 
But there is yet another reason to conclude that the Amendments can and should be 
harmonized as Debra asserts was the Legislature's intent. Aside £i.-om the actual language of the 
Amendments, which is clear and unambiguous, such a conclusion makes a great deal of sense, 
because it avoids to a great extent, ifnot entirely, the issue of "vested rights," i.e., the argument 
that once a statute of limitation has ban-ed a claim, a vested right to assert the bar as a defense 
arises, and the claim cannot thereafter be retroactively resurrected and pursued against the person 
in whom the right is vested. Plaintiff believes that the running of the statute of limitations on or 
before April 20, 2007 created in her the vested right to assert the bar as a defense, and that the 
2011 Legislature recognized such vested right in its statutory scheme. However, even if the Court 
disagrees that the 2011 Legislature intended to recognize her vested rights, Plaintiff believes and 
asserts that the Amendment cannot take away those rights as a matter oflaw, as discussed in the 
following section of Plaintiff's argument. 
14 
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B. NOTWITHSTANDING THE 2011 AMENDMENTS TO §§ 5-245, 10-1110 AND 
10-1111, PLAINTIFF HAD A VESTED RIGHT IN THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS DEFENSE EXISTING PRIOR TO THE 2011 AMENDMENTS 
WHICH CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY BY SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION AS 
A MATTER OF LAW 
The theory espoused by DHW is that the Amendments authorize DHW to "renew any 
Idaho child suppOli judgment cunently being enforced1o by the Department, which otherwise could 
be deemed to have expired since July 1, 1995." [DHW Motion, p. 2] Plaintiff does not believe that 
was the intent of the 2011 Legislature. As the discussion in Section A above shows, the clear and 
unambiguous language of the Amendments reflects otherwise. However, in the event the Court 
disagrees with Debra's position, Debra asserts that the applicable statute oflirnitations baned 
actions both to renew the original judgment and all actions to enforce the same on April 20, 2007 
at the latest, and any attempt by the Legislature to resurrect the judgment must fail as an 
unauthorized extension of its legislative authority. 
Thus, the issue before this Court is therefore whether a child SUppOli order which had 
previously expired pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations in effect at the time of its 
expiration may be resurrected by an amendment, applied after the fact of expiration, purporting to 
extend that statute of limitations retroactively. As is discussed in more detail in the following 
arguments, once a child support order has expired under the then-applicable statute oflimitations, 
a vested right to assert the bar of the statute of limitations arises, and any subsequent attempt to 
revive or resunect it must fail as a matter oflaw. 
IOThere is no known reason, either legal or otherwise, why the "current enforcement" 
language refened to DHW would or should have any effect whatsoever on the issue of 
retroactivity or why such a provision would or should determine whether a statute of limitation 
expired or not. 
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Roark v. Crabtree, Utah, 893 P. 2d 1058 (1995), although not an Idaho case, is a case on 
point and offers a thoughtful discussion of the pertinent issues which Debra hopes this Court will 
find persuasive. Furthermore, the Roark opinion espouses the majority rule,!! which Debra hopes 
this Court will follow. 
In Roark a female plaintiff filed a civil action for damages against a man arising out of 
alleged sexual assaults against her while she was a teenager and under the age of 18. Under Utah 
law, all claims arising from such alleged abuse were tolled until she was 18 years old. Thereafter, 
tort claims for assault and battery had to be brought within one (1) year and claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress within four (4) years, i.e., December 1, 1980, or be time-barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations. No lawsuit was filed prior to December 1,1980. 
Some twelve (12) years later, in 1992, the Utah Legislature passed §78-12-25.1, Utah 
Code, a statute entitled "Civil Actions for Sexual Abuse of a Child" (the "Sexual Abuse 
Amendment"). Pursuant to the Sexual Abuse Amendment, a person was allowed to file a civil 
action "for intentional or negligent sexual abuse suffered as a child within four years after 
discovery of the sexual abuse." [emphasis added] Roark at 1060. Roark in 1993 filed her civil 
action on the basis of the Sexual Abuse Amendment and the allegation that she only recently 
discovered the connection between the sexual abuse suffered as a child and her current (i.e., 1993) 
extreme mental and emotional distress. 
The trial court dismissed Roark's complaint on Crabtree's motion to dismiss on the basis 
that "Roark's claims were time barred under the pre-1992 statutes of limitations and that section 
78-12-25.1 could not be applied retroactively to revive those claims." Roark at 1060. 
!IRoark at 1063. 
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Plaintiff recognizes that in the Roark case the Utah Legislature had not opted for 
retroactive application of the Amendment, whereas in the case before this Comi the Idaho 
Ie gislature has specifically manifested its intention that § § 11-1110, 11-1111 and 5-254 be applied 
retroactively. However, that fact is of little, if any, consequence to this case. The mle of decision 
in Roark is based entirely upon whether the defense of statute oflirnitations is a vested right and 
not upon legislative intent. Indeed, the only reason legislative intent was even discussed in Roark 
in the first place was because it was raised by Roark as a reason to apply the Sexual Abuse 
Amendment retroactively, even though not mandated by the Utah legislature. 
The Roark Court specifically defined the issue it was deciding as: 
whether the defense of statute of limitations is a vested right. Phrased differently, 
can a claim which was barred under the then-applicable statute of limitations be 
revived by a subsequent extension of the limitation period?" Roark at 1062. 
The Roark Court answered the question in the negative, following the majority mle and 
citing a number of authorities therefor: Davis & McMillan v. Industrial Accident Comm 'n, 198 
Cal. 631, 246 P.1046, 1048 (1926); Corbett v. General Eng'g & Mach. Co., 160 Fla. 879, 37 
So.2d 161, 162 (1948); Spitcaufsky v. Hatten, 365 Mo. 94, 182 S.W.2d 86,104 (1944), overruled 
on other grounds, Director of Dept' of Revenue v. Parcels of Land Encumbered with Delinquent 
Tax Liens, 555 S.W.2d 293,297 (Mo. 1977); Waldrop v. Hodges, 230 N.C. 370, 53 S.E.2d 263, 
265 (1949); Dunham v. Davis, 229 S.c. 29, 91 S.E.2d 716,718-19 (1956); and the following 
citation from 51 Al11.Jur.2d limitation of actions §44 (1970): 
"[T]he great preponderance of authority favors the view that one who has become 
released from a demand by the operation of the statute of limitations is protected 
against its revival by a change in the limitation law." Accordingly, "after a cause of 
action has become barred by the statute of limitations the defendant has a vested 
right to rely on that statute as a defense . .. which cannot be taken away by 
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legislation ... or by affirmative act such as lengthening of the limitation period." 
[emphasis by italics maintained in citation; emphasis by underling added] 
Although the undersigned has yet to find an Idaho case directly on point, there are a 
number ofIdaho cases which recognize the existence and sacrosanct nature of vested rights and 
strongly suggest the same result as the Roark case cited above. For example, in the case of In the 
matter a/Hidden Springs Trout Ranch, Inc. v. Allred, 102 Idaho 623, 636 P.2d 745 (1981) an 
applicant for a water appropriation permit claimed he was negatively affected by an amendment to 
the Idaho Code while his application was pending. Hidden Springs, pp. 745-746. Although the 
Hidden Springs court ultimately determined that the applicant in that case had no vested right that 
was affected by the subsequent legislation, it is its discussion of vested rights themselves which is 
critical for purposes of this case. First, the Hidden Springs court recognized the importance of 
"vested rights," meaning "already existing rights." Hidden Springs at 746. Secondly, it held at 
747 that because the applicant's right was not such a right, it was "not therefore a right rising to 
any vested level which would preclude application of the amended [statute]." [emphasis by 
underlining added] Needless to say, if the right in question in the Hidden Springs case had been 
vested, the amended statute would not and could not have been applied to negate it. 
In Engen v. James, 92 Idaho 690, 448 P.2d 977 (1969), the Idaho Supreme Court, in 
construing whether a retired policeman's vested pension rights could be negatively affected by an 
act passed by the Legislature after his retirement, observed at 980 that "if respondent [the retired 
policemen] had acquired pension rights under [the statute in place at his retirement], those existing 




In Olsen v. J A. Freeman Co., Idaho, 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990) the Idaho 
Supreme Court reviewed the trial court's summary decision that Olsen's cause of action was 
barred by Idaho's products liability statute of repose. Olsen at 1287. In concluding that the 
statute of repose was a legitimate exercise of the Legislature's authority, the Olsen Comt cited 
with approval the case of Rosenberg v. Town of Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972) 
for the proposition that the Legislature has the power "to abolish rights that have not yet vested," 
[emphasis added] as reflected in the Rosenberg Court's ruling [293 A.2d at 667] that "[t ]he 
Legislature is entirely at liberty to create new rights or abolish old ones as long as no vested right 
is disturbed. Olsen at 1298. [emphasis added]. 
In Ben Lomond, Inc.v. City of Idaho Falls, 448 P.2d 209, Idaho, (1986) the Court at 214-
215 recognized that "prevailing zoning ordinances" gave the applicant ofa building or use permit a 
vested right at the time of filing for the pennit, and the city's belated attempt to change the 
applicable zoning ordinance was ineffectual. [citing] State ex rei. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 
Wash.2d 294,275 P.2d 899 (1954) 
The case of State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 796 P.2d 121 (1990) is likewise instructive. 
Although 0 'Neill is a criminal case, the 0 'Neill Court identified and discussed the existence and 
importance of a vested right in a statute of limitations, which parallels the issue in this case. In so 
doing, the Idaho Supreme Court cited with approval the following pertinent language from 
Washington Supreme Court case State v. Hodgson, 108 Wash.2d 662, 740 P.2d 848 (1967) cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 938, 108 S.Ct. 1117,99 L.Ed.2d 277 (1988): 
... statutes of lilnitation are matters of legislative grace; they are a surrendering by 
the sovereign of its right to prosecute. Since they are measures of public policy 
only, and subject to the will ofthe Legislature as such, they may be changed or 
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repealed in any case where the right to a dismissal has not been absolutely acquired 
by the completion of the running of the statutory period of limitation. 
This is not to say that a prosecution once barTed by the running ofthe applicable 
statute of limitation can be revived by the Legislature. It cannot be. The classic 
explanation is that of Judge Learned Hand: Certainly it is one thing to revive a 
prosecution already dead, and another to give it a longer lease of life .... 
Accordingly, "[u]ntil the statute has run it is a mere regulation of the remedy ... 
subject to legislative control. Afterwards it is a defense, not of grace. but of right, 
not contingent, but absolute and vested, ... not to be taken away by legislative 
enactment." ... [emphasis by underlining added; quoted material retained] 
The COlmnon thread among the cases cited above is the recognition of the existence, 
validity, and importance of vested rights and the fact that once possessed, such rights cannot be 
taken away by subsequent legislation. In this case Plaintiff had the "vested or already existing 
right" to assert the statute of limitations defense to an action by Defendant to renew the child 
support judgment against her. That right accrue' not later than April 20, 2007. At the same 
f 
moment, any right to renew the judgment on the part of Defendant or the State ofIdaho on his 
behalf died and remained dead until 20 11, when the State attempted to renew the judgment, 
alleging that the 2011 Idaho Legislature had decreed that the right 0 f renewal had been 
resulTected. Plaintiff respectfully disagrees and urges the Court to adopt the rulings discussed 
above. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
An integral part of the statutory scheme promulgated by the 2011 Idaho legislature is the 
provision in § 10-1111 that in order for the statute to apply retroactively, it must be renewed "prior 
to the expiration ofthe lien created in section 10-1110 .... " In this case, since the lien created in 
§ 1 0-111 0 expired, at the latest, on April 20, 2007, it is now impossible to renew the judgment and, 
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of course, impossible to apply the amendments retroactively. 
Regardless of the 2011 amendments, the Magistrate Judge's ruling must be overturned 
because it is legally impossible for the Legislature to retroactively abolish a vested right. Plaintiffs 
right to assert the statute oflimitations defense is such a right, and the Motion must therefore fail 
on that basis alone. 
-rv 
DATED this 1 day of December, 2012. 
ikJJ~/ 
Richard L. Harris, Attorney for Plaintiff 
ADDENDA 
A. Final Order on Motion for Renewed Judgment (Order Appealed From). 
B. Idaho Session Lawa, Chapter 104, pp. 267-269. 
C. Transcript of Motion Hearing, February 17,2012. 
D. Transcript of Motion to Reconsider, May 24, 2012. 
E. Notice of Appeal. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed via US Mail, fIrst-class postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy ofthe foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL FROM ~ 
MAGISTRATE'S COURT (with Addenda attached) to the following on this L day of 
December, 2012: 
M. Scott Keim, ISB No. 5879 
Deputy Attorney General 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
450 W State Street, loth Floor 
PO Box 83720 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF CANYON 
DEBRA A. PETERSON, CASE NO.: CV-1985-0006810-C 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FINAL ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
RENEWED JUDGMENT 
MYRON G. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
This matter came before this Court for hearing on a series of motions filed by the 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Health and Welfare, Child Support Services, being 
represented by its counsel of record Deputy Attorney General MICHAEL SCOTT KEIM; as 
well as Plaintiff DEBRA A. PETERSON being represented by her counsel of record Richard. 
L. Harris; with the Honorable Judge Dayo Onanubosi presiding. Defendant Myron G. Peterson 
declined to appear. 
FINAL ORDER ON MOTION FOR RENEWED JUDGMENT-Page I 
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The Court initially heard and considered the evidence and arguments presented by the 
parties in open court on February 17, 2012, whereupon the Court issued its decision in open 
court to DENY Plaintiff DEBRA A. PETERSON's Motion to Dismiss and in the Alternative 
for Summary Judgment and to GRANT the STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Health and 
Welfare, Child Support Services' Motionfor Renewed Child Support Judgment. 
I 
Thereafter, on March 1, 2012 Plaintiff DEBRA A. PETERSON filed a Motion for 
I 
Reconsideration, seeking to have this Court reev~luate the law and arguments relating to the 
issuance of a Renewed Child Support Judgment against Ms. Peterson. This matter was once 
again argued and presented to the Court on Plaintiff's Motionfor Reconsideration on May 24, 
2012 and the Court then once again made its findings and rulings on the record to DENY 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. 
Following issuance of its final ruling on May 24, 2012 the Court requested counsel for 
the STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Health and Welfare, Child Support Services prepare an 
order memorializing the Court's Decisions. 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING, SUBJCT TO THE FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS PLACED ON THE RECORD AND ANNOUNCED IN OPEN COURT ON 
FEBRUARY 17, 2012 AND MAY 24, 2012 AND GOOD CAUSE APPEARING 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED; 
1) The STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Health and Welfare, Child Support 
Services' Motion for Renewed Child Support Judgment, is hereby GRANTED 
and Judgment should issue against Plaintiff DEBRA A. PETERSON in the 
amount of seven thousand one hundred twenty-five dollars and one cent 
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($7,125.01) for past due child support in accordance with Idaho Code 10-1111 
as amended; 
2) Plaintiff DEBRA A. PETERSON's Motion to Dismiss and in the Alternative for 
Summary Judgment is DENIED; 
3) Plaintiff DEBRA A. PETERSON's Motionfor Reconsideration is DENIED. 
I 
DATED This Cjihday Of __ ~_--"'~d--l?\-,,-}-+/_' __ , 2012. 
l 
Magistrate Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify thatI am the duly elected and qualified Clerk of the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, and that on this __ 
day of JUL 1 0 2012 ,2012, I sent a copy of me foregoing FINAL ORDER ON 
MOTION FOR RENEWED JUDGMENT to the following individual(s) via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid: 
RICHARD L. HARRIS 
Attorney at Law 
P.O Box 1328 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
. M:-ScottKeim--
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
I 
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',n the process of receiving inununizations as specified by the board; or 
can e " ively demonstrate, through' verification in a form approved by the 
~, 
departmen , 'uni ty gained through prior contraction of the disease. 
Inununizat~' required and the manner and frequency of their adminis-
tration shall be a scribed by the board and shall conform to recognized 
standard medical pract~ ,in the state. The board shall promulgate appro-
priate rules ,for the enforc t of the required inununization program and 
specify reporting requirements ycare facilities, pursuant to the pro-
visions of chapter 52 r title 67 , Ida de. 
(.2) Any minor child whose parent or ian has submitted to officials 
of a l'icensed daycarefacility a certi:Eicate ed by a physician licensed 
by the state board of medicine stating that ical condition of the 
child is such that all or any of the required inununiz . ns would endanger 
the li:Ee or health o:E the child shall be exempt :Eromthe p 
section. Any minor child whose parent or guardian has submi 
statement to officials of the daycare facility stating their obje 
religious or other grounds shall be exempt from the provisions of this 
,tion. 
, , 




RELATING TO CHILD SUPPORT; AMENDING SECTION 5-.245 r IDAHO CODE r TO REVISE 
THE TIME FRAME DURING WHICH AN ACTION OR PROCEEDING TO COLLECT CHILD 
SUPPORT ARREARAGES CAN BE COMMENCED; AMENDING S;ECTION 20-,1110 r IDAHO 
CODE r TO REMOVE A QUALIFICATION AS TO THE JUDGMENT UNDER WHICH A LIEN 
ARISES AND TO REVISE THE TIME FRAME DURING WHICH A 'LIEN ARISING FROM 
THE DELINQUENCY OF ,THE PAYMENT DUE UNDER A RECORDED CHILD SUPPORT 
JUDGMENT CONTINUES i AMENDING SECTION 10-1111, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE 
FOR THE RENEWAL OF A CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT AND THE DURATION OF THE LIEN 
ESTABLISHED THEREBY i PROVIDING SEVERABILITY; DECLARING AN EMERGENCY 
AND PROVIDING RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1 . That Section 5-245, Idaho Code , be, and the same is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
5-245. ACTIONS TO COLLECT CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES. An action or 
proceeding to collect child support arrearages ~, arising under an Idaho 
child support order, can be commenced _iithin :five (5) year£; after the child 
reaches the age of majority or Hithin five (5) years after the child's death, 
if death oceurs before the child reaches majority at any time prior to the 
expiration of the resulting judgment or any renewal thereof . An action or 
proceeding under this section shall' include, but is not limi ted to, execu-
tion on the judgment, order to show cause, garnishment, income withholding, 
income tax offset or lottery prize offset. 
SECTION 2. That Section 10-1110, Idaho Code, be, and the same ~s hereby 
amended to 'read as follows: 
10-1110. FILING TRANSCRIPT OF JUDGMENTS -- LIEN ACQUIRED. A tran-
script or abstract of any judgment or decree of any court of this state or 
any court of the united states the enforcement of which has not been stayed 
as provided by law, if rendered within this state, certified by the clerk 
0001:10 
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having custody thereof, may be recorded with the recorder of any county 
of this state, who shall immediately record and docket the same as by law 
provided, and from the time of such recording ,and not before, the judgment 
so recorded becomes a lien upon all real property of the judgment debtor in 
the county, not exempt from execution, owned by him at the time or .acquired 
afterwards at any time prior to the expiration of the lien; provided that 
where a transcript or abstract is recorded of any judgment or decree of di-
vorce or separate maintenance making provision for installment or periodic 
payment of sums for maintenance of children or alimony or allowance for 
wife's support, such judgment or decree shall be a lien only in an amount for 
payments 'so provided, delinquent or not made when due. 'The lien resulting 
from recording of a judgment other than for support of a child continues five 
(5) years from the date of the judgment, unless the judgment be previously 
satisfied,orunless the enforcement of the judgment be stayed upon an appeal 
as provided by law. A l'ien arising from the delinquency of a payment due 
under a recorded judgment for support of a child after July 1, 1995, issued 
by an Idaho court continues mmnty-three (23) until five (5) years from the 
date ef after the death or emancipation of the last child for whom support 
is owed under the judgment unless the underlying judgment be is renewed, is 
'. ·-p:t'ev~0us~y--sat-i-sf-i-ed·or··unless--the-en£orcemen-t·of-the-judgment-be.ci-s--stayed·­
upon an appeal as provided"by law. PrO'.Tided, that no lien for ehildsupport 
shall continue more than fi"'.re (5) years after the child reaches the age of 
majority or five (5) years after the child's death, Hhichever shall fir-s-t 
oceur. If the recorded judgment is for the support of more than one (1) 
child, the lien shall continue until fiv'e (5) years after the youngest child 
reaches the age of majority or five (5) years after the death of the last 
:remaining child, uhichevershall first occur. The transcript or abstract 
above mentioned shall contain the title of the court and cause and number of 
action, names of judgment creditors and debtors, time of entry and amount of 
judgment. 
SECTION 3. That Section 10-1111, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
10-1111. RENEWAL OF JUDGMENT -- LIEN. (1) Unless the judgment has been 
satisfied, at any time prior to the expiration of the lien created by sec-
tion 10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof, the court which entered the 
judgment, other than a judgment for child support, may, upon motion, renew 
such judgment. The renewed judgment may be recorded in the same manner as the 
original judgment, and the lien established thereby shall continue fox five 
(5) years from the date of judgment. 
(2) Unless the judgment has been satisfied,and prior to the expiration 
of the' lien created in section 10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof, 
a court that has entered a judgment for child support maYt upon.motion, renew 
such judgment. The renewed judgment may be enforced in the same manner as the 
original judgment, and the lien established thereby shall continue for ten 
(10) years from the date of the renewed judgment. 
SECTION 4. SEVERABILITY. The provisions of this act are hereby declared 
to be severable and if any provision of this act or the application of such 
provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any reason, 
such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of 
this act. 
SECTION 5. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby 
declared to exist, this act shall be in full force and effect on and after 
its passage and approval, and retroactively to July 1, 2011, and shall apply 
to all orders currently being enforced by the Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare Child Support Program such that any Idaho judgment for child support 
000111. 
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that would otherwise have expired since July 1, 1995, may be renewed on or 
before December 30, 2011. 
Approved March 22, 2011. 
CHAPTER 105 
(S.B. No. 1116) 
AN ACT 
RELATING TO MOTOR VEHICLES; AMENDING SECTION 18-8001, IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE 
THE CO'ORT I S AVTHORI'l'YTO SUSPEND DRIVING PRIVILEGES FOLLOWING AN Il\! 
TIAL AND SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION OF A SPECIFIED OFFENSE. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 18-8001, 
amended to read as follows: 
18-8001. DRIVING WITHOUT PRIVILEGES. (1) Any person w drives or is 
in actual physical control of any motor vehicle upon the hways of this 
state with knowledge or who bas received legal notice pu uant to section 
49-320, Idaho Code,that his driver's license, driving rivileges or per-
mit to drive is revoked, disqualified or suspended in t s state or any other 
jurisdiction is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(.2) A person has knowledge that his license, dr' ingpri vileges or per-
mit to drive is revoked, disqualified or suspende 
(a) He has actual knowledge of the revocati ,disqualification or sus-
pension of his license , driving privileges r permi tto drive; or 
(b) He has received oral or written not' from a verified, authorized 
source, that his license, driving priv' eges or permit to drive was re-
voked, disquali-fied or suspended; or 
(c) Notice of the suspension, disqu, ification or revocation of hisli-
cense, driving privileges or pe to drive was mailed by first class 
mail to his address pursuant to ction 49-320, Idaho Code, as shown in 
the transportation department cords, and he failed to receive the no-
tice or learn of its content as a result of his own unreasonable, in-
tentional or negligent con ct or his failure to keep the transporta-
tion department apprised his mailing address as required by section 
49-320, Idaho Code; or . 
(d) He has knowledge ,or a reasonable person in his situation exer-
cising reasonable d' gence would have knowledge of, the existence of 
;facts or circumsta s which, under Idaho law, might have caused the re-
vocation, disqua ication or suspension of his license, drivingpriv-
ileges or permi 0 drive. 
(3) Any perso ho pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of 
subsection (1) fthe first time:' 
(a) Shall e sentenced to jail for a mandatory minimum period of not 
wo (2) days, and may be sentenced to not more than six (6) 
rovided however, that in the discretion of the sentencing 
he judge may authorize the defendant to be assigned to a work 
e or work detail program wi thin the custody of the county sheriff 
ng the period of incarceration, or, if the underlying suspension 
t resulted in the violation of this section is not a suspension 
esulting from an offense identified in subsection (8) of this section, 
the judge may authorize an equivalent amount of community service in 
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(proceedings begin.) 
COURT: All right. I've got the Peterson v. 
,terson matterl CV9B-5S10C (sic). Mr. Keim Is present and 
you brought somebody with you today. 
MR. KEIM: Yes. It's Braden Lange. He's an Intern 
with the attorney general's,office. 
COURT: Okay. 
MR. KEIM: He'll be at counsel's table. 
COURT: Mr. Kelm representing the deputy attorney ']9
0 1 ,general. Mr., Harris is present. This is t:i legal Issue 
11 that has been briefed by Mr. Harris and also by Mr, Kelm, 





reply by Mr.-Keii1:,1 believe there was a reply brief filed 
a couple of days ago If I remember, February 1$, 
MR" KEIM: That's correct, Your Honor, 
r;:OUR,T: Mr. HarriS, do you have that? 
MR, KARRIS: r have that, 117 
',-1~2"0r l~ dQ8:~~~~:~;~~~:'r-:~~~~;~~~~~;~~t~SQ9glir§~~ 





what I can add In addition to the briefing. The briefing 
J 
Is extensive, I thlnk.it addresses the iSSUe right from 
the very beginning. 
, !4 The legislature In 2011. passed a law that made the 
'j ,~::::--,enForcement of child support retroactive all the way back 
II ' '. 
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1 expired Is a vested right on the part 'of the person to whom 
2 It Is in favor of and cannot be revived by legislative 
3 action Which apparently Is the case here[ that the State is 
.:\. seeking to collect child support eVen after emanCipation, 
5 even after the five years of judgment time of 5-245 has 
6 passed and there was no attempt to renew that judgment, no 
7 action belnQ taken to otherwise enforce that judgment. 
'S The statute of limitation applies and the Statel 
9 even by legislative action purporting to make that 
10 retroactive, cannot make it retroac'tlvc: in Violation of the 
11 due process rights of my clIent because it -. the law is 
12 clear that you 'just CCln't do that; 
13 CQURT: Is that argument one in the same in the 
14 sense that the argument-- the first.argument you made 
15 dealing wIth the statute of limItatIon/arid the second 
1 S' argument·-
11 MR, HARRIS: Well, It's a little different in this 
18 respect, Judge. I would say that the language of the 
-- ~1-9--- ~tatut~-~nacted by-thileglslaturifuslfigth-arpnrase-;"lfa' 
2Q child support judgment 15 currently being enforced by the 
21 bepartment," they can -- they can make it go all the way 
22 back to 2000 -- or excuse me, 1995 ii) making that 
23 retroactiVe .. But in this case I this child support judgment 
24 was not currently being enforced and in fact could not be 
25 enforced without this legislation because the statute of 
6 '[ , 4' ,11 ~l~Sb~IWO~dYY~~in~-a-t---I-n-t-h-at-e-n-a-ct-m-e-n-t~~~-1~-II-m-I-~-t-lo-n-s-fu-r-e-n-fu-r-~-m-I-~-t-D-f-t-h-e-c-h-ild~SU-P-p-o-rt-]-~-d-g-m-e-n-t~~ 
,I J2
3 
which t b~lieve Is Section 10-11111 It illiows the 2 wouId have expired on April 201 2007. 
Department and the Bureau of Child Support to renew any 3 So the language of the statute which I believe is 
, 4 child support judgment and the operatfve language 154 clear and unambiguous would support our assertion that the 
I 5 "cLJrrently being enforced by the Department" which 5 State' c;:;nnot enforce a judgment ag<llnst Mrs. Peterson for '16 otherwise would have been deemed to have expired since July '6 back-dueclli1d support. 
'I 7 ,1, 1995. 7 COURT: Let me follow up on that. So your pOint Is 
8 Iii this particular cass, I believe It'~ section -- .s the reason that the State was able to be able to 
Idaho Code 5-245 basically sets a Ilve-year period after' 9 retroactively 'seek renew;:; I of this support was because of 
emancipation of the chIld in which the child support amount 
can be enforced. That flve-yea(" period expired on ~pril 20 , 
of 2007 and since April 20 of 2007, based upon that statutr . 
of limitations and . that judgment having not been renewed l 
this particular case Was not, quote, currE!ntly being , 
enforced by the Departme~t after this legislation becamd 
effective in 1011. 
And because It was not being currently enForced, 
then the operative language of the statute which is clear 
and unGimbIguous would -- baSically prOVided that since the 
statute had run, the StatE: cannot 90 back and revive II 
jUdgment that has expired. 
NOW, In addition to that .- and that's just on the 
p!'aln language of the statute itself. But in <lddition to 
that, there is -- and we've cited in the brief extensive 
authority to the effect that a statute of limitation onCE) . . ' 
5 
1 a the 2011 statute that was enacted which Is a violation of 
11 your client's due process? 
. ' 
12 MR. HARRIS: That Is correct. That is correct. 
13 And what I'm saying is that by that langu'age of the 
14 statute, they can'tseek to enforce a judgment or renew the 
1.5 judgment for back child support against my client. The 
16 
11 
statute -- the language of the statute itself wowld 
prohibit that. 
1 B But setting aside the statute and only looking CIt 
19 the retroactive part of It which would cEluse It to go back 
20 to 1995 and ·any judgment after 1995 could be enforced, the, 
21 statute orIlmitations having to do with child support 
:22 specirically provides that a child support judgment can be 
23 enforced five years after the date of emancipation of the 
24 person for whom the child support was to be paid, 
25 And we are saying that that five-year statute after 
7 
_)12.417.012 10:01:4~ AM Pllge 4 to 7 of 7.4 4 of 9 sheets 
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emanCipation of the child expired on April 20, ~0071 and 
2 then the legislature passed thiS statute four years later 
3 '-ying to revive or trying to provide a situation when:! the 
4 • .Jdgment that expired on April 20( 2007, can now be ren~wed 
5 again. We're saying that that was a vested right on the 
6 part of my, client. You can't revive an expired statlJte of 
7 limitations after It's expired and that's What the 
,8 legislature attempted to do here. 
S COURT: Dkay. 
10 MR. HARRIS: They can't do that and the law is 
11 clear on that point. ,They can't do' that. 
12 COURT:· Mr. Kelm. 
13 MR.,KEIM: Yes; 
14. COURT: I'm not going to deprive you from making 
15 you~ argument the way you see fit but r'm particularly 
16 Interested In two points. Hopefully these Cwo points will 
17 be included In your argument. If not, then figure out how 
, -18,,-toJncor.po.r.ateJhemJ[U:'9JJL£rg~ment. _______ .:. ,_,_, : __ _ 
19 One, thaton the face of the statute itself the way 
20 It Is written that child support cannot be-- can only be 
:21 enforced only five years afteremanc\potioflClnd the chlld 
22 In question was emandpated or at least the last one on 
'23 April 20; (inaudible), 50 on the face ofthe statute 
.24 Itself, the statute of limitation already came and gone, 
,2,': .50 the 5t;;lte Is precluded .. Zlctually under that law cannot 
(-' 8 
'1 enforce the support. 
2. And then to take It 8 little bit farther, that what 
3 gives the State the ability to then enforce this child 
4 support is this 2011 -- I metln this·· this legislative 
5 enactmE?ntempowered the State to then -- give the State the 
£) ability to enforce thiS co II ec:ti on cf back child support 
7 retroactively.! understOlnd that that part Is a 






due process Issues and things of that nature. 
And so -- So in the midst of your argumentt I would 
.Iike you to do whatever you can to Incorporete those. I'd 
like to be educated as to those two. 
," 
MR. KEIM: Certainly, Your Honar. First aff, and 
14. this was actually the. second !lne on my outline, this is 
15 reall:y not a statute of limitations C[lse because th.e 
16 statute of limitations that was in place back In 2007 Is 
17 the previous version of 5-245 Zlnd what It stated was, "An 
13 action or a proceeding to collect child support arrearages 
19 must be commenced within five years after the child reaches 
'?Q the age of majority," 
1.1 In thiS case, we have the affidavit which Is the 
only eVidence on file, the affidavit of Stephanie West thet 
23 was submitted August 10 which --
2.4 COURT; Of what year? 
25 MR. KEIM: Or20l:\.. 
9 
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1 COURT: Okay. 
2 t-lR. KEIM; Which states, "The Department first 
J began (Ji;tempcs to enforce the support obligntlon Dn January 
4 26, :1-998," and then it goes on to state, "That the 
8 Department of Health & Welfare Child Support -- Bureau of 
6 Child Support has continuously attempted to enforce the 
7 support obligation referenced 'above." 
8 With any statute of limitations, It deals with when 
9 ,you can Initiate an action and once you Initiate that 
10 
11 
action, you can continue it to fruition. 
COURT: So the statute's tolled at that point. Is 
12 that your point? 
13 MR. KE!N: It's not that it's tolled. It's been 
14 met. 
15 COURT: It's been met. Okay. 
16 MR. KEIM; Collection a.ction was instituted prior 
17 CO the running of that statute of IImitati,ons. The Issue 
18 is whether or not the JIJogment -- the legislature had the 
-19'-'jUdgment noftolengtnef)-F'seatlJ t,ne- lim i tatlons-tha t-h ad- -
20 already eXPired; but whether or not the legislature hod the 
21 authority to revIve the judgment because that's the part 
22 that applies to Ms. Peterson. 
23 Her case was being enforced by the Department of 
24 Health & Welfare In Idaho whiCh had interstated it to the 
25 Statu: of Utah where she resides. But the only evidence In 
10 
1 the record Is the affidavit of Ms. West that indicates when 
Z .. enforcement began and then It was continuous up until at 
:3 least August 10 of 2011 when her affidavit Was filed. 
4 The next poJnt is that Ms. Peterson in her brief 
5 talks .8 lot about vested rights and vested rights 
6 triggering a due process analysis. ,'But if you look at 
7 ldaho law dealing with the Issue of vested rights, what 
g that deals with is whether or not a statute can be applied 
9 retr"actlve when there's no specific statement that It 
1 0 applies retroactively. 
11 In this case, we have that specific stat/ilment. We 
12 have the emergency clause whiCh said that It applies 
13 retroactively so that the Dep<!Jrtment can renew (.lny jud9m~nt 
14 which may otherwise be conSidered to hcive expired since 
15 1995,· 
16 And to apply It in the way that Ms. PetersDn Zlrgues 
17 in her brief -- and I'll kind of read the quote that's 
1S there. The retro -- in t~e brier, it state.5 on page 9, 
19 ';The retroactive language of the arnendmentsmakes the act 
·20 applicable to any judgment for chl!d support that would 
21' otherwise have expired since 1995 as long as the lien 
22 created hac;! not expired/, and that'" the part they add In. 
23Elut the fact Is that that could'n't happen. It 
24 couldn't .:. the statute or limitations COUldn't have -- the 
26 judgment couldn't have expired and the lien not have 
11 
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" expired beC6USG th!!:y're the sarne thing. 
:2 So it's not the state that's trying to read an 
3 Iblguity Into the statute. It's MS. Peterson in that 
14 analysis. 
'5 ' The Idaho case law, If you look at the .Gllrden Cltv 
S case, the quote -- and again, this is com'ing straight out 
,7 of Ms. Peterson's brief. "Generally, a statute will not be 
8 applied retroactively in the absence of clear legislative 
j~ 
11 
Intent to that effect." We hBve that legislative Intent. 
It's set forth, In Section 5 of the session law from last 
year: 
'.1 2 But the quote goes on to say, "However, it is also 
3 ,." th~ rule tl:latretroadlveIeglslatiDn Is;~hlythat which , 
'14 affects vested or already existing rights." Well, we know 
15 it's retroactive, Therefore, it's going to affect vested 
i6 rIghts by definition and that comes dlractly out of the 
117 ,City of Garden CitY caSe. 
:;1 B" - '-----And-just·from-thevery"sound-of-it,-however,.IL - "-






helS a vested right to remain In contempt of the order of 
this court.Sile refused to PelY the support that was 
" ordered by this court. and now wants to say, "I ran far 
enough. I ran long enough. I get amnesty, I don't have 
~4 to honor this, court's order. And that I get the right to 
., t--'~folst the expense of raising my child who is now 
! 12 
1 emancipated on my ex-husband and on the State which has to 
pay for those expenses that should have been covered by the 
~ J! child support I should have beef'\ paying all these years." And the last thing Is the analysis of the 
I 
! 5 constitutional limitations on retroactive legislation 
\ 
) i; really goes to criminal cases throughout history an!1 even at the federal level, if a statute has an explicit 
statement of retroactivity and it's in the plain'language 
9 of the statute, that retroactivity Is enforced. It !s 
'I 10 allowed. 
!11 The fact is the legislature chose a specific course 
b of action to revive a'speclflc category of laps~d 
r
b judgments. This motion met the requirements; It was 
'r brought prior to December 301 2011. It would have ; 5 expired --1'16 COURT: December, whClt? 
.17 MR. KEIM: Prior .. the statute -- the 
, :'8 retroactivity prOVision allowed for a window in Which the 
r~9 State could seek to renew these judgments and that was 
'10 through, the end of tile last calendar year. December 30, 
2.011., was the cut-off date. So it was brought within that 
122 time frame. 
J 'j 
\3 The judgment in this case expired, as Mr, Harris 
r;: said, in 2007, So It expired after 1995 which was the other·· one of the o~her c;riterla of the statute and, 
13 
-----~-----
-------------~ - ----------- ------~~ -
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1 finally, as stated In the affidaVit of Ms. West that was on 
Z file August 10 of 2011, the Department began its 
3 enforcemeflt In 1998 and continuously enforced the case. 
4 COURT: Mr. Harrlsl any response? 
5 MR. HARRIS; Judge, I'm not aware of any act that 
6 was done to enforce this child support after the 
1 emancipation of the child Involved, There was nothing done 
g to -- any act that was done to 'enforce collection of child 
.9 support af'i:eremancipatlon. 
10 COURT: So the child was emanclpated In 2000 --
11 MR. HARRIS; No, it was five ye.ars prior to April 
12 20,2006. 
13 MR.KEIM: 2002., 
14 COURT: 2002. 
15 MR. HARRIS: Well, It goes back a long way prior to 
16 2007. 
17 COURt: Let's -- that's What I'm trying to find 
.:1_ ~_ Sll,l.t._ - -- ----- ---- - - ------ - -- - --
19 MR. HARRIS; The time to renew this judgmenffor 
20 past que child support expired April 20,2007. 
21 . COURT: When was the child emancipated? 






























MR. HARRIS: Right. Yeah. 
14 
COURT:ihen the statute of Ilmltation of course 
your argument Is about five year.s after that? 
MR.. HARRIS: Right. 
COURT: 50 that would be April af 2.007. 
MR. HARRIS: Right. 
COURT: okay. 
MR. HARRIS; And It's dear that if you have a 
judgment and the judgment Is going co lapse by virtue In 
this case 5-245, you just simply file an affidaVit co renew 
the judgment. . 
COURT: I understand, 
MR, HARRIS: And that extends it for another 
period. That was nat done. 
COURT: Mr. Kelmrwhat action did the Department 
took between April 2007 -- let me ask you this: The 
question In thI5-- In this form. After 2007, when did the 
Department took the next action? What Is the nex~ action 
the Department took after ioon 
MR. KEIM: Your Honor, that aspect of the affidavit 
Was never challenged so I did not bring any witness to 
testify to that. I could supplement the record if you 
would want. 
I do know that even as recently as last year, there 
was repeated communications wier. the State of utah. The 
State of Utah. who had been enforcing this on behalF of 
15 
Page 12 to 15 or 24 9 sheets 
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1 Idaho indicated that Ms. Peterson had nothed 13 reported 
;2 job In the. last two years so they were unable to do wage 
:: lliection. However, the State of Idaho has had a 
4 statewide !len In place since at least 199B when the case 
5 was first Initiated .. As soon as Ms. ·Peterson went into 
6 arrears on the case, 13 lien with the Secretary of State's 
7 Office was flied. That's separate and cpart from the 
8 judgment lien that arises as a result of lO-lpO. 
.9 I did want to address one Issue that Mr. HarriS 
1 o brought up. 
11 COURT: Before I let you address that, let me make 
i 2. sure that you all understand what I'm trying to zero In, 
13 Okay? zero Into-. Trie chUd ernanclpated in Apr!! 2002 so 
14 the statute In question says that child support can be 
15 enforc.ed only five years after emancipation, So that five 
·15 years of emanCipation 15 Dn or sometime around Aprll 200·7. 
17 Ok,w? 
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1 qoesn't lay forward the speCifics but It indicates that in 
2 paragraph S--
:5 COURT: Give me a second. Let me "' I'm not sure 
4 If 1 haVe that affidavit. 
S MR. KEIM: It's the afFidavit In support of motion 
6 for renewed child support judgment, 
7 . COURT: Okay. Paragraph 8? 
a MR. KElM: If you look at paragraph 8, It says, 
9 "Idaho Department of Health &. welfare, Bureau of Child 
10 Support, has continuously attempted to enforcethe child 
11 support obligation referenced above," and If you look at 
12 paragraph 3, it Indicates ';/hen anempts to enforce the 
'13 obl;lgation were started, 
14 COURT: Okay. 
15 MR, .KEIM: That eVidence was not disputed in the 
is :record. 
17 COURT: Okay. 
s-- --------I-understi'lndthe-State's-argumenUb_atJhl?_~~tlQ.r_'___ __ 18 _______ ~_~ARRIS: Well, alter April 20, 2007, because of 
19 commenced -- the action to collect thIs judgment started 19 that statute ofllmltatrons-FhaFtermffiates tnarjLrtlgrnent;----
way back in 1999 and has been going on ever since. But at 
least we knoVi It's been going on unti/2007, The last 
action! have In front of me was In 2011, Right? So I 
.20 there can't be ~nY enforcement ·actlons taken. The only 
action that can be taken is to renew that judgment. That 21 






wanted to know what action the Stat~ engaged in after 2007, 23 The State Is not entltled 20 year's from now even 
MR, KEIM: Okay. Like I said, 1 do ·not have a 
witness here to testify. Whan can tell you is that 
16 
·1 this -- this case would have been continuously and 
2 repeatedly submitted to the IRS for a tax offset each and 
3 every year. If she had filed Income taxes and had a refund 
4 coming to her, that would have been offset. l~ nad been 
5 sent to the State of Utah collection agency for them to 
6 enforce. They had attempted to locate an employer, ha d not 
7 been able to do so. 
S And when -- the other part of 5-245, when you look 
.sat it, It specifically says, "An ·actlon or proceeding under 
10 this section, whIch Is an actlon to enforce child support 
11 arrears, shaillnclude but is not limited to execution on 
1·2 the judgment[ order to,.show cause, garnishment, income 
13 withnolding, lncome tax offset, lottery prize offset," All 
14 of those offsets had been keyed and If she had filed, if 
15 she had an Income return coming, It would haVE been 
16 intercepted; . 
17 She had been keyed for a passport denial so if she 
18 had applied to obtain a passport, It would have been 
19 denied, Those are all enforcement mechanisms that the 
20 State W;:l:; utilizing from prior to -2007 to now. 
~1 COURT: What evidence do 1 have. of that besides 
,2 - your argument? 
24 without this enabling legislation to enforce a child 
-2.5 support judgment that has expired, that has lapsed, The 
18 
'\ St:ate of Idaho could not -. even Ifthls leglslatiol1were 
·2 not passed by the legislature, they cauldnot enforce any 
.3 child support action at this pOint in time because it's 
4 lapsed. 
5 . COURT: Are yau " let me mal$:e sure I understand 
6 your pOint, that separate and apart from the legislatlon 
'7 that we've been referrln·g to, the fact that after the 
S expiration of the five years emenclpa tion period, the State 
9 is precluded to rene:>'l this judgment. 
10 MR. HARRIS: After April.20 of20a7, they're 
11 precluded because It's lapsed. The. statute of limitation 
12 h<lsrun, 
13 COURT: Okay. And the statl.Jte--
14 MR. HARRIS: But if you follow the argument that is 
15 being made bec6use the State, according to that one little 
16 question in their •• one little phrase In their affidavit 
17 says we've attempted to continuously enforce thiS, it would 
18 mean that they could still enforce this Judgment or chHd 
19 . support order even after ApriL 20, 2007 --
20 COURT: Okay. 
21 MR.. HARRIS: -- without this legislation onon. 
123 MR. KEIM: The evidence that you have of that Is 
22 That's their argument and It falls b!:'cause they can't after 
23 April 20 of 2007 because It's -- the time has run, 
24 the affidavit of the -- the only affidavit on file in the 
25 rec:ord which Is the affidavit of August 10, 2011. It 
17 
7 sheets 
24 COURT: I've got you, Mr. Keirn, the pOint I'rn 
25 trying to get to is this though: You've mllde reference to 
19 
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1 the afRdavit prepared by o'ne of the deputies at the AG's 
2 office. Youlve pointed to paragrl'lph 8 and then you asked 
1<0 to take a look at paragraph 3, If I don'tfind those 
:4 cwo paragraphs convincing enough that [have. a 
5 de.monstratlon in front of me, will you still -- whOle would 
S be your a'rgument then thai, after·- after 2007·- after 





MR,KErM: Your Honor, that is the point of the 
retroactive. nature. of this legislation in this case.. 
COURT: And their point is that's a violation of 
due process, Right? r meanI'mnot suggesting -- I'm not., 
')2 suggesting i agree with him. 
')3 -. .. MR, 'KEIM: Although not speCified in his brief, 
14 chat is incumbent In the nature of the argument! '(our 
~OURT; Okay, 
It WOlS the one and only type of judgment that could 
not be renewed and my belieF and the reason that this 
amendment came about was because of a similar case r.o this 
up north where there was a question of the conflict between 
5-24:1! the statute of limitations! and the judgment Hen 
statute and the Sr.ate had always been of the position that 
you began enforcement and you had continuous enforcement 
because there were ei'lforcemeN mechanisml(outside of the 
judgment lien. Therear.e statewide liens Clnd other 
enforcement mechanisms that are granted in child support 
cases that ilre not grOlnted in ocher types of civil actions, 
And however, upon having an adverse ruling! instea~ 
of saying, "Hey, let's look at fighting tooth and nail," 
the aVenue that was taken was to amend the statute with Fhe 
explicit re~roact!ve provision allowIng for renewal of the 
judgments in this specific class of cases. 
COURT; Well, I suspect -- r strongly have a 
suspicion that regardless of my ruling this afternoon, this 
will no~ be the last time we hear about this issue but I've 
had some time to think about this. 
The issue regarding statute of limitation, the 
I 
RICHARD L HARRIS PAGE 09/10 
1 that, the statute says you're precluded from collection --
2 collecting the judgment because of the statute of 
:3 limitation, 
4 Mr. Harrisl argument Is that the statute of 
5 limitation already applies, The judgment is not being 
6 currently enforced and that is ~he reason that I made the 
'7 comment awhile ago when Mr, HarriS was presenting his 
a argument to me that the question was is this -- is the 
tl statute of limitation argument separate and apart from 
'10 the -- from the retroactivity of the statute. 11m of the 
11 opinion that they're all In one. It's a continuation of 
12 the order. 1 believe the retroactivity at' the statute that 
13 was enacted was enacted for the purposes of addressing that 




So the State iilction to commence the collection of 
11 this judgmGnt begun In 199B, Based on what I have -- I've 
there's a legislative Intent In this C<lse and that 
legislative Intent addressed the Issue of retroactivity 
application of the statute, ! don't find that is a 
Violation of due process In this case. 
Al'ter ail, like I said, regardless of what my 
decision Is, I'm sure this Is not going to be the last timE: 
22 
1 we all hear about this 50 che -- let me.see here, The 
2 plaintiff's motion to dismiSS is hereby denied, Will you 
3 please preparG the order for me? 
<1 MR. KEU-I: Certainly, Your Honor, 
5 COURT: .Mr. Keim. The COUrt Is in recess, 
6 MR, HARRIS: Could! request the Court to make 
7 specific findings and conclusions on this? 














of It and will you ,prepare the order for me? 
(Proceedings conclUded,) 
State action was commenced regarding the collection of this 22 
jUdgment way back In 1996.' That action continu~s, There's 
no question that the. statLlte de.aling with emancipation -~ 
th~ child was emanCipated April 2002, Five years after 
21 
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(Proceedings begin.) 
COURT: This Is a civil matter, Case No. 
'Y1985-6810, Debra Pecerso'n versuS Myron Peterson. Mr. 
.,dm is present on behalf'of. the Department. Mr. Keim 15 a 
deputy attorney general representing the state, And Mr. 
Harris is also present r~presentlng •• representing Mrs. 
Peterson. 
This case was previously before me on -~ the last' 
time this case was before me, I believe that was 
Februi;lry -- let me make sure. February -'-7 on the 
plaintiff's motion -- on the plaintiff's motion for 
_entry -~ the Department's motion for entry of renewal of 
chIld support judgment, Arguments were presented. 
In fact, this case was a ctually briefed. The brief 
'!5 was presented to me before May 17 (sic). On May 17 -- May 
';6 17 was the date set for oral argument,' Mr. Keim presented 
117 argument. Mr. Harris also presented argument, The Court 
, RICHARD L HARRIS PAGE 65/67 
1 and could not under any clrc~mstClnce be currently enForced. 
2' Sa with that said, I would submit It. We did file 
3 a supplemental brief and argument that I thInk supports 
4 that pOSition and I just don't think that a judgment that 
5 has been barred by the statute of limitatIon can be 
6, currently enforced which would Fall within that provision 
7 of the statute and It Is a bar to enforcement In this 
S particular case. 
9 I don't know that in 2000 -- or 1998 when this 
10 child turned -- or 2002 when, this child turned 18 that It' 
1'! waS actually reduced to a judgment. There may have been an 
1.2' amount that was due and payable on that date but! don't 
13 knowthattnat Vias ever reduced to iii judgment. I don:t --
14 I haven't been able to find such a judgment. I would agree 
15 that there probably was a sum certatn that was due but it 
16 was barred when the statute of limitations run In :Z007. 
17 COURT: Okay. Mr. Keim. , 






motion to reconsider on tgday's'dOlte. I also received a 
, , 
brief in opposition to"motlon to reconsider !Tom you, Mr. 
Kelm, This case was set before Judge B,oomer I be!leve that 
\4 was coverIng for me and the parties agreed' that this shal! 






On May 3, there was a supplemental brief sent --
fiJedby Mr. Harris. I've, also reviewed that. 
Mr, Herris, this is your motion. You may proceed. 
MR. HARRIS: Thankyou, Judge. [f It please the 
Court, my motion to reconsider has to do with that language 
that the government Is relying upon toesse.ntially , 
reinstate a judgment or child support that was barred by a 
statute of limitations. And the actual language of that 
statUte that the government Is relying upon Is, "This act 
shall be in full'l'orce and effect retroactive July 1, 1995, 
and shall apply to all Drders currently peing enforced." 
And so that languag@ "cLlirentlybeingenforced" at the time' 
" , 
. that this legislation was passed would app',mintly apply and 
make It retroactivE!. 
What I'm suggesting to the Court Is that the child' 
. in this case turned l8 In 2002. The five-year statute of 
limitations to renew a judgment expired J.n 2007: This 
statute, says that any judgment ~or child support that would 
have expired since July i, 1995, may renew on or before 
December 3D, ZOli. 
And wha~ I'm suggesting to the Court is that the 
lartguage "currently being enForced" would apply to a 
Situation In which th~re was stili an outstanding Olnd valid 
judgment, There Is no valid judgment after 2007 In thiS 
case because le'was barred by the statute of limitations 
5 
21 'Harris has the right to.do that. However, there are a 
22 couple of points I want to make. 
, 23 One, he talks about how the judgment had not been 
24 renewed prior to five years after the child's emanCipation 
25 or. the time frame In whiCh the judgment could be renewed. 
6 
1 The problem was prior to the 20U amendments, Section 
2 lO-l1ll. specifically had aneX'ception to prohibit renewal 
3 'of child support judgments. That was one of the parts Df 
4 last year's amendments that was removed to set forth a 
5 specific provision allowing when child support judgments 
6 could be renewed. 
7 The other thing that Mr., Harris seems to be relying 
a on and his client seems to be relying Dn Is the belief thae 
:9 the. running of' the statute of limitations Institutes a 
10 Vested right and when you look-- there is case law from 
11 the federal level Interpreting the federal Constitution. 
12 eJ.rubyrgb Can cqmoam: vfln::us U.S, .- the c;ltetlon Is 113 
13 Federal 2d 82.1 ., says, "Those statutes confer no vested 
14 rlgl1ts. They are ex gratia to the indiVidual to procect 
15 them from perjury and they benefit the public by 
16 accelerating litigation. There is no unfairness In 
17 retrospectively removing something that was only a shield," 
18 and it goes on to say and this [$ what I Flnd pertinent to 
19 this case. "No man promises to pay money with any view to 
20 being relea,sed from that obllgation by lapse of time, It 
2.1 violates no rights of hiS, thereFore, when the legislature 
22 says time shall be no bar though such was as the law when 
2.3 th~ ~ontract was made." 
. 24 This Isn't a contract case but it's analog ous. You 
25 hElve a court that told Ms. Peterson she had an obligation 
7 
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1 to pay money "nd now she's saying, "l ran far enough and 
Z fast enough ,lnd I hid well enough that they didn't get the 
'i \loney collected In the flve years that used to be allo\'ved. 
4 ... should be able to run away. U It's oily oily In come 
Sfree. It's the hide and seek doctrine, 
S And this Court should look to the fact that the 
7 legislature considered and made a specific finding that It 
S was appropriate to retroactively apply a Window to allow 
9 judgments otherwise considered to have been expired to be 
10 renewed during that time frame. The motion to'renew was 
11 filed during that time framE in this case and It's' 
12 appro'prlate for this COUf.t to renew the judgment. 
13·" COURT: 1 spent·· I have to say to both of you, 
14 thiswas an interesting Issue for me, an Interesting case 
16 for me and l spent quite a bit of time .when this case was 
16 briefed and argued beforeme and I listened to the 
17 arguments very carefully, 
-··1B - . ---:·--ldonltsee-enythingJn.the brJ.e.f'd[Qm_~o.i:h_.!iI9_e,.:;. _ 
"._ .. ' .. '.-
19 that have been presented to me today and the argument that 
20 has been presented to metoday that has not been fully 
21 exhausted when r made my previous ruling. 
22 The issues are the same,'The basis for the motion 
23 to reconsider are the same as before and 1 don't see any 
24 basis for me to depart from my previous ruling. This 
.j>'" _ issue·- If an aspect of the Issue Is the 
8 
unconstitutionality of. the statute, I think that can be 
:2 taken up by the legislature but as far as whether or not 
:', there's a provision by law, by statute that allow for , 
4 retroactivity, I think r previously made the ruling that! 
5 see that provision and that provIsion applies and the 
6 statute of limitation Is not a bar to this claim sothe 
7 moticl'\ to reconsider Is denied. 
8 . The Court is in rt~C~ss, I need to (inaudlble.), 
3 CL.ERK: At! rise, please, 
10 COURT: Mr, Keim, will you please prepare the order 
11 for that? 
1~. MR. KEIM: Yes" 1 wrll, Y~ur Honor. 
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Reconsideration~ntered on or about May 24, 2012, and from that Order -
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2. That Plail}tiff/Appellant has the right to appeal to the District Court from the 
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pursuant to Rule ll(a)(1). 
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to assert on appeal as set forth hereafter;.provided, however, does not prohibit 
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/ 
a. Does· the plain and unanlbig):10US language of 1. C. l 0-111 0 arid 10-
III i (2) as amended by the 2011 legislature permit and allow 
retroactive renewal of an expired judgment in this case. 
-- -E -Do-es-Hlee:ffecCoTan expiredjuaglne-a iii-this-caseact-as-a -bar-tO-
collection efforts when thejudgment lien created by LC. 10-1110 has 
expired by a failure to renew the judgment. 
c. Did Appellant have a vested right in the statute of limitations defense 
existing prior to the 2011 amendments which cannot be taken away by 
subsequent legislation? 
4. There is not an Order sealing any part of the record in this action. 
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8. That service of this Notice has been made required to be served pursuant to 
" 
Rule 20 and to the Office of the Attorney General. 
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I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
This action comes before this Court for judicial review of a decision of the 
magistrate division issued by the Honorable Dayo Onanubosi, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 83. The decision which Appellant Debra A. Peterson (hereinafter "Peterson") is 
challenging was issued by the magistrate court following a motion hearing on the record and 
involved the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "the State"), Bureau of Child 
Support's motion to renew a child support judgment under the 2011 amendments to Idaho Code 
§§ 10-1110 and 10-1111. The Magistrate Court considered Peterson's arguments along with 
those submitted by the State before issuing the Final Order on Motion for Renewed Judgment in 
this matter on July 10, 2012. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
This matter was initiated by the State filing its Motion for Entry of Renewed Child 
Support Judgment (hereinafter "the State's Motion") together with a supporting affidavit on 
August 10,2011. In the State's Motion the State sought to renew judgment for the unpaid 
child support obligations arising under the Magistrate Court's original orders in the total amount 
of seven thousand one hundred twenty-five dollars and one cent ($7,125.01). (Affidavit in 
Support 0/ Motion/or Renewed Child Support Judgment filed August 10,2011.) Thereafter, the 
State filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Renewed Child Support Judgment on 
December 7, 2011. 
Peterson filed her response to the State's Motion on or about December 12, 2011. 
Peterson did not submit any affidavits or other evidence in support of her arguments, or to 
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contest the amount of the renewed judgment being sought in the State's motion. On February 
15,2012 the State filed a Reply Briefin Support of Motion for Renewed Child Support Judgment. 
The magistrate court heard the initial oral argument with regard to this matter on the afternoon of 
February 17, 2012. (Tr. Vol. 1). After hearing from both parties, Judge Onanubosi stated his 
ruling in open court and finding in the State's favor. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 21, 117 through p. 23, 12). 
On March 1, 2012, Peterson filed her Motion for Reconsideration. Again no affidavits or 
other evidence was submitted in support of her arguments. On April 4, 2012, the State submitted 
its Brief in Opposition to Motion to Reconsider, which was followed on May 3, 2012 by a 
Supplemental Argument submitted by Peterson. Judge Onanubosi heard oral argument on the 
Motion for Reconsideration on May 24, 2012 and once again issued his ruling in open court 
reaffirming his decision to renew judgment against Peterson. 
Pursuant to the trial court's request the State prepared the Final Order on Motion for 
Renewed Judgment which was subsequently signed by the trial court on July 10,2012. Peterson 
had previously filed her Notice of Appeal on June 29, 2012. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Erik Peterson was born . (Affidavit in Support of A10tion for Renewed 
Child Support Judgment filed August 10,2011.) Peterson is Erik's mother and was required to 
pay a support judgment as well as ongoing support in the monthly amount of one hundred thirty-
four dollars ($134.00) for his benefit. (Order on Defendant'S Motion to Modify Judgment filed 
January 12, 1998) The total in support due under that order and remaining unpaid by Ms. 
Peterson comes to seven thousand one hundred twenty-five dollars and one cent ($7,125.01). 
(Affidavit in Support of Motionfor Renewed Child Support Judgment filed August 10,2011.) 
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
i. Can Peterson attack the amount of the unpaid support obligation for the first time 
on appeal, and despite the fact that she failed to provide any evidence on the issue to the 
trial court? 
ii. Did Judge Onanubosi correctly apply the retroactivity provision from the 2011 
amendments to Idaho Code §§ 5-245, 10-1110, and 10-1111 when he ruled on the State's 
Motion in this case? 
111. Did Judge Onanubosi correctly find that the retroactivity provision from the 2011 
amendments to Idaho Code §§ 5-245, 10-1110, and 10-1111 is allowable under Idaho 
Code § 73-101 ? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for a District Court hearing an appeal from the Magistrate 
Division is the same that would apply to an appeal from the District Court to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 83(u). 
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to free review. Harrison v. 
Binnion, 147 Idaho 645, 649, 214 P.3d 631, 635 (2009). 'It must begin with the literal words of 
the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute 
must be construed as a whole.'" Grease Spot, Inc. v. Hames, 148 Idaho 582,584,226 P.3d 524, 
526 (2010). 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. 
State v. Dickerson, 142 Idaho 514, 517-18, 129 P.3d 1263, 1266-67 
(Ct.App.2006). The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the 
burden of establishing that the statute is unconstitutional and must overcome a 
strong presumption of validity. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 
131 (2003). 




1. Peterson's allegations that the amount of unpaid support is in dispute should not 
be considered by this Court for the first time on appeal. 
Peterson has stated in a footnote to her Appellant's Brief on Appeal from Magistrate 
Court (hereinafter "Peterson's Brief') that she contests the amount of the child support claimed 
in the State's motion. Although the exact footnote is contained in the Peterson's Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss and in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, the issue was 
never raised at either hearing before the trial court. Furthermore, Peterson proffered no evidence 
whatsoever on this issue in support of such an argument. 
Idaho courts have repeatedly stated and confirmed that they will not consider issues 
presented for the first time on appeal. See Sec. Fin. Fund, LLC v. Thomason, 153 Idaho 343, 
282 P.3d 604,607 (2012), reh'g denied (Aug. 15,2012); Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 
429,196 P.3d 341,347 (2008); Viveros v. State Dept. of Health & Welfare, 126 Idaho 714, 716, 
889 P.2d 1104,1106 (1995); State v. Doe, 123 Idaho 370, 371,848 P.2d 428,429 (1993); Silver 
Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 101 Idaho 226, 611 P.2d 1011 (1979); and Frasier v. 
Carter, 92 Idaho, 79,437 P.2d 32 (1968). 
In addition, Peterson has cited no facts in the record, and has offered no legal authority 
supporting her implied challenge of the calculated support obligation. The Idaho Supreme Court 
has previously held that arguments that are not supported by citations to either facts or authority 
are deemed waived. 
However, we find that the constitutional arguments contained in Wheeler's briefs 
are both incoherent and unsupported by authority. Idaho Appellate Rule 35, which 
governs the content of briefs on appeal, requires that "[t]he argument. .. contain 
the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the 
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reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the 
transcript and record relied upon." LA.R. 35(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, this Court has held that issues on appeal that are not supported by 
propositions of law or authority are deemed waived and will not be considered. 
Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 323, 179 P.3d 276, 286 
(2008). 
Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 266, 207 PJd 988, 997 (2009). 
Peterson's challenge to the amount of the support obligation, which was not adequately 
supported or presented to the trial court, should not be entertained by this Court for the first time 
on appeal. This Court should disregard Peterson's implied challenge to the State's calculation of 
her support unpaid support obligation. 
2. The express intent of the 2011 Idaho Legislature allows the State to renew the 
child support judgment in this matter. 
Renewal of the child support judgment in this matter was appropriate as it is specifically 
allowed by the express retroactivity provisions of 2011 Idaho Session Laws §§ 104 and 331. 
Those two pieces of legislation amended Idaho Code §§ 5-245, 10-1110 & 10-1111 to 
effectively extend the period of time in which unpaid child support obligations could be 
collected. Moreover, the amendments in question were passed with a specific retroactivity 
provision which stated in pertinent part, 
[T]his act shall be in full force and effect on and after its passage and approval, 
and retroactively to July 1, 1995, and shall apply to all orders currently being 
enforced by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Child Support Program 
such that any Idaho judgment for child support that would otherwise have expired 
since July 1, 1995, may be renewed on or before December 30, 2011. 
2011 Idaho Session Laws § 104 as amended by 2011 Idaho Session Laws § 331 (emphasis 
added). The Affidavit in Support of Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment filed 
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in this matter on August 10,2011 set forth a statement of facts meeting all of the retroactivity 
criteria set forth above. 
As an initial matter Idaho Code § 73-101 does generally indicate that, "No part of these 
compiled laws is retroactive," however that section goes on to state, "unless expressly so 
declared." Idaho Code § 73-101. As a result the Idaho legislature has expressed a preference for 
only prospectively applied statutory enactments while still allowing itself the authority to 
expressly provide for retroactive application when it deems appropriate. As the legislation which 
implemented these amendments to Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 10-1111 contained an express 
statement that the amendments were to be applied retroactively under a limited set of 
circumstances, the requirements of Idaho Code § 73-101 were met. 
Peterson has argued that the plain language of the statute mandates that the judgment in 
her case cannot be renewed. However, in making that argument, Peterson ignores the plain and 
clear intent of the retroactivity clause. 
That belief is misplaced and is in direct opposition to the fact that it is the Session Laws 
of the state of Idaho that are the complete and official record of Idaho legislative acts. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has confirmed the importance of the Session Laws when evaluating the 
application and interpretation of legislation. In 2002 when evaluating the importance of the 
"Official Comments" to the provision of the UPC codified in Idaho Code § 28-2-309 the Court 
stated, "The Comments are not authoritative, because they were not contained in the session law 
that adopted Ie. § 28-2-309." Jen-Rath Co., Inc. v. Kit Manufacturing Co., 137 Idaho 330,335, 
48 P.3d 659 (2002) (emphasis added). As such the Supreme Court has made it clear that all 
provisions of enacting session laws are authoritative. 
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The clear language of the enacting session law authorizes the renewal of the judgment 
against Ms. Peterson. A comprehensive review of the 2011 legislation that amended these 
sections reveals the legislature's clearly expressed intent to provide for exactly the nature of 
renewed judgment requested here. As stated above, section 5 of the enacting legislation reads in 
relevant part: 
this act shall be in full force and effect ... retroactively to July 1, 1995, and shall 
apply to all orders currently being enforced by the ... Department. .. such that 
any Idaho judgment for child support that would otherwise have expired since 
July 1, 1995, may be renewed on or before December 30, 2011. 
2011 Idaho Session Laws § 104 as amended by 2011 Idaho Session Laws § 331. This retroactive 
language clearly evinces intent to "revive" certain expired judgments and to allow their renewal. 
Its application is expressly limited to a specific set of judgments "that would otherwise have 
expired" under the relevant law. 
Peterson has argued that the retroactivity clause should not apply to her case because her 
judgment did expire. Peterson's Brief p. 7. If one were to accept that analysis the retroactivity 
clause would have no effect. That analysis also ignores the plain language of the legislation that 
clearly applies to judgments that would have expired since 1995, if not for the specific allowance 
for retroactive renewal. To accept Peterson's argument would render the retroactivity clause of 
no effect whatsoever, and as such utterly superfluous. 
It is well settled that "in determining the ordinary meaning of a statute effect must be 
given to all the words ... , so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." State v. Mercer, 
143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308,309 (2006); Norton v. Dept. ofEmp't, 94 Idaho 924,928,500 
P.2d 825, 829 (1972). If the renewal language of section 5 is to avoid superfluity, it must apply 
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to at least some judgments "otherwise expired" under statute. The group of judgments that 
would be expired, save for the retroactivity clause, includes Ms. Peterson's unpaid child support 
obligation. This is the same conclusion reached by the Honorable John K. Butler in a recent 
decision evaluating this very issue in a recent decision in Gooding County. 
The language indicates that some judgments would usually have expired, but this 
law allows those judgments to be renewed. If the language meant what the 
Appellant argues it does, then the law would be meaningless. The year of 1995 
was more than ten years ago, so any judgment that expired in 1995 would 
certainly be expired by now unless it had been renewed. So, the language 
indicates that those expired judgments, even the ones that expired as early as July 
1, 1995, can be renewed under this law. 
(Veenstra v. Veenstra, Gooding County Case No. CV-1994-21476, Memorandum of Decision on 
Appeal, filed December 11, 2012, p. 11, attached hereto and marked as Addendum "A.") 
Ms. Peterson's support obligation fits well within the class of judgments that the 
legislature intended to allow renewal in enacting the 2011 amendments to Idaho Code §§ 5-245, 
10-1110, and 10-1111 with the attendant retroactivity clause. As such this Court should affirm 
the Magistrate Court's renewal of that unpaid support obligation. 
3. Peterson's claim that her child support obligation could not be renewed due to a 
vested right in a statute of limitations defense is misplaced. 
Ms. Peterson further attempts to defend her position by argumg that the statute 
impermissibly disturbs what she calls a "vested right" to avoid her obligation to pay the accrued 
child support. She defines her vested right in this case as the right to avoid reinstatement of any 




From the outset it should be noted that if section 5 is to have any meaning at all, it must 
permit the reinstatement of at least some child support jUdgments "that would otherwise have 
expired." That is to say that the only permissible interpretation of the provision under Mercer and 
Norton requires a disruption of at least some "vested rights" as defined by Ms. Peterson. Since 
the statute's unambiguous language requires disruption of these so-called "vested rights," Ms. 
Peterson's argument, in order to succeed, must amount to a facial attack on the constitutionality 
of the provision. "It is generally presumed that legislative acts are constitutional, that the state 
legislature has acted within its constitutional powers, and any doubt concerning interpretation of 
a statute is to be resolved in favor of that which will render the statute constitutional." Meisner v. 
Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 258, 260, 954 P.2d 676, 678 (1998) (citing Olsen v. lA. Freeman Co., 
117 Idaho 706, 709, 791 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990». Thus, the burden of overcoming the 
presumption of constitutionality lies with the party challenging the statute, in this case Ms. 
Peterson. ld. Ms. Peterson has failed to carry her burden. 
As this Court is aware, both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Idaho 
Supreme Court have found that retroactive legislation in the context of civil statutes is 
permissible. Ms. Peterson raises no challenge to this general presumption. 
Furthermore, numerous courts, including both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the 
United States Supreme Court, have recognized specific legislative authority exists to revive 
lapsed or expired claims. A fairly lengthy discussion of statutes of limitations and why they are 
subject to legislative change, even retroactively, was set forth by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in 1945, 
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Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather 
than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. They are practical 
and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the 
citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have 
died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost. Order of Railroad Telegraphers 
v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586,88 L.Ed. 788. 
They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate 
between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay. 
They have come into the law not through the judicial process but through 
legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate. Their 
shelter has never been regarded as what now is called a 'fundamental' right or 
what used to be called a 'natural' right of the individual. Be may, of course, have 
the protection of the policy while it exists, but the history of pleas of limitation 
shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively 
large degree of legislative control. 
Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, 65 S. Ct. 1137, 1142,89 L. Ed. 1628 (1945). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had a more succinct discussion in a case dealing 
with student loan debt, while acknowledging Congress' right to revive otherwise expired actions, 
Under BETA, however, Congress provided that actions to collect on defaulted 
student loans were no longer subject to any statute of limitations. See 20 U.S.C. § 
1091a(a). Moreover, Congress made BETA effective as if it were enacted under 
COBRA. See BETA § 3(c), Pub.L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, 125. By doing so, 
Congress not only eliminated COBRA's six-year statute of limitations period, but 
also revived all actions which would have otherwise been time-barred. 
United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir. 1994). Other similar specialized laws 
reviving specific categories of claims have been upheld with regard to a number of different 
scenarios including: mass torts, securities claims, and tax claims. 
Peterson cites Utah case law for the proposition that "vested rights," once settled, may 
not be altered by subsequent changes to statutes of limitations. While it is not clear that the 
present case involves a statute of limitations as such, it is not necessary to reach this question. 
Ms. Peterson misunderstands her own case law. In Roark, the Utah Supreme Court took great 
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pains to "note that [the statute in question] contains no express declaration of retroactivity ... 
[and] that the legislature did not intend the section to apply retroactively." Roark v. Crabtree, 893 
P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1995). The court then engages in analysis of whether the statute might 
apply retroactively, despite the lack of express legislative intent to do so, because the statute was 
"procedural in nature." Id. It is only in this context that the court examines whether or not a 
"vested right" was created. Id. Thus, Roark, and the so-called "majority rule" cases only stand 
for the proposition that "time barred claims [may not be revived] through retroactive application 
of extended statutes of limitations" where those statutes are not expressly made retroactive by the 
legislature. Id. (Emphasis added.) 
The Idaho case law that Ms. Peterson cites is inapplicable for the same reason: each case 
cited deals with the construction of a statute not expressly made retroactive to avoid retroactive 
application. In this case, the Idaho legislature made its express intent for retroactive application 
abundantly clear. Not only does section 5 include the phrase, "this act shall be in full force and 
effect ... retroactively," but the legislature subsequently and specifically amended section 5 to 
take effect "retroactively to July 1, 1995." 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws § 267-69; 2011 Idaho Sess. 
Laws § 968 (emphasis added). Illustrating her confusion over the issue, Ms. Peterson cites in her 
own brief City of Garden City v. City of Boise for the proposition that "it is ... the rule in Idaho 
that retroactive legislation is only that which affects vested or already existing rights." 104 Idaho 
512,515,660 P.2d 1355,1358 (1983). 
In other words, legislation that is not retroactive will not be interpreted to affect "vested 
rights." The cases cited by Ms. Peterson thoroughly examine the principle underlying this rule. 
The legislature understood this rule when constructing its amendments to Idaho Code § § 10-
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1110 and 10-1111. For that reason, the legislature made its intent to apply section 5 retroactively 
express and clear in the language it used. Ms. Peterson, who carries the burden of demonstrating 
that the expressed intent of the legislature falls outside its constitutional authority, has provided 
no argument that this retroactive application is constitutionally impermissible. As a result, the 
statute should be applied and the judgment against Ms. Peterson renewed. 
Finally, as stated above the State disputes the characterization of this case as relating to 
an expired statute of limitations. Prior to the 2011 amendments in question, the relevant statute 
of limitations for bringing an action to collect child support arrearages stated, 
An action or proceeding to collect child support arrearages must be commenced 
within five (5) years after the child reaches the age of majority or within five (5) 
years after the child's death, if death occurs before the child reaches majority. An 
action or proceeding under this section shall include, but is not limited to, 
execution on the judgment, order to show cause, garnishment, income 
withholding, income tax offset or lottery prize offset. 
Idaho Code § 5-245 (emphasis added). Under that version of Idaho Code § 5-245 an action to 
collect upon child support arrearages could be commenced up until the 5 year anniversary of the 
death or majority of the youngest child under the order. However, Peterson's interpretation 
would require that collection activities actually have to have been completed, not commenced by 
the relevant 5 year mark. By the very nature of a statute of limitation, and the current state of 
courts not only in Idaho, but throughout the United States, quite often actions filed within a 
relevant statute oflimitation will not wind their way through the often complex path of the courts 
and be completed by the date the statute runs. As stated in the Affidavit in Support of Alotion for 
Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment the State began its collection efforts well prior to the 
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running of the statute of limitations under Idaho Code § 5-245, but due to Ms. Peterson's 
avoidance of her obligation collections could not be completed. 
4. The Idaho Legislature is not prohibited from reviving an expired judgment through 
the use of Idaho Code § 73-101. 
If anything, this case would present a question of first impression as no appellate decision 
has specifically addressed the issue of whether the allowance for retroactive legislation under 
Idaho Code § 73-101 can be used to revive an otherwise expired judgment. The concept of 
revival or revivification of a lapsed or dormant judgment is not without precedent. Black's Law 
Dictionary defines revival as, "[t]he process of renewing the operative force of a judgment which 
has remained dormant or unexecuted for so long a time that execution cannot be issued upon it 
without new process to reanimate it." Our legislature actually took a very conservative approach 
in this matter and allowed a single window of time in which a certain class of judgments could 
be revived as a remedial measure. The motion to renew the child support judgment in this matter 
was filed within the specific window authorized by 2011 Idaho Session Laws §§ 104 and 331. 
Now that the window has expired, future judgments will need to be renewed prior to their 
expiration date. 
As stated above both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme 
Court, have recognized legislative authority exists to revive lapsed or expired judgments. Idaho 
Code § 73-101 authorizes a revival action in the presence of a specified retroactivity clause. 
Furthermore, there is no affront to due process in allowing for revival of actions as demonstrated 
by the numerous federal cases affirming revival statutes. For these reasons, this Court should 
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affirm the Magistrate's decision to defer to the Idaho Legislature's choice in authorizing revival 
of child support judgments in 2011 Idaho Session Laws §§ 104 and 331. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As set forth above, the Magistrate's Final Order on MRJ was issued in accordance with 
Idaho law and should be affirmed. Peterson failed to contest the amount of the support anearage 
before the Magistrate Court and as such this Court cannot consider that issue for the first time on 
appeal. 
Additionally, Peterson's proposed interpretation of the legislation in question directly 
contradicts its clear and unambiguous language while trying to make the legislation say what it 
was never intended to say in order to obtain her desired result. Peterson has likewise failed to 
meet her burden of establishing any constitutional shortcoming within the legislation. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Peterson has failed to demonstrate any legal error 
committed by the Magistrate Court in issuing the Final Order on Motion for Renewed Judgment. 
This Court should uphold the Magistrate's decision and affirm the Final Order on .Motion for 
Renewed Judgment requiring Ms. Peterson to pay that portion of her child support obligation that 
she has failed and refused to pay to date. 
DATED This ___ Cl_" _ day of February, 2013. 
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON APPEAL 
The briefing in the appeal was completed on November 2, 2012 and neither party has 
requested oral argument and the court hereby determines that oral argument is not necessary and 
the matter was deemed submitted without oral argument. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Albert Pete Veenstra, III appeals a magistrate court's decision renewing a child support 
judgment against him. The State filed its Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment 
on October 17, 2011. The Gooding County Magistrate issued the Renewed Child Support 
Judgment against Veenstra on May 16,2012. 
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The origin?-l child support judgment against Veenstra for the support of Y nez 1. Veenstra 
was entered on July 17, 1991. The child was born on  and turned twenty-three 
years old on September 5, 2010. The State, in filing its Motion, sought to renew the judgment for 
past due child support obligations in the am~unt of$18, 629.84. 
After the State filed its Motion, Veenstra filed an Objection to Motion for Entry of 
Renewed Child Support Judgment, a Motion for Clarification, and an Affidavit on October 24, 
2011. On January 26, 2012, Veenstra filed a Supplemental Objection and Motion to Dismiss. On 
March 23, 2012, he filed a Motion and Affidavit for Entry of Default. The State filed a Reply 
Brief in Support of Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment and a Notice of 
Hearing on April 27, 2012. After the Renewed Child Support Judgment was issued on May 16, 
2012, Veenstra filed his Notice of Appeal on June 25, 2012. The Court has reviewed the 
Appellant's Brief, the Respondent's Brief, and the Reply Brief of the Appellant. 
II. 
STANDARD 
A district court reviewing a trial court's decision on appeal must use the same standard of 
review as used by the Idaho Supreme Court in reviewing a district court's decision on appeal. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 83(u); Roe Family Services v. Doe, 139 Idaho 930, 934, 88 
P.3d 749, 753 (2004). In reviewing decisions from the magistrate court, the district court will not 
weigh the evidence or substitute its view of the facts. Ortiz v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 
113 Idaho 682, 683, 747 P.2d 91, 92 eCt. App. 1987). The district court determines whether there 
is substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether that court's 
conclusions oflaw follow from those facts. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable 
fact-fmder would accept and rely upon. Id. If a district court determines that there is substantial 
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evidence to support the trial court's fmdings of fact and the court's conclusions oflaw follow 
from those facts, a district court will affirm the trial court's decision on appeal. Ortiz v. State, 
Dept. o/Health & Welfare, 113 Idaho 682, 683, 747 P.2d 91,92. 
A district court reviewing a trial cOll:rt's refusal to enter a default judgment must use the 
abuse of discretion standard. Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 38, 720 P.2d 217,221 (Ct. App. 
1986). This standard requires that a trial court make findings of fact that are not clearly 
erroneous, apply the proper law to the facts, make a logical conclusion, and consider the policy 
favoring resolution on the merits and relief in doubtful cases. Dorion v. Keane, 153 Idaho 371, 
283 P.3d 118, 120-21 (Ct. App. 2012). 
A district court reviewing a trial court's interpretation of a statute may freely review the 
trial court's interpretation, and interpretation of a statute is a question of law. Grease Spot, Inc. v. 
Harnes, 148 Idaho 582,584,226 P.3d 524,526 (2010). A district court must begin its review of 
the trial court's interpretation of a statute by first looking at the literal words of the statute. Id. 
Then, the court must give those words their plain and ordinary meaning and must interpret the 
statute as a whole.ld. If the statute is ambiguous, the court may examine the statute's policy, the 
reasonableness of the parties' interpretations, and the language of the statute.ld. 
III. 
ISSUES 
1. Is the Appellant barred from raising the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
on this appeal? Ifnot, does one ofthe defenses bar the renewed judgment action? 
2. Is the Appellant barred from alleging that his due process rights have been violated? If 
not, have his due process rights been violated? 
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3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not granting the Appellant's Motion for Entry of 
Default Judgment? 
4. Did the trial court err in interpreting Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 10-1111 when it issued 
the Renewed Child Support Judgment?· 
5. Do the amendments to Idaho Code §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 violate the Idaho and United 
States constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto legislation? 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
The Appellant argues that this court should "grant to him the rule of lenity as was 
depicted for Pro-Se [sic] litigants" in the Haines v. Kerner case. (Appellant's Br. 3). However, 
no such rule was formulated in that case. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 
594,596,30 L. Ed~ 2d 652 (1972). In that case, apro se petitioner's complaint was dismissed by 
a district court, and he appealed this dismissal arguing that the court erred in not allowing him to 
present evidence. Id. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was allowed to offer proof and 
present evidence, and in holding this the court acknowledged that it holds pro se pleadings to 
less stringent standards than attorney-drafted pleadings. Id. The State argues that Idaho has never 
given leniency to pro se litigants. (Respondent's Br. 3). It cites Michalk v. lVfichalk in arguing 
that pro se litigants are not given special treatment and are required to adhere to the procedural 
rules. Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 229, 220 P.3d 580, 585 (2009). The Appellant has 
been given the opportunity to offer proof and present evidence as required by Haines, but he is 
still required to adhere to the procedural rules as required by Michalk. 
1. The Defendant Cannot Raise the Affirmative Defenses of Res Judicata and Collateral 
Estoppel Because They Are Untimely. 
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The Appellant argues that the State's renewed judgment action is barred by either res 
judicata or collateral estoppel. (Appellant's Br. 10). He asserts that the judgment was final on 
July 17, 1991, and since no appeal was made before it expired on September 15, 2010, the 
renewed judgment is barred. Id. 
The Respondent argues that Veenstra is prohibited from raising these defenses for the 
first time on appeal. (Respondent's Br. 4). It notes that he did not assert these defenses in any of 
his fIlings in the magistrate court, and the transcript from the May 16, 2012 hearing does not 
mention these defenses either. Id. In response to this, the Appellant argues that he did in fact 
discuss these defenses at the May 16,2012 hearing, but this discussion is indicated as inaudible 
on the transcript. (Appellant's Reply Br. 4-5). 
Res judicata is claim preclusion, and collateral estoppel is issue preclusion. Hindmarsh v. 
Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Under the principle of res judicata, a valid 
judgment on the merits prohibits any later action between the same parties upon the same claim. 
Id. Under the principle of collateral estoppel, parties are prohibited from re-litigating an issue 
that has already been litigated between the same parties. Rodriguez v. Deptt of Correction, 136 
Idaho 90, 92-93, 29 P.3d 401,403-04 (2001). 
The Appellant should have asserted his affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel when he filed his Objection to Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment or 
his Supplemental Objection and Motion to Dismiss. Instead, he waited until after a magistrate 
court ruled on the State's Motion and he had fIled an appeal to raise these defenses. He argues in 
his Reply Brief that he raised these issues during the May 16,2012 hearing; however, there is no 
mention of res judicata or collateral estoppel in the transcript. See (Mot. Renewed Child SUpp. 
J. Hr'g Tr.) Since these affirmative defenses must be pled before an appeal is made, they are 
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untimely. See Fairchild v. Fairchild, 106 Idaho 147, 152, 676 P.2d 722, 727 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(holding that since a party did not raise the affIrmative defense of laches until the appeal, the 
court could not rule on this defense). The Appellant failed to plead these defenses before he 
appealed to this Court. As such, this Court vvill not consider them regardless that the Appellant is 
a self-represented litigant. 
2. The Defendant's Due Process Claim is Unsupported by Law or Facts. 
The Appellant argues that he was denied due process when the magistrate court denied 
his request for an entry of default against the State. (Appellant's Br. 2). He also argues that he 
has been denied due process "when [Respondents] have tried to relitigate or renew ajudgment 
that has expired." (Appellant's Br. 12). 
The Respondent argues that this Court should dismiss any due process claims because 
this is the fIrst time they have been raised, and the Appellant offers no legal authority or citation 
to facts in the record for his claims. (Respondent's Br. 4-5). The Respondent cites to Wheeler v. 
Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, as standing for the proposition that any issues on appeal that 
are not supported by legal authority will be deemed waived. (Respondent's Br. 5) (citing Hall v. 
Wheeler v.Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 266, 207 P.3d 988,997 (2009). 
The Appellant has offered no legal support for his conclusion that he was denied due 
process. In his Brief he argues that "it is also believed that the action of not granting to the 
AppellantlDefendant the entry of default judgment denied to him Due Process of the Law." 
(Appellant's Br. 2). Additionally, he claims that the Respondent's attempt to renew the judgment 
violated his due process rights. (Appellant's Br. 12). Yet, both of these statements are mere 
conclusions unsupported by facts or law. The Appellant's statement that he has been denied due 
process of the law as guaranteed by the Constitution is insufficient. This is simply a conclusion 
6 - MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON APPEAL 
0001.60 
of law, and it is unsupported by facts. He also indicates under the "Issues Presented" section of 
his Brief that one of the issues is whether the magistrate denied him due process by 
misinterpreting the terms of § § 10-111 0 and 10-1111, but he does not address this specific due 
process issue in his Brief and only argues that the court misinterpreted the statutes. Since none of 
the due process claims are supported by law or facts, the Court will not address these claims, and 
they are dismissed. 
3. The Lower Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion When it Denied the Appellant's Motion 
for Entry of Default. 
The Appellant argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the magistrate court to deny 
him the "amount of damages" he sought in his Motion for Entry of Default Judgment. 
(Appellant's Br. 12). To support this argument, the Appellant claims that the judge should have 
interpreted Idaho Code § 10-1111 from the plain meaning of its words alone as opposed to 
reviewing legislative history. ld. Veenstra asserts that the judge abused his discretion when he 
"went 'out-side' [sic] of the statute when interpreting the said same statute." ld. He claims that 
the statute was unambiguous, so the court should not have considered anything outside of the 
statute's language when attempting to interpret it.ld. 
The Respondent argues that Veenstra failed to provide any legal authority to support his 
claim, so it is waived, and it argues that an entry of default would have been inappropriate 
according to the procedural rules nonetheless. (Respondent's Br. 5-6). Veenstra never filed a 
counterclaim and only filed a supplemental objection requesting that the court dismiss the State's 
claim. (Respondent's Br. 6). Additionally, he failed to file a Notice of Hearing, and no hearing 
ever took place. ld. The Respondent maintains that it never had to respond to Veenstra's request 
in his supplemental objection because Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3) states that the 
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deadline for responding to a motion is based upon the hearing date. LR.C.P. (7)(b)(3); fd. Since 
there was never a hearing date, the State maintains there was never a deadline for it to respond. 
(Respondent's Br. 6). 
The Respondent also argues that Ida.lI0 Rule of Civil Procedure 55, the rule that governs. 
default judgments, did not apply to Veenstra's request because that rule is only applicable if 
Veenstra were requesting affIrmative relief from the Respondent. fd at 7. Furthermore, it states 
that the magistrate court heard argument from both sides, and Veenstra has failed to explain how 
the magistrate court abused its discretion. fd at 7-8. 
The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion when it did not enter default judgment in 
Veenstra's favor. The court did not make fIndings of fact that are clearly erroneous, and it 
applied the correct law to the facts. Furthermore, its conclusion was a logical one. The 
Respondent is correct in noting that the default rules did not even apply here since Veenstra was 
not requesting any affIrmative relief. According to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a)(1), an 
entry of c,iefault is only appropriate against a party whom one is seeking affIrmative relief 
against. See LR.C.P. 55(a)(1) ("[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affIrmative relief is 
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules ... "). Therefore, 
Veenstra was not entitled to a default judgment because he never sought affIrmative relief from 
the State. Veenstra argues that he did seek affIrmative relief when he "asked for the return of all 
money taken from him illegally." (Appellant's Reply Br. 8). Veenstra misinterprets the meaning 
of affirmative relief. AffIrmative relief is "[t]he relief sought by a defendant by raising a 
counterclaim or cross-claim that could have been maintained independently of the plaintiffs 
action." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Veenstra has not raised any counterclaim or 
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cross-claim that could have been maintained independently of the State's Motion for a Renewed 
Child Support Judgment. 
Veenstra's argument that the court abused its discretion in the way it interpreted Idaho 
Code § 10-1111 is discussed in more detail below, and the court did not abuse its discretion by 
reviewing the provisions of the session law that implemented the amendments to Idaho Code § 
1O-11l. 
4. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Interpreting the 2011 Amendments to Idaho Code §§ 
10-1110 and 10-1111 When it Issued the Renewed Child Support JUdgment. 
The Appellant argues that the magistrate court misinterpreted Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 
10-1111 when it renewed the judgment. (Appellant's Br. 4). He asserts that according to Idaho 
Code § 10-1110, the child support judgment against him expiI:ed on Ynez's twenty-third birthday 
which was September 5, 2010. Id. He acknowledges there is an exception to this rule that a 
judgment can in fact continue longer if it is renewed. See id. However, he asserts that the 
judgment was not renewed properly according to Idaho Code § 10-1111. Id. 
He argues that Idaho Code § 10-1111 requires that a court may only renew a judgment if 
the judgment has no~ yet expired. Id. He asserts that the judgment expired on September 5, 2010, 
long before the court renewed the judgment on May 16, 2012. Id. He claims that the State's 
Motion for Renewal of Judgment needed to be served and filed by September 5, 2010, the 
expiration date of the judgment, in order for the court to issue a renewed judgment in accordance 
with Idaho Code § 1 0-1111. Id. 
The Appellant acknowledges the 2011 amendments to the code. Id at 5. However, he 
claims that even the amended statutory language prohibits renewal. Id. Additionally, he contends 
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that the court should not have reviewed the legislative history of those amendments, and in doing 
so it violated the principles of statutory interpretation. Id. 
Additionally, he asserts that the court's interpretation of the legislative history was wrong 
and legislative intent must be determined by the plain meaning of the words of the statute in 
question. Id. He states thCj.t all words of a statute must be given effect. fd at 6. He goes on to 
argue that the State is incorrect in its interpretation of Section 5 of Senate Bill No. 1103 to 
support its argument for a renewed judgment. fd. He interprets the part of that section that reads 
"would otherwise have expired ... " to mean that the section does not apply to the present facts 
because his judgment did in fact expire. Id at 7; 2011 Idaho Session Laws § 104 as amended by 
2011 Idaho Session Laws § 331. He interprets the part of the section that reads "may be renewed 
on or before December 30, 2011" to mean that the order must be entered by this date. 
(Appellant's Br. 7). He argues that since the order was not entered until May 16, 2012, the 
judgment is against the statute. Id. 
The Respondent argues that it is the date of its motion filing, not the date of the order, 
that is important when interpreting Idaho Code § 10-1111. It cites Smith v. Smith to support its 
claim that the Appellant is incorrect in stating that since the judge did not sign the judgment until 
May 16,2012, the 2011 Amendments to Idaho Code § 10-111 do not apply. (Respondent's Br. 
8); Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho 800, 802, 964 P.2d 667, 669 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a 
plaintiff only needs to file a motion for a renewed judgment within the specified time frame). 
The Respondent maintains that it was proper for the court to review the provisions of the 
session law that implemented the amendments to Idaho Code § 10-1111 and cites the Jen-Rath 
Co., Inc. case which implies that session laws are authoritative. (Respondent's Br. 12); see Jen-
Rath Co., Inc., v. Kit Manufacturing Co., 137 Idaho 330, 335, 48 P.3d 659 (2002) (implying that 
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session laws are authoritative in holding that the official comments to I.C. § 28-2-309 were not 
authoritative because those comments were not contained in the session law that adopted I.C. § 
28-2-309). It claims that Section 5 of the session law contains a retroactivity clause which shows 
the legislature's intent to allow courts to renew presently expired child support judgments. Id. 
The magistrate court did not err in interpreting the statutes and issuing the renewed 
judgment. Since the State fIled its Motion of Entry for Renewed Child Support Judgment on 
October 17,2011, before December 30,2011, it filed the Motion in a timely manner. The State is 
correct in its assertion that it is the Motion fIling date that is important, not the date the judgment 
was renewed The Appellant is incorrect in his assertion that the session law is legislative history 
that a court should only consider if a statute is ambiguous. The session law is authoritative here 
and clearly shows that Idaho Code § 10-1111 is to be retroactively applied to the present case 
since the State filed its Motion prior to the December 30,2011 deadline. 
The Appellant misinterprets the language of Section 5 that reads "any Idaho judgment for 
child support that would otherwise have expired since July 1, 1995, may be renewed on or before 
December 30,2011 .... " He argues that this language means that this section does not apply to 
those judgments that have already expired. (Appellant's Br. 7). The Appellant misunderstands 
the use of the word "otherwise." The language indicates that some judgments would usually have 
expired, but this law allows those judgments to be renewed. If the language meant what the 
Appellant argues it does, then the law would be meaningless. The year of 1995 was more than 
ten years ago, so any judgment that expired in 1995 would certainly be expired by now unless it 
had been renewed. So, the language indicates that those expired judgments, even the ones that 
expired as early as July 1, 1995, can be renewed under this law. 
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5. The Amendments to Idaho Code §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 Do Not Violate the United 
States and Idaho Constitutional Prohibitions Against Ex Post Facto Legislation. 
The Appellant argues that the 2011 amendments to Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 10-1111 
violate the Idfu~o and United States constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto legislation. 
(Appellant's Br. 12). The Respondent argues that the constitutional prohibitions against ex post 
facto legislation only apply to criminal laws and is therefore inapplicable to this civil matter. 
(Respondent's Br. 9). 
In Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, the court held that "ex post facto 
prohibition only applies to penal and criminal actions, not to civil actions." Wheeler v. Idaho 
Dept. a/Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 261-62, 207 P.3d 988,992-93 (2009). The court also 
held that there is a two-part test to determine whether a law is penal or civil. Id. First, one must 
determine whether the legislature has designated a preference that the law be considered criminal 
or civil. Id. If the legislature has indicated that the law should be considered civil in nature, a 
court then decides whether the statute is so punitive in its purpose or effect that it should in fact 
be considered penal in nature. Id. In deciding whether a statute is punitive in its effect or 
purpose, clear proof is required. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 
2641,651. Ed. 2d 742 (1980). 
Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 10-1111 are found in Title 10 of the Idaho Code. Title lOis 
entitled "Issues, Trial and Judgment in Civil Actions." Clearly, these statutes are civil in nature. 
Additionally, this Court can find no reason to determine that this statute is so punitive in nature 
that it is a criminal law. Therefore, since these statutes are civil in nature, both the Idaho and 
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United States constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto legislation are inapplicable in this 
case: Furthermore, the amendments are not unconstitutional. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court concludes that there is substantial evidence to 
support the trial court's fmdings of fact, and that court's conclusions of law follow from those 
facts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant the Appellant a default 
judgment against the Respondent, and the court correctly interpreted Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 
10-1111. 
Therefore, the magistrate court's granting of the Renewed Child Support Judgment is 
AFFIRMED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. . f) 
DATED this II day Of\l.eC~012. 
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A. THE UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF 10-1110 AND 10-1111(2) AS 
AMENDED IN 2011, AS A WHOLE OR AS MAY BE CONSTRUED BY THE 
COURT, PRECLUDES THE RENEWAL OF A CHILD SUPPORT 
JUDGMENT WHICH HAS EXPIRED DUE TO THE RUNNING OF THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Debra and Respondent obviously have a difference of opinion on the meaning of 10-1110 
and 10-1111 (2) (collectively the "Statute"). 1 If Debra is correct, the literal words of the Statute, 
construed as a whole and given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings, wi111ead this court to 
the conclusion, without engaging in the process of statutory construction, that the Statute does 
not contemplate the resurrection of a child support judgment that has previously expired due to 
the running of the statute of limitations. Furthermore, the result is the same even if the court 
engages in the process of statutory construction. As the following discussion will establish, 
accepting Respondent's interpretation of the Statute would require this court to completely ignore 
the unambiguous language in 10-1110, which requires any action to renew a judgment be taken 
before the lien created by 10-1111 has expired, along with the equally unambiguous language in 
10-1111 establishing the lien. 
The Statute was included in Debra's Brief, but will be restated here for the Court's 
convenience. Amended Section 10-1111 (2)2 is restated in its entirety as follows, with the 
provision supporting Debra's argument emphasized by underlining: 
lAs Debra has pointed out in her Brief at p. 14, differences of opinion do not mean that a 
statute is ambiguous. 
2 As amended by the 2011 Legislature. 
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Unless the judgment has been satisfied, and prior to the expiration of the lien 
created in section 10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof a court that has 
entered a judgment for child support may, upon motion, renew such jude:ment. 
The renewed judgment may be enforced in the same manner as the original 
judgment, and the lien established thereby shall continue for ten (10) years from 
the date of the renewed judgment. 
Thus, 10-1111 (2) clearly allows a court which has entered a judgment for child support to 
renew the judgment, but only "prior to the expiration of the lien created in section 10-1110 or 
any renewal thereof." It inevitably follows that if the lien created in 10-1110 has expired, then 
this section 10-1111(2) clearly does not authorize the renewal of a child support judgment. 
"The lien" referred to in § 1 0-1111 (2) is found in the following language from § 10-11103, 
with the parts directly relating to Debra's argument again emphasized by underlining 
A transcript or abstract of any judgment or decree of any court of this state ... 
may be recorded with the recorder of any county of this state, who shall 
immediately record and docket the same as by law provided, and from the time of 
such recording, and not before, the judgment so recorded becomes a lien upon all 
real property of the judgment debtor in the county, not exempt from execution, 
owned by him at the time or acquired afterwards at any time prior to the expiration 
of the lien; provided that where a transcript or abstract is recorded of any 
judgment or decree of divorce or separate maintenance making provision for 
installment or periodic payment of sums for maintenance of children ... , such 
judgment or decree shall be a lien only in an amount for payments so provided, 
delinquent or not made when due .... A lien arising from the delinquency of a 
payment due under a judgment for support of a child issued by an Idaho court 
continues until five (5) years after the death or emancipation of the last child for 
whom support is owed under the judgment unless the underlying judgment is 
renewed, .... [emphasis added] 
The lien contemplated by 10-1110 clearly only existed for five (5) years after the 
emancipation of the last child for whom support was owed (which in this case is April 20, 2002) 
and would therefore expire on April 20, 2007 ''unless the underlying judgment is renewed." 
3 As amended by the 2011 Legislature. 
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However, as already discussed above, the underlying judgment cannot be renewed under 
10-1111(2) unless it is renewed prior to the expiration of the lien in 10-1110. In this way, the 
Legislature has expressed its clear intent that no judgment may be renewed unless it is renewed 
prior to the expiration ofthe applicable statute oflimitations or any renewal thereof. 
Respondent argues that notwithstanding the clear and unambiguous language of 10-
1111(2) and 10-1110, 10-1111(5), as amended, completely nullifies Debra's claim. According to 
Respondent, 10-1111 (5) states in relevant part as follows: 
... this act shall be in full force and effect ... retroactively to July 1, 1995, and 
shall apply to all orders currently being enforced by the ... Department ... such 
that any Idaho judgment for child support that would otherwise have expired since 
July 1, 1995, maybe renewed on or before December 30, 2011.4 
When read in isolation from 10-1111 (2) and 10-1110 cited by Debra above, perhaps a 
reader might come to the conclusion Respondent has, although Debra does not concede that 
argument. However, as Respondent has already conceded, the Statute must be construed as a 
whole and not on the basis of one provision or another.5 Notwithstanding that concession, 
Respondent persists in arguing that 10-1111 (5) somehow "overpowers" the other parts of the 
Statute, an argument which is entirely inconsistent with the authorities cited by both Respondent 
and Debra.6 Debra believes that the following discussion will demonstrate that 10-1111(5) was 
never intended to mandate the result urged by Respondent. 
4Respondent's Brief, pp. 5 and 7. 
5Respondent's Brief, p. 3. 
6Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983), appeal after remand, 111 
Idaho 897, 728 P.2d 1306 (1986), cited by Debra in her Brief at page 13 (footnote) and Grease 
Spot, Inc., v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 584, 226 P.3d 524,526 (2010), cited by Respondent on 
page 3 of his Brief 
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First, it is important to note that under the "may be renewed" language of 10-1111 (5), 
renewal of a child support judgment is not mandatory, but is rather discretionary. This suggests 
that it does not necessarily apply to all judgments, whereas Respondent seeks the interpretation 
that it does apply to alljudgments. If the Legislature had intended 10-1111(5) to apply to all 
child support judgments, it would presumably have said so, but did not. It could have included 
some form of mandatory language conceming the renewal of "any judgment for child support that 
would otherwise have expired since July 1,1995, ... " such as "all judgments ... " but did not. 
Respondent asserts that Debra's argument "would render the retroactivity clause of no 
effect whatsoever, and as such utterly superfluous.,,7 Respondent's argument is both inaccurate 
and misleading. Read in conjunction with 10-1111 (2) and 10-1110, as it must be to follow the 
rules of statutory interpretation, subsection (5) allows, but does not require, the court to renew an 
expired judgment. In all events, subsection (5) must be read and harmonized with 10-1111 (2) and 
10-1110, which limit renewal of those judgments for child support which have not yet expired. In 
the overall sense and read as a whole with 10-1110 and 10-1111, subsection (5) appears to be in 
the nature of an enabling statute, which gives the court authority to renew certain judgments 
which "would otherwise have expired," but only if doing so does not run afoul of 10-1111 (2) and 
10-1110. 
As Debra has pointed out in her Brief, the court's obligation is to hannonize the various 
parts of the Statute ifit can do so without "palpable absurdity."s Debra believes the only way to 
7Respondent's Brief, p. 7. 
SSee discussion onpp. 10-14 of Debra's Brief and more particularly State v. Rhode, 988 
P.2d 685, 688 (1999) and Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 299, 715 P.2d 968, 969 (1986) cited at 
page 11 thereof 
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do so is to read subsection (5) of 10-1111 as being applicable to "any' judgment for child support 
"that would otherwise have expired since July 1, 1995" as long as the lien created by §IO-1l10 
and applied by §IO-l1l1 has not yet expired. To read it otherwise would result in the palpable 
absurdity urged on this Court by Respondent's interpretation. 
Even if the Court engages in statutory construction to determine legislative intent behu1d 
the Statute, the result would be the same. Appellant agrees with the ''well settled" tenet of 
statutory construction (cited at page 7 of Respondent's Brief) that "in determining the ordinary 
meaning of a statute effect must be given to all the words ... , so that none will be void, 
superfluous, or redundant." State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308,309 (2006). 
This is consistent with Debra's argument on page 13 of her brief, and is merely another way of 
saying that statutory construction requires that a statute be construed as a whole. 9 Applyrng those 
same principles to construing the Statute, the Statute cannot be hmmonized as urged by 
Respondent. To do so would be to allow Section 5 of 10-1111 to prevail over all other parts of 
the Statute, which is inconsistent with the rules of statutory construction and inconsistent with the 
expressed intent of 10-1110 and 10-1111 (2). 
Also, as Debra has pointed out in her Brief at Page 14, another reason to conclude that the 
Statute should be hannonized as urged by Debra is that it avoids the issue of "vested rights," i.e., 
the argument that once a statute of linlltation has barred a clarn1, a vested right to assert the bar as 
a defense arises, and the claim cannot thereafter be retroactively resurrected and pursued agarnst 
the person in whom the right is vested. As Debra has already pointed out in her Brief, she asserts 
9Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983), appeal afterremand, III 
Idaho 897, 728 P.2d 1306 (1986). 
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that the running of the statute of limitations on or before April 20, 2007 created in her the vested 
right to assert the bar as a defense, and that the 2011 Legislature recognized such vested right in 
its statutory scheme, and justifies Debra's argument of how the court should harmonize the 
Statute. If the court were to conclude that the Statute means what Respondent says it means, that 
conclusion would inevitably result in an irreconcilable conflict between case law and legislative 
intent, and the Statute should be construed, if the court detemlines it should engage in statutory 
construction in the first place, to avoid such a conflict. However, even lithe Court disagrees that 
the 2011 Legislature intended to recognize her vested rights, Debra believes and asserts that the 
Amendments cannot take away those rights as a matter oflaw, as discussed in the following 
section of Debra's argument. 
B. RESPONDENT HAS COMPLETELY FAILED TO CONTROVERT DEBRA'S 
CLAIM THAT THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT TAKE A WAY HER VESTED 
RIGHT IN HER STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE BY SUBSEQUENT 
LEGISLATION 
Although in her Brief Debra cites not less than twelve (12) case authorities to establish 
that Idaho recognizes vested rights, Respondent's Brief has completely ignored all but two (2) of 
them. And in the two decisions Respondent has acknowledged,1O he has completely ignored the 
point ofthe citations made by Debra in the first place. Rather than responding to Debra's 
argument head-on, by analysis and argument, Respondent's strategy on appeal appears to be (1) 
to obfuscate the issue of vested rights by attempting to create a constitutional dispute where none 
exists (since Debra has never raised constitutionality in the first place), and (2) by misleading this 
l°l.e., Roark v. Crabtree, Utah, 893 P.2d 1058 (1995) and Olsen v. J. A. Freeman Co., 
117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990). 
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court with arguments and authorities which are neither controlling nor even applicable in this 
case. 
For instance, Respondent argues (Respondent's Brief, p. 9) that 10-1111(5) is 
meaningless unless it disrupts at least some "vested rights." This assertion is simply untrue. If 
11-1111 (5) is given the interpretation urged by Debra, i. e., that it is linlited to circumstances 
where the applicable statute oflimitations has not yet run, then it is consistent with both 10-1110 
and 10-1111 (2) and is not disruptive of any vested rights. 
Furthermore, Respondent's follow-up argument attempting to inveigle the issue of 
constitutionality into the equation (Respondent's Brief, p. 9) is likewise demonstrative of his 
attempts at obfuscation. Using constitutionality as his stepping-stone, Respondent launches into 
an argument (Respondent's Brief, page 9) which cites a United States Supreme Court case and a 
9th Circuit Case, both of which relate to statutes of limitations, and both of which are based on 
constitutional issues. However, neither of the cases cited by Respondent even mentions the issue 
of vested rights, much less resolves the issue in Respondent's favor. The Chase Securities case l I 
is limited to the question of whether the change in a statute oflimitations - in that case - offended 
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, an issue never raised in this case. Neither is the 
Phillips Case cited by Respondene 2 applicable or authoritative in this context for the same reason 
- it says nothing about vested rights. 
Respondent also cites the District Court of Gooding County case of Veenstra v. Veenstra, 
CV-1994-21476 Memorandum of Decision on Appeal, December 11,2012 ("Veenstra"), as 
I 1 Chase Securities Corp v. Donaldson, et aI., 325 US 304 (1945). 
12United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 1994). 
10 
authoritative. Veenstra is not binding on this court in the first place because it is a district court 
decision. Neither is it authoritative to the issues raised in this appeal for several reasons. First, 
the Veenstra decision does not discuss the issue of vested rights, which apparently was never 
raised by the appellant in Veenstra as Debra has in this case. Second, at least part of the Veenstra 
appeal was based upon whether or not the appellant in that case was entitled to assert res judicata 
and collateral estoppel as defenses, neither of which has been raised by Debra in this case. Third, 
the Veenstra case raised constitutional issues in the form of Due Process violations and ex post 
Jacto legislation, neither of which has been raised by Debra in this case. 
The only possible parallel of Veenstra to this case is the fact that the appellant in Veenstra 
argued that the trial court erred in its interpretation of § § 10-1110 and 10-1111 "when it issued the 
Renewed Child Support Judgment."]3 However, because a reviewing court is not bound by the 
lower comi's interpretation ofa statute, but reviews the statute de novo, any such parallel, 
between Veenstra and the present case is of no consequence to this appeal, presuming arguendo it 
exists in the first place. 
Because Debra urges this comi to adopt the holding in the case of Roark v. Crabtree, 
Utah, 893 P.2d 1058 (1995), Respondent attempts to distinguish Roark by arguing]4 that the 
legislature in that case did not purport to retroactively revive any statutes oflimitation already 
expired, whereas the Idaho legislature in this case had manifested its intent otherwise. However, 
even if the court agrees with Respondent, the Roark case is not distinguishable :liOln the present 
case on that ground. The fact the Utah legislature did not specifically make its later act 
13Veenstra, p. 4. 
14Respondent's Brief, p. 11. 
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retroactive was not material to the Utah Supreme Court's rule of decision relied upon by Debra 
here, which is the discrete issue that the Idaho Legislature lacked the authority to resurrect a 
statute of limitation that had already expired, vesting its possessor with the right to assert an 
affirmative defense to its application. Thus the message of Roark, which is the 1l'.Jljority view, is 
that a legislature has no authority to retroactively extend a statute of limitations which has ah-eady 
expired. Respondent has completely failed to controvert the majority view stated in Roark and to 
even discuss those cases cited by Roark. 15 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In interpreting a statute, prior to any exercise in statutory construction, this court is 
required first to attempt to hannonize all of the statute's salient provisions such that the resulting 
interpretation is not palpably absurd. In this case, the interpretation urged by Debra is not 
palpably absurd, and therefore falls within the Idaho mandates of statutory interpretation. As 
between Respondent's interpretation and hers, Debra believes her interpretation is the only 
interpretation which allows the court to harmonize all pertinent provisions of the various statutory 
provisions, while Respondent's interpretation would require the court to give 10-1111 (5) undue 
emphasis and significance and thereby to ignore 10-1110 and 10-1111 (2). 
Aside from the issue of statutory interpretation, Debra urges this court to adopt the 
majority rule identified in the Roark case, a recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court which is 
cited and discussed in Debra's Brief, which is that it is legally impossible for the Idaho Legislature 
to retroactively abolish a vested right. Debra's right to assert the statute of 
15Debra's Brief, pp. 17-18. 
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limitations defense is such a vested right, and this appeal must therefore prevail on that basis 
alone. 
DATED this ~ day of February, 2013. 
Richard L. Harris, Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed via US Mail, first-class postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S ~?Y BRIEF ON APPEAL FROM 
MAGISTRATE'S COURT to the following on this _V"_/_ day of February, 2013: 
M. Scott Keirn, ISB No. 5879 
Deputy Attorney General 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
450 W State Street, 10th Floor 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DEBRA A. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MYRON G. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
I. Background and Procedural History 
CASE NO. CV1985-6810 
ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE 
THE RENEWED JUDGMENT 
AND ORDER TO REMAND 
Appellant appeals from the magistrate court's decision ordering her to pay the 
unpaid balance on her child support obligation. 
The parties are the parents of Erik Peterson, born . A support 
obligation was entered against Appellant on January 9, 1998, in Canyon County Case 
No. CV85-06810. Erik Peterson emancipated on April 20, 2002. At the time of his 
emancipation, there was $7,125.01 in unpaid support due in the above-cited case. 
In August, 2011, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare sought an Order to 
renew the child support judgment to collect the unpaid balance on the account. The only 
evidence provided in the Record is the Affidavit in Support of the Motion for Entry of 
Renewed Child Support Order, filed by an individual from the Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare. In that Affidavit, the affiant states that enforcement of the 
obligation began on January 26, 1998 and the Bureau of Child Support "has 




continuously attempted to enforce the support obligation referenced above," This issue 
in the case arises because of the 2011 amendments to Idaho Code §§ 5-245, 10-1110 
and 10-1111. Those amendments allowed retroactive application to any child support 
judgments that were being enforced at the time the statutes were amended in 2011. 
The amendment to Idaho Code section 10-1111 allowed renewal of any judgment of 
child support where such judgment would otherwise have expired since July 1, 1995, so 
long as the motion to renew the judgment was filed on or before December 30, 2011. 
The Appellant objected, arguing that the Judgment was more than five years old 
and therefore, the statute of limitations precluded any recovery. Respondent argued 
that recent legislation allowed collection of lapsed, unpaid child support obligations older 
than five years through a retroactively clause. The magistrate court agreed with the 
Respondent and entered a Renewed Judgment. It is from that decision that Appellant 
appeals. 
II. Issues on Appeal 
1. Whether I.C. §1 0-1111 (2) as amended in 2011 is ambiguous, thereby permitting 
the Magistrate Judge to engage in statutory construction and consider the 
statements in the Session Laws; 
2. Whether the language of I.C. §§10-1110 and 10-1111(2) as amended in 2011 
precludes the renewal of a child support judgment against Plaintiff-Appellant 
because such judgment was not renewed prior to the expiration of the lien 
created by I.C. §10-1110. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE THE RENEWED JUDGMENT AND ORDER TO 
REMAND PAGE-2 
000182 
3. Whether Plaintiff-Appellant had a vested right in the statute of limitations defense 
to the renewal of the judgment and whether such right can be abrogated by 
legislation. 
III. Standard of Review 
A district court sitting in its appellate capacity reviews an appeal from the 
magistrate's division based on the record and determines the case in the same manner 
and upon the same standards of appellate review as the Idaho appellate courts. Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 84(u). The findings of the magistrate will be upheld by this 
Court, if they are supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record. Issues of 
law are freely reviewed by this Court. Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 447, 915 
P.2d 6, 9 (1996) (internal citations omitted). Questions of statutory interpretation are 
questions of law. New Phase Investments, LLC v. JaNis, 153 Idaho 207, 209,280 P.3d 
710,71292012). 
IV. Analysis 
The Amount Of The Unpaid Child Support Obligation Is Not Properly Before This Court 
Appellant, in a footnote, disputes the amount of unpaid child support is 
$7,125.01. This issue was not raised before the magistrate. Issues raised for the first 
time on appeal will not be considered, Murray v. Spalding, 141 Idaho 99,101,106 P.3d 
425, 427 (2005), therefore, Appellant has waived any challenge to the amount of 
obligation owing. 
Idaho Code §§1 0-111 0 And 10-111 Are Plain And Unambiguous And Therefore, The 
Court Need Not Engage In Statutory Construction 
Idaho appellate courts have adopted the following approach to statutory 
interpretation: 
ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE THE RENEWED JUDGMENT AND ORDER TO 
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The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the 
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with 
the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read in 
isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document.. .. 
When the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent 
of the legislative body must be given effect, and the Court need not 
consider rules of statutory construction. 
New Phase Investments, LLC v. JaNis, 153 Idaho 207, 280 P.3d 710, 713 (2012) citing 
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011) (quoting Farber v. Idaho 
State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310, 208 P.3d 289, 292 (2009)). "[T]he best guide to 
legislative intent is the words of the statute itself." Matter of Permit No. 36-7200 in Name 
of Idaho Oep't of Parks & Recreation, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992) 
abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 
889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, 
and rational meaning. State v. Sexton-Gwin, 39352, 2013 WL 628000 (Idaho Ct. App. 
Feb. 21, 2013)(citing State v. Bumight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219 (1999) .. 
Idaho Code section 10-1111 provides in pertinent part: 
(2) Unless the judgment has been satisfied, and prior to the expiration of 
the lien created in section 10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof, a 
court that has entered a judgment for child support may, upon motion, 
renew such judgment. The renewed judgment may be enforced in the 
same manner as the original judgment, and the lien established thereby 
shall continue for ten (10) years from the date of the renewed judgment. 
The lien created in section 10-1110 is, in this case, a recorded judgment of child 
support obligation. The recorded judgment operates as "a lien upon all real 
property of the judgment debtor in the county." Further, 
A lien arising from the delinquency of a payment due under a judgment for 
support of a child issued by an Idaho court continues until five (5) years 
after the death or emancipation of the last child for whom support is owed 
under the judgment unless the underlying judgment is renewed, is 
ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE THE RENEWED JUDGMENT AND ORDER TO 
REMAND PAGE-4 
0001.84 
previously satisfied or the enforcement of the judgment is stayed upon an 
appeal as provided by law. 
Idaho Code § 10-1110. There is nothing ambiguous about these statutes that would 
necessitate this Court engage in statutory construction. 
The statutes plainly and clearly set forth the provisions relating to the length of 
time a judgment ordering child support is valid and the process to renew that judgment. 
Based on the clear and unambiguous language of section 10-1110, a civil judgment 
expires unless a party, before that expiration, moves the court to renew the judgment. 
Bach v. Dawson, 152 Idaho 237,239, 268 P.3d 1189, 1191 (Ct. App. 2012). ("In short, a 
civil judgment-whether or not a lien is actually recorded-will last for five years, at 
which time it expires, unless a party, before that expiration, makes a motion to renew 
and such motion is granted by the court. ") Idaho Code section 1 0-1111 simply allows 
any judgment entered pursuant to I.C. §1 0-111 0 to be renewed, so long as the renewal 
occurs prior to the expiration of the lien. In light of the plain and unambiguous nature of 
the statute, there is no reason for this court to look to the legislative history in this case. 
Respondent urges this Court to look to the language of Senate Bill 110, 2001 
Session Laws, Chapter 104, as evidence of the Legislature's clearly expressed intent to 
retroactively extend the time in which child support judgments could be renewed. 
However, because the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no 
ability of this court to look to the language of the Senate bill or any other portion of the 
legislative history.1 
1 Although the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 104 P.3d 969 
(2005), indicated that even where there is no ambiguity in a statute, looking to the 
legislative history is instructive to determine legislative intent, Id., at 973-974, 104 P.3d. 
at 931-932, this court is constrained to follow more recent, and what appears to be a 




The courts limit themselves to reviewing only the language of an unambiguous 
statute even where the results may be "palpably absurd" because the crafting of 
legislation falls to the Legislature, not to the Court. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l 
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,895,265 P.3d 502,508 (2011), citing Herndon v. West, 87 
Idaho, 335, 339, 393 P.2d 35, 37 (1964). Indeed, the Court must follow that law as it is 
written. "If it is socially or economically unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not 
judicial." Id. 
Additionally, nothing in the language of the statutes themselves indicate the 
statutes are to apply retroactively. Gailey v. Jerome Cn ty::. , 113 Idaho 430, 433, 745 
P.2d 1051, 1054 (1987). (holding that a statute did not apply retroactively because "[I]t 
was not "expressly ... declared" in the statute that the amendment was to be 
retroactively applied.") For example, in Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444,915 P.2d 6 
(1996), a biological father challenged the retroactive application of the amendment to 
I.C. § 7-1107 which increased the time in which a paternity action could be filed from 
within nine years of the child's birth to any time prior to the child's reaching the age of 
majority. Id. Therein, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the retroactive application of 
the statute did not violate I.C. § 73-101's prohibition against retroactive application of 
statutes because the statute included the language, "This section shall apply 
more consistent standard: unless the statute is ambiguous, this Court's review is limited 
to the plain language of the statute. This Court is unable to find authority that would 
allow it to read Session Laws in pari materia with unambiguous statutes, but see, Bart 
M. Davis et. aI., Use of Legislative History: Willow Witching for Legislative Intent, 43 
Idaho L. Rev. 585, 593 (2007) ("The legislative intent section of a bill that is passed and 
published in the Idaho session laws has the full force and effect of law. As such, they do 
not fall in the category of legislative history materials over which judges may exercise 
discretion ... ") 
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retroactively ... ," thus evincing the Legislature's clearly expressed intent. Id., at 448, 915 
P.2d at 10. 
In contrast, the plain language of neither I.C. §§ 10-1110 nor 10-1111 contain 
any indication that the Legislature intended the statutes to apply retroactively. The 
amendment to I.C. § 10-1111 simply expanded the types of judgments that could be 
renewed to include orders for child support, where child support orders had not been 
expressly permitted to be renewed under previous versions of the statute. 
In this case, the obligation for Erik Peterson continued until five years after his 
emancipation. His emancipation occurred in 2002 when he turned 18, therefore, the 
1998 judgment continued for five years thereafter, or until 2007. The 1998 judgment 
could have been renewed at any time prior to April 20, 2007; the parties all agree the 
judgment was not renewed within that time frame. Because the judgment was not 
renewed within that time frame in accordance with the plain meaning of I.C. §§ 10-1110 
and 10-1111, the magistrate court erred in granting the State's motion to renew the 
Judgment. 
This Court understands that construing the statute in this manner may be 
inconsistent with the legislative history. However, "the purpose of an unambiguous 
statute is not the concern of the courts when attempting to interpret a statute. This Court 
has stated that when the language of a statute is definite, courts must give effect to that 
meaning whether or not the legislature anticipated the statute's result." Matter of Permit 
No. 36-7200 in Name of Idaho Oep't of Parks & Recreation, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 
P.2d 848, 853 (1992) abrogated by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. etr., 151 
Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011). 
ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE THE RENEWED JUDGMENT AND ORDER TO 
REMAND PAGE-7 
000:187 
Because this Court is reversing the decision of the magistrate court as to this 
issue, it need not address the third issue raised by Appellant. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that the decision of the magistrate court granting the State's motion to file 
the renewed judgment is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for proceedings 
consistent herewith. 
Dated this ~ay of April, 2013. 
~~~ Molly J. H skey 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on \ ~ day of April, 2013, s/he served a true and 
correct copy of the original of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE THE 
RENEWED JUDGMENT AND ORDER TO REMAND on the following individuals in the 
manner described: 
• upon counsel for plaintiff: 
Richard L. Harris 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1023 Arthur St 
PO Box 1438 
Caldwell, 1083606 
• upon counsel for defendant: 
M. Scott Keirn 
Deputy Attorney General 
450 W. State Street, 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
and/or when s/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with 
sufficient postage to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, 
Clerk of the Court 
~l By: ______________________ __ 
Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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M. SCOTT KEIM, ISB NO. 5879 
Deputy Attorney General 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
450 W. State Street, 10th Floor 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 334-5537 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
K KILLEEN, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF CANYON 
DEBRA A. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
MYRON G. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Health 
And Welfare, Child Support Services, 
Intervenor/Appellant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 1 
Case No. CV-1985-0006810-C 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category: L4 
Filing Fee: Exempt 
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TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, DEBRA A. PETERSON, AND HER 
ATTORNEY, RICHARD L. HARRIS, 1023 ARTHUR, CALDWELL, IDAHO 83606, AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, 
Child Support Services (hereinafter, "Child Support Services"), appeals against the above named 
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order on Motion to File the Renewed Judgment 
and Order to Remand, entered by the District Court sitting in its appellate capacity in the above 
entitled action on the 19th day of April 2013, Honorable Judge Molly 1. Huskey presiding. 
2. Child Support Services has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
order described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(2), LA.R. 
This is NOT and expedited appeal pursuant to Rule 12.2, LA.R. 
3. At this time the issues on appeal which Child Support Services anticipates it will 
assert include but are not necessarily limited to the following: 
a) All provisions of a bill passed by the legislature carry the force and effect 
of law whether or not those provisions are later codified in the Idaho Code or are 
only published in the Idaho Session Laws. 
b) The retroactivity provision of the 2011 legislation amending Idaho Code 
§§ 5-245, 10-1110, and 10-1111, was part and parcel of the enacting bills, as 
evidenced by its publication in the Idaho Session Laws. 
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c) The District Court erred in its finding that the retroactivity provision was 
merely legislative history which was not material to the interpretation and 
application of the 2011 amendments. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record in this matter. 
5. No additional reporter's transcript is requested. The record at the District Court 
already includes two transcripts of hearings from the Magistrate Court which will be utilized. 
The Magistrate Court transcripts already contained within the record are for hearings held 
February 17,2012, and May 24,2012. 
6. Child Support Services requests the following documents to be included in the 
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R. 
a) Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment, filed August 10, 
2011. 
b) Affidavit in Support of Motion for Renewed Child Support Judgment, 
filed August 10,2011. 
c) Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support 
Judgment, filed December 7, 2011. 
d) Motion to Dismiss and in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, filed 
December 12, 2011. 
e) Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed December 12,2011. 
f) Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support 
Judgment, filed February 15,2012. 
g) Motion to Reconsider, filed March 1, 2012. 
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h) Brief in Opposition to Motion to Reconsider, filed April 4, 2012. 
i) Supplemental Argument, filed May 3, 2012. 
j) Notice of Appeal (to District Court), filed June 29,2012. 
k) Final Order on Motion for Renewed Judgment, filed July 10,2012. 
1) Transcript of February 17, 2012 Motion Hearing, filed November 15, 
2012. 
m) Transcript of May 24, 2012 Motion to Reconsider, filed November 15, 
2012. 
n) Appellant's Brief on Appeal from Magistrate's Court, filed December 10, 
2012. 
0) Respondent's Brief, filed February 11, 2013. 
p) Appellant's Reply Brief on Appeal from Magistrate's Court, filed 
February 25,2013. 
q) Order on Motion to File the Renewed Judgment and Order to Remand, 
filed April 19,2013. 
7. I certify: 
a) No fee for the preparation of a report's transcript is required as Child 
Support Services has not requested the preparation of any additional reporter's 
transcript. 
b) Child Support Services is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the clerk's record pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3212. 
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c) Child Support Service's is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-2301. 
d) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20, LA.R. 
DATED This _-,,{-,-CL--_day of May, 2013. 
OFFICE OF THE ATTOR.r..JEY GENERAL 
4x1~1:~ 
'MSCOTT KEIM ' 
Deputy Attorney General 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 5 
0001.94 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _(---,6><--_ day of May, 2013 I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the following individua1(s) as 
indicated below: 
Richard L. Harris U.S. Mail --
Attorney at Law __ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1438 -L Hand Delivery 
1023 Arthur Fax --
Caldwell, ID 83606 Email --
Myron G. Peterson -K- U.S. Mail 
33747 Apple Valley Rd. __ . Overnight Mail I 
Parma,ID 83660 __ Hand Delivery 
Fax --
Email 
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Richard 1. Harris 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 1438 
1023 Arthur 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
Phone: (208) 459-1588 
Fax: (208) 459-1300 
ISB No. 1387 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LED A.M. ____ -'P·.M. 
MAY 24 2013 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DEBRA A. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MYRON G. PETERSON, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Health 
And Welfare, Child Support Services, 
Intervenor/Appellant. 
CASE NO. CV-1985-0006810-C 





TO: THE ABOVE NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENTS MYRON G. PETERSON AND THE 
STATE OF IDAHO AND THEIR ATTORNEYS LAWRENCE G. WASDEN Ai\JD S. KAY 
CHRISTENSEN THROUGH M. SCOTT KEIM, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
CONTRACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION, 450 W. STATE STREET, lOth 
FLOOR, PO BOX 83720, BOISE, ID 83720-0036. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named cross-appellant Debra A. Peterson appeals against the above 
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named cross-respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from that certain Order on Motion to File 
the Renewed Judgment and Order to Remand Entered by the District acting as an appellate court 
in the above styled and numbered cause on the 19th day of April, 2013, the Honorable Judge 
Molly 1. Huskey presiding (the "District Court Order"). 
2. Cross-appellant Debra A. Peterson has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and the judgment or order described in paragraph 1 is an appealable order under 
and pursuant to Rule II(a)(l), II(a)(2), and/or II(g), 1. A. R. 
3. Presently, cross-appellant Debra A. Peterson intends to assert on cross-appeal, in 
addition to resisting the appeal of cross-respondents, that she had a vested right in the defense of 
the statute oflimitations which expired on April 20, 2007, 5 years after the child of the parties 
reached the age of 18 and became emancipated (the "Vested Rights Issue"). The Vested Rights 
Issue was raised by cross-appellant in the District Court, but because the District Court ruled in 
cross-appellant's favor on the statutory construction issue, the District Court did not rule on the 
Vested Right Issue, which cross-appellant believes would also have resulted in a ruling in cross-
appellant's favor, had the District Court considered it. In all events, cross-appellant seeks to 
preserve the Vested Rights issue for determination by the Supreme Court or, at the pleasure of 
the Supreme Court, to remand the Vested Rights Issue to the District Court for its ruling, in the 
event the Supreme Court does not affirm the District Court order. 
4. No additional reporter's transcript is requested. 
5. Cross-appellant states that she requests no documents be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 1. A. R. and those designated by 
appellants in their initial notice of appeal. 
6. Cross-appellant states that she requests no documents, charts, or pictures offered 
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or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court in addition to those requested 
in the original notice of appeal. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That the service of this notice of cross-appeal and any request for additional 
transcript upon the reporter is not necessary in that no additional transcript has been requested. 
(b) That there is no estimated fee for preparation ofthe reporter's transcript or for any 
additional documents in the cross-appeal. 
(c) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, 
1. A. R. 
DATED this '2-t day of May, 20l3. 
Richard L. Harris, Attorney for Cross-
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be served via US Mail, first-class postage prepaid, 
ai7te and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL to the following on this 
day of May, 20l3: 
M. Scott Keirn 
Deputy Attorney General 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
450 W. State Street, 10th Floor 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
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MYRON G. PETERSON, 
Defendant -Cross Respondent, 
And 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 






















Case No. CV-198S-06810*C 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following 
are being sent as exhibits as requested in the Notice of Appeal: 
2 Transcripts of Hearings, filed on November 15,2012 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this --"--=-_ day of June, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
III the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 




MYRON G. PETERSON, 
Defendant-Cross Respondent, 
And 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 






















Case No. CV-1g8S-06810*C 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction as, and is a true, correct Record of the pleadings and documents as requested 
in the Notice of Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ---'~ __ day of June, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
000200 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 





















MYRON G. PETERSON, 
Defendant-Cross Respondent, 
And 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 




Supreme Court No. 41017-2013 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United States's mail, postage prepaid, one copy of 
the Clerk's Record to the attorney of record to each party as follows: 
M. Scott Keirn, Deputy Attorney General, POBox 83720, 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
Richard L. Harris, POBox 1438, Caldwell, ID 83606 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this --""~_ day of June, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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